MINORITY GOVERNMENT TURKISH COALITION STILL SURVIVES ALL OPPOSITION

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33675, 26 October 1974, Page 16

MINORITY GOVERNMENT TURKISH COALITION STILL SURVIVES ALL OPPOSITION

(By

RALPH JOSEPH)

TEHERAN. October 2. Shortly after forming his coalition with the National Salvation ’arty in January, the Prime Minister (Mr Bulent Ecent o nave remarked that if the coalition survived a short time, it ouli probably survive a long time. Political observers weu no. so . u Modesty probably prevented Mr Ecevit from saying that ]f he survned u short time in office, he would probably survive a long time.

But Turkey’s opposition parties, who are mostly | Right-wing and plainly' frightened by the growing popularity of the Republican People's ' Party leader, are doing all they’can to ensure, that he does not .survive for: longer than they can help it.i Right now they cannot help it, because although together they have a sufficient number’ of parliamentary seats to form a coalition, they are too hopelessly divided among themselves to get one going. The former President, Mr Ceial Bay ar — recently, released from prison where: he had been since the mili-l tary coup of 1960 — has; been atetmpting to form a! Right-wing united front, but' the chief of the Justice Party, Mr Suleyman Demirel, has shunned the idea of any front not headed by himself. More shrewdly, perhaps, Mr Demirel is aware that the formation of a front of this sort would arouse the hostility of Kemalist nrmv officers, and would tn-

vite military intervention inis Turkish politics once again, [t I The hostility of the, J [ Democratic Party towards, i i Mr Demirel arisas from its jc ■ belief that his Justice Party j I [has usurped the position of 11 I Turkey’s major Right-wing Ic I party, since it is made up? 'mainly of former Democrats.'i ! After the release of Mr; IBayar, there was a move to}; !merge the two parties once); 'again under the leadership,; iof the former Democratic}! 'Party chief, now 81 years a | old. ’ Tins Mr Demirel was} | [unwilling to do — for thei ( 'same reasons that he is now I. fighting shy of joining a) Right-wing united front. I ( Limited sympathy i Mr Ecevit, meanwhile, has been steadily winning the, sympathy of the Democrats, mainly by playing an im- , portant role in securing the ! release of Mr Bayar. This, of [ course, was simply part of ' Mr Ecevit’s overall struggle 1 to secure more political free- } dom within the country, inP opposition to army officers,! [during periods of direct ori, } backstage military rule. ! But the Democratic Party j ! sympathy towards Mr Ecevit; [is limited, as the party 1 showed quite clearly a few; [days ago when it turned; down an offer from him for’ a coalition government. Also it is reported to have opposed elections in Decem- ■ ber. The Democratic Party is > said to favour elections by > next spring or in October ■ next year. ’ There does, seem to be a r general desire among , the ; political parties for elections 1 long before the scheduled 1 date of October, 1977, but for tactical reasons opinion is divided about the timing ’ of the fresh polls. ; When Mr Ecevit formed ’ his coalition with the Nat--1 ional Salvation Party last . January, after a three-month j period of coaxing and J friendly overtures, he appears to have hoped it 5 would ride the inevitable I stormy parliamentary . weather right through to > 1977. By May, however, Mr j Demirel had succeeded in " weakening the coalition by reportedly causing 20 National Salvation Party members to vote against certain key clauses in Mr Ecevit’s amnesty bill, by which the 1 Prime Minister hoped to free i a large number of political ! prisoners not convicted for r | crimes of violence. .1 Eventually Mr Ecevit had ,31 his way, when the Con-

stitutional Court restored the desired clauses in the amnesty law. But the 20 renegades had acted in defiance of their party chief. Mr Necmettin Erbakan, and the Prime Minister felt the coalition was not going to work. He almost resigned immediately. Had he done so, and allowed Turkey to go to the polls then, he would probably have lost heavily because he had been forced to take a number of unpopular steps immediately after coming to power. Chief 1 among these was his action 'to raise the prices of almost [everything produced by the nationalised industries — a move caused by general inflation. However, Mr Erbakan made apologetic overtures, and Mr Ecevit decided to stay, to give the National Salvation Party “another chance.” The Budget was passed without much ado, and the coalition survived another attempt by the 'Opposition to cause a Nat‘ional Salvation Party split 'by demanding the resignation of the Minister of Education (Mr Mustafa Ustunidag) in June. I Liberties bill ' The R.P.P. Liberties Bill considers the education portfolio an important one in implementing its long-term plans to spread Kemal Ataturk’s reformist ideas among the rural masses, and Mr Ustundag had been issuing directives that were thoroughly distasteful to the National Salvation Party and the Opposition. Mr Ustundag however survived a vote of no confidence. Another crucial test for the coalition was considered due in November when Mr Ecevit was to have put up his Democratic Liberties Bill, aimed at ridding the Constitution of clauses infringing on the individual Turk’s freedoms of expression and association. But before that could 1 come Mr Ecevit’s own popu- ' larity took a sudden up--1 swing after his action, in ' Cyprus, which contrasted ' sharply with that of another ' R.P.P. Prime Minister who 1 headed a coalition government a decade ago — Gen- ‘ eral Ismet Inonu. The Grand ! Old Man has held a position ' second only to Kemal Ata- ' turk in Turkey’s 50-year republican history. By acting 'las positively as he did in J Cyprus, Mr Ecevit seemed to I prove that he, not General [inonu, deserved the title of' [Turkey’s “second Ataturk.” [ Like Ataturk, Mr Ecevit. could hardly be accused of I political naivete. Rather than wait for November for a blow at the National Salvation Party, his actions in s September were clearly J aimed at forcing the crisis ias early as possible, to . enable him to dump a cumy bersome coalition partner. This obviously would force 5 fresh elections, when he a would be able to strengthen . his party in Parliament and i emerge with an absolute majority and a stable govt eminent. But political observers ,1 cannot see him succeeding II in dragging voters to the s polling booths in December, e m the middle of the severe e Turkish winter. The earliest ” an election can be expected s would be about spring or early next summer, when _ the opposition parties would probably hope some of his e new-found popularity would e have begun to wear. Until n then, Mr Ecevit may try to >- ride it out with a minority government.