POWER: KISSINGER STYLE

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33609, 10 August 1974, Page 10

POWER: KISSINGER STYLE

Kissinger: The Uses of Power. By D. Landau. Robson Books. 278 pp. Bibliography and Index. (Reviewed by S.W.M.) “You and I are going to end this war,” Richard Nixon said to Henry Kissinger at a White House gathering of the National Security Council staff sometime after Nixon had assumed the Presidency in January, 1969. The war was of course, in Vietnam and the surrounding countries. It is at once staggering and curious that the war has to be specified; they claim a number of endings since then, the latest being in Cyprus — a claim that the British have been at pains to say did not hurt British feelings. Much water was to flow under the remnants of boobed bridges throughout South-East Asia before there was an end — and when it came it was something less than an end. But there was a withdrawal of American forces, and there was a Nobel Peace Prize,

which were kinds of ends. The “light at the end of the tunnel” (Lyndon Johnson's beloved phrase) may be harder on eyes which are not American, but it did make Kissinger glow. Since then Kissinger has become almost a mythical figure. He seemed, almost single-handedly, to achieve a rapprochment with China, to make advances in negotiations over nuclear arms with the Russians, to sort out the problems of the Middle East countries for them, and to settle the Cyprus war with a few telephone calls. Kissinger was the academic who could cut through all the diplomatic rubbish, the trouble-shooter par excellence. He avoided the mire of Watergate and is the Nixon Administration’s greatest — perhaps its last — claim to respectability. When feeling against the Vietnam war ran highest, Kissinger appeared as the moderating influence on Nixon. It was — and still is — a pleasant myth, but the myth has to be understood for what it is. Nothing can

detract from Kissinger’s ability to reconcile differences, to propose formulas acceptable to both sides. Nothing can detract from the fact that world leaders find him acceptable or likeable and are prepared to work with him. Nothing can detract from the fact that he has been successful in settling disputes and saving the lives of hundreds if not thousands in wars. But these very considerable attributes and accomplishments have to be seen against the prolongation of the war in Vietnam and the over-all design towards which Kissinger is working. David Landau’s book does several things very' well indeed. It demythologises Kissinger, not sensationally, but effectively. It gives the basic assumptions of Kissinger’s thinking. And it demonstrates how Kissinger and Nixon have worked together so well. Kissinger was not an academic who suddenly entered politics and diplomacy and beat the professionals at their own game. Before he became special adviser on foreign affairs to Nixon he had been an adviser to Johnson and to Kennedy. He had known the disappointments of being edged out of positions in bureaucratic infighting. He had longed for more power. He came to the Nixon Administration highly motivated, and with a coherent world view. It was a view in which 19th century thinking played a great part. According to Mr Landau, Kissinger likes the Metternich view of the world best. Independence of policy, such as that shown by Willy Brandt of West Germany, irritated Kissinger mainly because it interfered with the trading Kissinger saw as an essential element of

the relations among Great Powers. The Uni tea States liked to offer the Soviet Union something in one area of the world in return for something else. Independent policies upset this, arrangement and were to be discouraged. In Nixon, Kissinger found someone he could work with. His main difference is one of outlook. Nixon remains a committed and strong anti-Communjst; Kissinger would have a world which was nonideological, including antiCommunism. Kissinger also found in Nixon someone whose moves would be acceptable to the Right, which Kissinger, a Jew who saw the beginnings of Nazi Germany, feared greatly. Mr Landau’s book falls into none of the usual categories. It is a political biography, but the apC roach is analytical, not istorical. The analysis is not content with describing Kissinger’s role in policymaking, but also considering where he was right and where he was wrong. In part it is polemical. It is as if one has been let in on debates at a high level in American policy-making in which Kissinger has played a part: the missile debate, the China moves, and Vietnam, always that spectre of Vietnam that haunts the American conscience.

It is hardly a surprising feeling when Mr Landau’s sources are considered. He conducted about 100 interviews with people who had known Kissinger at Harvard and had been associated with him in his role first as Fresidential adviser and more recently as Secretary of State. Most of the officials wanted to remain anonymous. Mr Landau also obtained copies of off-the-record briefings which Kissinger gave to reporters. The ground rules of these briefings prohibit the identification of the source. Mr Landau says that he did not obtain the copies through the White House and, therefore, feel; under no obligation to keep the source secret.

Besides this secret information, Mr Landau has interpreted Kissinger’s thinking from his published work. Kissinger declined to be interviewed. From all these sources, Mr Landau has built up a rounded, credible picture of Kissinger, who may be counted among the most powerful figures in the world today. It is necessarily a speculative picture, but its accuracy may be tested against the observation of American foreign policy. As such the book provides useful clues to the direction in which the United States, — and to some extent the world — is heading.