DIEGO GARCIA BASE U.S. MOVE TO INDIA \ OCEAN COULD START A NAVAL RACE

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33453, 7 February 1974, Page 12

DIEGO GARCIA BASE U.S. MOVE TO INDIA \ OCEAN COULD START A NAVAL RACE

By VICTOR ZORZ.Ai Although the reopening of the Suez Uanal i.- expected only later this year, it has already given a start to a naval race between the Super Powers which may eclipse, in cost and intensity, all the arms races of earlier years. It does not have io happen — but it i< acquiring a mad momentum of its own. as the nuclear missile race once did. If it is no’ halted now. before it really gets going, the opportunit\ t<> arrest it wii not recur for a good many years.

'lhe crucial lap of the natal race begins on the •small island of Diego Garcia, barely a speck on the map of the Indian Ocean, which Britain is willing to make available for a United States base in an area previously luntenanled by the super- | powers. The Pentagon wants ■the base because the Soviet Navy will now be able to use Suez to increase its presence in the area. Soviet ships will now have to spend much less time at sea on their way to the Indian Ocean, a 2200-mile journey from the Black Sea. instead of 9000 miles from Vladivoslock in the Far East. Some spokesmen for the United States naval lobbysay that this would enable the Russians to quadruple the number of ships on station. without actually assigning more ships to the area, but other experts dispute this claim. To match the Russians, the United States would have to increase its own strength. The Diego Garcia base, the navy argues, would provide support facilities for both ships and aircraft which would make it less necessary to bring other vessels from far off, leaving them free for other tasks, and would make the whole operation far less costly. The argument may make good naval sense, but it leaves out of account the, politics of the arms race, i The Soviet naval lobby was pressing the Kremlin last! .year for permission to increase its own strength tn I the Indian Ocean, as was; evident from the cries of ! alarm its spokesmen were

e uttering in the press about eUnited States intentions, i, I But Washington publicly p signalled Moscow that its inhj tentions were entirely honore able. si 1 1 “Modest” facility s ! “We do not plan a regular ( presence in the Indian 0 1Ocean,” said Under Secre- t s |tary of State (Mr U. Alexis/ J Johnson) or to “engage in ” j competition” with the Soviet a Union. The Defence Depart- j n ment. in turn, also insisted v . that it was building only a , -j “modest” communications . .(facility on Diego Garcia Administration officials let , it be known that they did ( e not want to do anything!(that would push the Soviet . yUnion into a naval race ini, ythe area, and the Kremlin! ■fallowed itself to be taken in! ’•by this, or so it would now;, ? I seem to Moscow. One Mos-' ’|cow journal associated with I the Soviet anti-arms lobby | Aeven suggested at the time jthat, although United States i yhawks were trying to extend ' Mt he superpower con-; jfrontation to the Indian ’(Ocean, they would probably: 1 fail to achieve their object-. j Jive. |j ■ The hawks had been talk-1 1 [ling, it said, about Russia’s‘ c “(“grand design" against theq ’ i West based on control of ( the Indian Ocean, but the t »l State Department, it argued, 1 1 tl“sees no such threat.” t “lUnited States strategists did f j . I have far-reaching plans for; > othe area, it said, by nowa- !£ : I days such plans “are by no j ■ means always carried out’ ] t( because they were impeded ( sjby detente. It concluded that t the struggle be- < ji tween United States hawks ■

and doves over the Indiai Ocean buildup was not vet over, the "realists” were doing better than the - null tarists." The publication of this ' article in Moscow, coupled with the unprovocative So viet conduct in the Indtar Ocean, suggested, as did the signs in Washington at tht time, that both powers were leaning over backwards t< (contain the natal race in tht area. All this changed durinc the October war. when both navies sent in powerful rem forcements and Washington announced that it would henceforth maintain an in- ; creased and “regular ' pres •ence in the Indian Ocean Then came Dr Kissinger's successful peace effort in Ithe Middle East, with its i promise of the reopening of the Suez Canal. which ! strengthened Washington's (resolve to go back on its implied promise to the (Kremlin to to keep the naw lon a leash in the Indian Ocean. Delicate balance But why should the build- ; ing of naval support facilities on Diego Garcia, which (the Pentagon says can be done for a paltry SUS2Om I be viewed in such cataclysmic terms? Because, Ito begin with, it would destroy the delicate balance be (tween the naval lobby and its opponents in the Krem lin. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are now embarked on major naval construction and mod ernisation programmes but the political leaders in both countries have so far con ceded much less than the naval lobbies are demanding. In the United States, the navy’s inordinately costly ambitions are a matter of public record. In the Soviet Union, they are to be found between the lines of articles and speeches by naval lead ers. They do not ask publicly for money. But their description of the navy? tasks leaves little doubt (that, if these are to be fulfilled, far more money will I have to be found than the Kremlin can now be seen to be spending. In both countries, the naval lobbies have been (using the Indian Ocean, because of its proximity to the Persian Gulf oil routes, as the bogey with which to push the politicians into crossing a new strategic threshold. The decision to build a bas< on Diego Gama will, if it is maintained, represent the crossing of the threshold by the United States. The Soviet Union will follow, as night follows day, and the last quarter of the century will witness a naval race which promises, because the ship is more versatile and übiquitous than the missile, to outdo the great missile race that dominated the third quarter of the century. (Copyright 1974 Victor Zorza.)