CONTROL’ OF ARMS MOVES FOR TOTAL BAN ON ALL INCENDIARY WEAPONS

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33451, 5 February 1974, Page 12

CONTROL’ OF ARMS MOVES FOR TOTAL BAN ON ALL INCENDIARY WEAPONS

By

DERYCK VINEY

t'l the Gunrdisn. I

i Reprinted by arrangement! Cynics are no doubt right in saying that international agreements to prohibit particular classes of weapons, even if universally accepted and observed, have little effect on lhe over-all arms race or the frequency <•’’ wars. But even in the nuclear age — and precisely because all conflictsince Nagasaki have been fought with non-nuclear weapons - conviction has survived that some weapons, or some wavs of using then . are more appalling and illicit than others. Two principles at least bate been recurrently invoked: that unnecessary suffering should i>e avoided and that non-combatants should be spared.

• Since incendiary weapons, ■notably those with a “scatIter” effect like napaim and (phosphorus are demonstrably responsible for extreme" and prolonged suffering and (through fire-bomb-ing) for the most indiscriminate impact on civilians I outside nuclear war. it is I not surprising that pressure ’to restrict them has been (gradually building up in the (shadow of the S.A.L.T. talks land of our immediate conIcern with European force reductions. The point now reached in the debate is as follows. Twenty-one governments . have replied, almost on time, ■and almost all with some endorsement, to the United Nations Secretary-General’s request for comments on the experts’ report on incendiary weapons circulated at the end of 1971. This spoke of (the “necessity of working ■out measures for the prohibition of the use, production, (development and stockpiling” of fire weapons. The , 28th General Assembly is (likely any moment, then, to start debating the issue with (more expertise, and less ex--1 elusive reference to AmeriIcan use of incendiaries in ■Vietnam, than its two pre’decessors.

(majority of States want it. The Russians, though natur- • ally endorsing a report |which they helped to draft, iin fact make their support for its recommendations (equally conditional on a (.“consensus.” ■ Outright demands for a (total ban on use come from (about half the respondents, •sometimes qualified with the phrase “especially use against civilians.” and India • specifies the requirement of : reciprocity. The most substantial replies, typically, have come from the Netherlands and the Scandinavians, .among whom the Swedes analyse a choice,of options and come down in favour of a total ban on the use of all (incendiaries. As for attempts to prevent their production, the more thoughtful respondents! (mindful of the deadlock in efforts to control chemical weapon production) point to (the ease with which napalm, say. can be made and the difficulty of verifying compliance with any prohibition. Sensibly, they call for an attempt to control use first: the Indian reply roundly 1 states that it would be a waste of time to bother; about: production at present. I How much is world opin-| ion genuinely’ agitated oven

nave seen them used most systematically in Japan, Korea and Vietnam. "In front of us a curious (figure was standing. . He had no eyes and the • whole of his body was covered with a hard black crust speckled by yellow pus I thought of the hundreds of i villages reduced to ash which I personally had see: .. . along the Korean • front. . . Thus Rene Cut (forth m the "Guardian' of March 1. 1972. But the fact that in • cendiaiy weapons are hoi'rifying (and therefore in many circumstances effe. itive) and that they are often easily and cheaply made (and therefore widely stock piled), makes them harder, not easier, subjects for arms jcontrol negotiation. So does I the variety of possible uses (those who deplored their use against the Viet Cong must ask themselves how hard they would protest against their use by insurgents, sa\ against South African force'. Issues involved One is immediately faced ’with three possible bases for distinction: as between more land less obnoxious agents !(say, the "scattering" type I like napalm and phosphorus versus the "intensive" de

After that the subject is due to be taken up at the Red Cross sponsored diplomatic conference in Geneva from February to April, which is to consider the possible extension of “International Humanitarian Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts.” And possibly thereafter, if the General Assembly so directs, the Standing Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (C.C.D.), also in Geneva, will explore the chances of a formal international ban or restriction on the use, and conceivably on the mere devel-' opment and possession, of incendiary weapons. How much support will nations give to any such moves? The number of governments who would care publicly to oppose restrictions on unpopular (but ef(fective) weapons is always minute; the number prepared to promote them is also small — even allowing for those who prefer their powerful patrons to make the 1 running. Seven countries appointed experts to draw up the original report asked for; by the General Assembly — U.S.S.R. Czechoslovakia and Rumania; Mexico and Peru: Nigeria, and the ever dis-armament-conscious Swedes,

(this question? The pressure (no doubt comes mostly from the Western democracies and from countries anxious (to use the issue as an “anti:imperialist” stick. But the •restricted scope of these two (overlapping categories (hardly affects the merit of (the case. , A single press photograph iof a Vietnamese girl fleeing •naked and agonised from a | (mis-targeted) phosphorus-, (bomb burst, and belated ac- 1 (counts of the fire storms in (Hamburg, Dresden and (Tokyo (the last causing l (more deaths than the Hiro(shima atom bomb) have per- • • haps done more than any- 1 (thing else to raise doubts: ; about whether burning! (people, even in war, can bet (right. Military flame-throw-ling goes back" to the Greeks, and incendiary air attacks to 'the Spanish war. But -"napalm” — row a : generic term for various thickened petroleum derivatives — was only developed, in the last war and it is this; agent and the equally skin-- • clinging and unquenchable! White phosphorus which) have excited the greatest (horror among those who)

“(vices like Battle-of-Britam ’(magnesium and thermite s ( bombs); as between different 5 j uses, such as battlefield etn- • ployment versus large-area -lattacks; or, most: basically. -’ between uses calculated io sjeause unnecessary suffering Hor civilian casualties and the rest. ’ The British Manual of ’’Military Law shows, in the’ory at least, awareness of •(the issues. It notes that -“the •use of flame-throwers and y napalm bombs when directed military targets is >| lawful. However, their use •(against personnel is contrary ’ to the law of war in so far •|as it is calculated to cause 5 ! unnecessary suffering". The ’(corresponding United States ; (manual says much the same ‘ The dilemma is, of course, (’lthat a selective restriction. Jl though easier for nations to agree on. is more likely to ’ collapse in practice; and se Elective use of a partiallyweapon often incut' ‘I the same odium as uninhi’jbited use. Hence, no doubt. ’ the relative excellence of the British record ttt abandoning '(incendiary weapons after the Hstart of the Malayan cam’(paign and forgoing them al- • together — in spite of alleged military' pleas — in (the Aden fighting. The official British preferlence is evidently to leave 1 1 discussion of actual weapons tto the diplomatically and E • technically experienced (C.C.D., using the forthcom‘ling Red Cross conference to 1) improve if need be upon The • (Hague Regulations restrict'ling the licit methods and .•effects of warfare in prin(jciple. Many others, however, (argue that a specific ban on I (incendiary weapons should -: be written into the rules, on nthe grounds that they intrinsically violate them. ■ Whether or not a total t ban on incendiary weapons > is achieved — as the British !(delegate to the abortive >| pre-war Disarmament Con(ference wished — the !;fundamental Hague rule will I remain: that belligerents do ; not have an unlimited right ■las to the choice of means ■ for injuring the enemy. Even t(the most fragile detente I (should make it easier to exsi plore what that really implies.