TOO INSTANT UNION SHORT LIFE PREDICTED FOR LIBYAN-TUNISIAN MARRIAGE

Press, Volume CXIV, Issue 33447, 31 January 1974, Page 16

TOO INSTANT UNION SHORT LIFE PREDICTED FOR LIBYAN-TUNISIAN MARRIAGE

(From the "Economist")

President Bourguiba, of Tunisia and Colonel Gadaffi, of Libya, after meeting on the island of Djerba, proclaimed the merger of their countries into an Arab Islamic Republic on January 12. The Arab world is accustomed to the colonel’s unpredictability and to Mr Bourguiba’s eccentricities, but it still gasped. How could Libya’s young military zealot, dedicated to Pan-Arabism, Islamic fundamentalism and the destruction of Israel, work in harness with Tunisia’s elderly and cautious leader, who has refused to let either Islamic traditions or pan-Arab aspirations obstruct his country’s development, and has argued that economic and social progress is the Arabs’ true weapon against Israel? Within 48 hours it began to look as if the answer was that they can’t.

The first hitch became apparent as soon as Mr Bourguiba got back to Tunis. During the 40-minute flight from Djerba he was evidently reminded that his country’s Constitution did not provide for a quick referendum, so that the Tunisians could not approve the merger on January 18, as had been agreed with Colonel Gadaffi. The plebiscite, the president said at Tunis airport, would have to wait until late March.

The next upset followed the return of the Tunisian Prime Minister, Mr Hedi Nouira, from an official visit to Iran. It seems that he was completely taken aback by the decision on unification. But he lost no time. When the Tunisian Foreign Minister, Mr Mohammed Masmoudi, who had been the architect of the merger, returned from accompanying Colonel Gadaffi back to Tripoli, he was immediately sacked. On January 15, after a long meeting of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister announced that the union would proceed slowly, stage by stage. This was exactly the message that Colonel Gadaffi did not want to hear. He had already seen the fading away of the stage-by-stage union between Libya and Egypt. If Libya’s union with Tunisia was to have any hope of coming off at all easily, the wedding had to be secret and quick and the marriage settlement left to be worked out later. Mr Masmoudi persuaded his president to play it that way, but the ploy failed, for the majority of the Tunisian Cabinet will want to examine what the union really means before committing themselves. The difficulties will be enormous. Only a year ago Mr Bourguiba gave Colonel Gadaffi a public dressing-down for proposing an immediate union.

Since Tunisia gained its independence in 1956, Mr Bourguiba has struggled to persuade his people to break through the barriers raised by traditional Islam, and to recognise the need for more education, for family planning, and for an active role for women in the nation’s life. He has sought to encourage foreign investment and the tourist industry. He has advocated co-operation among the countries of the Maghreb (the Arab west) and between them and the West, and has urged the Arabs to be realistic about the existence of Israel. On almost every count he is at odds with Colonel Gadaffi. The man who, in spite of all these things, succeeded in selling him the idea of this union was Mr Masmoudi, who was convinced that the Libyan-Egyptian merger would founder and that Colonel Gadaffi, thwarted in this direction and increasingly isolated in the Arab world, would be-

come an increasingly uncom-i fortable neighbour. Under the guidance of a prudent elder statesman, and with; the more numerous and bet-

ter-educated Tunisians dominating a joint adminisitration, the young colonel might be tamed. And there I were other obvious advantages for Tunisia. Libya’s vast reserves of foreign exchange could accelerate its development; there would be greater opportunities for employing Tunisia’s restless young graduates; and the voice of the new Arab Islamic Republic would ring loud in the Maghreb’s councils.

These arguments swayed President Bourguiba, but he clearly did not expect such strong opposition from his Prime Minister, nor the chilly reception the news of the merger evoked in Algeria and Morocco. Algeria’s President Boumedienne has always taken the Bourguiba line that Arab unity can only come about step by step, and he is very sceptical about the new union’s chances. But when the Algerians say that it is unnatural they are on weak ground. The frontier between the two countries was arbitrarily imposed by their former French and Italian rulers, and the Tunisians and Libyans have much more in common than the Tunisians have with the Algerians, or the Libyans with

| the Egyptians. Algeria’s real I fear is the prospect of its I acquiring a more formidable ; and competitive eastern neighbour.

. The Moroccans’ displeasure at the news was as predictable as the Egyptians' relief. King Hassan's relations with Colonel Gadaffi, who has vowed to do all he can to overthrow the king, are bitter. So were the king’s relations with President Bourguiba, only recently; but a fortnight ago they agreed to forget their harsh words. King Hassan cannot think that bringing Colonel Gadaffi into the Maghreb fold is the way for

Mr Bourguiba to make amends. But in Cairo the union was welcomed as a means of getting the Libyans off Mr Sadat's back. There is much to be said for the view that a union between the two countries could be beneficial for both and have a soothing effect on the Arab world. But Colonel Gadaffi’s obsession with immediacy and President Bourguiba’s imprudence in acting behind the backs of both his advisers and his neighbours may have doomed the venture from the start. If, as now seems likely, it all ends in tears, there will be an even angrier and more frustrated leader in Libya, and in Tunisia a president discredited at the end of a long and remarkable career.