BRITAIN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME CRISIS PROMPTS CRITICAL LOOKS AT NEW INDUSTRY

Press, Volume CXII, Issue 32861, 9 March 1972, Page 14

BRITAIN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME CRISIS PROMPTS CRITICAL LOOKS AT NEW INDUSTRY

(By 1

DAVID FISHLOCK,

, Science Editor of the "Financial Times" London)

(Reprinted by arrangement)

This article describes the advances and setbacks of Britain’s nuclear energy programme in the context of the power crisis caused by the miners’ strike.

x, iere is all that nudear power we have heard so much about since the Second World War, people ask when the lights go out What has happened to the nuclear project — the first national programme for nuclear electricity — that was going to reduce the shortfall in coal supplies and Britain s dependence on imported oil? And should we not now press ahead faster with nuclear power, to achieve a better energy balance in Britain?

Just 17 years ago last month the Government announced its first nuclear programme, to build about a dozen small nuclear stations, equivalent to 5m or 6m tons of coal a year. They were to be based on the “uranium boilers” nearing completion at Calder Hall and Chapelcross, built primarily for military plutonium production but having a useful by-product of electricity. The economists estimated that the electricity from these stations would be competitive with that raised from coal.

Many vicissitudes Now, 17 years later, the last of the stations built under this programme is still being commissioned. The programme itself has cost about £7som to complete, compared with the £3oom estimated in 1955. But it has come through many convolutions—it was quadrupled in output after the Suez crisis of 1956, then axed again, changed to fewer but bigger stations, and, most recently, restricted by technical troubles—to arrive at its present peak output of about 4000 megawatts. This is the equivalent of about 12m tons of coal. But if the atom looked competitive with coal 17

years ago, why, with all the . moneyl the Government has ■ invested in research and deJ velopment since the mid- . 19505, has uranium not taken ; over a much bigger share of . the fuel needs of the nation? ’ Surely nuclear power, bum- , ing fuel that lasts for j several years, would at least be immune to the kind of interruption caused by the miners’ pickets lately? One crucial reason why the • atom does not dominate Bri- ’ tain’s energy requirements (in ■ fact, it meets only about 6 ; per cent of peak needs) is : the frenzied response it has 1 brought from the traditional 1 fuels. i ’ “Sailing ship effect” i Nuclear power’s overr whelming advantage is the t low cost of running a station. - To combat the threat, the s coal, oil and gas industries t have all made very rapid j advances in winning, transs porting and burning their fuels. As so often happens 1 in technological forecasting, I those who wrote the White Paper of 1955 overlooked the “sailing ship effect” that can keep technologies alive and kicking long after they should have been supplanted. They also overlooked just how fast . total demand would increase, j But now we have been ’ given an excellent reason why ! atomic power should be S pushed ahead as quickly as possible — to help safeguard supplies against a repetition 1 of recent events. Unfortu- ’ nately, neither the atom nor ' any other source of elec- ! tricity can in the short term ‘ safeguard our electricity supply. It takes too long—five or six years to build a big > power station—for any quick changes to be implemented in the supply situation. Even if the lead time were not so long, and capital cost were no problem, the best ’ course of action is still ! unclear. What could be disas- , trous, however, is the kind i of panic decision to quadruple our nuclear programme, taken - when Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal in 1956. Some would say the emergent nuclear industry has never recovered from the disruption that followed Suez. Eleven stations Let us look at the record of Britain’s first-generation nuclear stations. They number 11, including the plutonium producers at Calder and Chapelcross (the latter are not owned by the Central Electricity Generating Board (C.E.G.8.) but are wholly devoted to electricity production). These "magnox stations”—named after the fuel they use—so far account for nearly 50 per cent of the nuclear electricity generated by the Western world. The original military system was modified for commercial use for only about £2om. The commercial stations, moreover, were all built for less than 25 per cent over the tender price. At the end of the winter peak last year, a Board member of the Central Electricity Generating Board summed up the performance of the magnox stations thus: “Because of the rapidly escalating costs of coal there are on this very day magnox stations in operation producing electricity, despite their high capital costs, at base-load total generation costs as low as some of the Board’s contemporary coal-fired stations.” The last and largest of the magnox stations, at Wylfa in Anglesey, came on-load early in 1971. This winter it has reached an output of 720 megawatts. This is not far short of the normal top rating for Wylfa, now set at 900 J megawatts—a good perform-; ance by modem power station ■ standards for the first year of 1 operation. The rapid increase 1 in size of power stations, of 1 all kinds, has greatly leng- ■ thened the time needed to work new plant up to full ] power. 1 Wylfa, in company with 1 seven other magnox stations, ’ has suffered severely from ’ a decision by the C.E.G.B. in 1970 to cut back their output by nearly 20 per cent. The magnox reactors were found to be afflicted by a novel type ! of corrosion: hot carbon 1 dioxide coolant was reacting ] with the structural steelwork. * A tough oxide layer two or three times the volume of • the steel itself was building 1 up on the structure support- < ing and restraining the reactor core. Corrosion causes loss ( It mattered little on open { surfaces. The real trouble j arose between tightly mating < faces, such as the threads of i nuts and bolts. Build-up of j corrosion stretched the bolt i very slowly—so slowly in fact j that it revealed a new corro-, sion phenomenon, that a bolt ] can fail at strains far less ; great than the steel would, normally succumb to. i What at first sight might < seem a hideously dangerous i situation—reactors in danger , of falling apart —proved on | closer inspection much less . of a hazard. Corrosion tests I

showed that if the reactors were restricted to 360 deg. C. they had every chance of surviving their full design life span of 20 years.

The exceptionally low fuel cost of the magnox reactors gave the C.E.G.B. an immense economic incentive to limit gas temperatures inside the reactor to 360 deg. C., and thus curtail the rate of corrosion.

In total, the restriction meant the loss of about 1000 megawatts of nuclear electricity, out of the 4800 megawatts originally ordered under the first British nuclear programme. But since lifetime, not safety, was the point at issue, the generating boards were left with a loophole allowing them to raise working temperatures to 380 deg. C. at times of crisis. A further 400-500 megawatts can be secured this way. ; Some of the magnox re--1 actions—the C.E.G.B. will not say how many—have been ■ running at 380 deg. C. duri ing the present power crisis. Once it was hoped it might i be possible to reclaim a good ; many of the lost megawatts. , The hope proved forlorn and I the generating boards are I now reconciled to their , reduced output. More serious, however, the greatly intensi- ' fled investigations of corro- ’ sion inside gas-cooled re- , actors have revealed the , possibility that it might ; attack the steelwork within i the still hotter second- ' generation nuclear stations. Sacrifice of output In 1965 Britain embarked ,on another nuclear programme, based on the .advanced gas-cooled reactor (A.G.R.), running on a richer fuel. Up to last year the reactor had cost £ll4m to develop and the generating boards had earmarked some ! £7som for five stations, totalling 6200 megawatts. The idea that these A.G.R.S may fail to attain their design output is only the latest in a chapter of accidents that has bedevilled the whole of this other programme. But the fact remains that the first three A.G.R. stations, expected to come on-load during the next couple of years may sacrifice 10 per cent of their output — nearly 400 megawatts—before ever commencing work.

Britain, in short, is paying a formidable price for its claim to be the first nation in the world to launch a big nuclear programme. Part of that price is already being reclaimed from the exceptionally good performance put up by the magnox stations, but the rest must remain as part of the long-term investment in a more betterbalanced fuel economy—the entrance fee to an exclusive club.

On paper, the United States has fared much better, having invested in the cheaper and less highly rated watercooled reactors, and sold them widely through the world. But the United States systems, with fewer reactor-years of experience behind them than Britain’s, are already experiencing technical trouble of a different, and perhaps much more serious kind. A growing volume of criticism about the efficacy of their safety systems could culminate in a decision to reduce reactor output by law. Ultimate success

i No nation, believes Lord . Hinton, chief architect of the , 1955 White Paper, has yet made any money out of , nuclear power. In fact, he . sees money spent on nuclear , plants as risk capital that , can be justified only by l higher-than-normal rates of . return. But he sums up the view of j those nations—Britain, the . United States, West Germany. France, Canada, and Japan ' among others — who have already invested heavily in atomic electricity when he says: “Nuclear power must win, and will win in the long run and it would be a mistake to imperil its progress by rushing fences in what are still the early stages of the race.” But, by the same token, it is a race Britain cannot forgo. Only by learning to build today’s comparatively simple systems, on time and to a price, will we ever develop the skills to construct more highly-rated reactors, such as the fast breeders. And those are the systems on which the world is counting to bring cheaper power. Bull ship unloaded “Operation Bullship” went off without a hitch yesterday and last evening the 30 French bulls were safely in quarantine on Somes Island. The animals were lifted by helicopter from the freighter Westmoreland lying in the harbour. The bulls, each weighing about 7501 b, were housed in crates weighing 13001bs. Watersiders who worked on the Westmoreland were issued with protective clothing and had to have showers before they left the ship. The animals have been bought by the Department of Agriculture to improve beef I i herds.—(P. A.).