‘VISION OF ALL-INDIA’

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32783, 7 December 1971, Page 17

‘VISION OF ALL-INDIA’

(By

LOUIS HEREN.

of "The Times.” through N.Z.P.A.)

LONDON, Dec. 6. Soon after the 1965 war the then Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan met in Tashkent to reaffirm their obligation under the United Nations charter not to resort to force and to settle their disputes by peaceful means. '

It was a dramatic occasion, and not only because the meeting was arranged by the Soviet Union. After the horrors of partition and vears of tension and conflict the two governments appeared determined to begin afresh, but less than six years later the question of whether these two Commonwealth countries can ever live in peace remains m doubt. Of course, it can be argued that the unity of the subcontinent was a British invention, a brief and transitory phase, but this would be a false reading of Indian historv. From the invasions of the first Aryan tribes, India absorbed and largely Hinduised those who came to conquer and settle. The chief exception was the Moslems, but their survival as a political entity was largely thanks to the British. Without imperial concern for minorities, they too could have been absorbed, if not converted. _ . Even under the British Raj Hindu-Moslem unity was pursued by Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. He understood Moslem fears of Hindu dominance in a self-govern-ing India, but was confident of achieving constitutional safeguards. These were promised by

the Congress Party in the socalled Lucknow Pact of 1916, but Jinnah finally broke with Congress because Gandhi substituted Hindu ideology for a secular Indian nationalism. The Nehru report, prepared under the chairmanship of the future Prime Minister's father, rejected separate electorates and weighed representation for minorities. This was seen nt the time to assert fine democratic principles, but the arrogance of Hindu history with its assumption of ultimate absorption. must have strongly influenced both father and son. According to the Indian historian, S. Gopal, the report marked a turning-point in the history of the subcon-

tinent It certainly brought Jinnah back from London to lead the Moslem League he had once despised. Given the aroused Moslem suspicions, and Jinnah’s tenacity. the division of India and the creation of Pakistan then became inevitable. Many Pakistanis are still convinced, nevertheless, that India has never accepted division. I believe this to be correct to the extent that many Indians perhaps a majority, have a vision, nurtured by history. and religion, of a united India sprawling south, east aftd west from Ute Karakorams. I also believe that many think reunification to be inevitable. This does not mean that the conquest of Pakistan is an Indian objective, although some nationalists do indeed nurse such an ambition. Rather is it an attitude which helps to explain much of what has happened since 1947. For instance, Junagadh, Hyderabad and Goa did not have to be invaded and absorbed, and by practitioners of Stayagraha of all people. Given timer they would have returned to the arms of mother India. Kashmir can also be explained by that vision of allIndia. Nehru did of course have strong attachment to the state, but without that vision too much of what has occurred would be disgraceful, especially the long detention and denigration of Sheikh Abdullah. I do not intend to rehearse the old arguments with which both sides have bored and confused too many people for too long. It is sufficient to remember that the

: Kashmir disturbances in 1947 i were but an extension of the ! greater massacres in the Punjab. It was apparent at the time that Pakistan, but a few weeks old and without an established government, could not prevent the tribes from swarming up the Jhelum into Kashmir. But once there, the two armies might have tried to co-operate in restoring order as they tried in the Punjab. They were never asked. The all-India vision was too powerful. Before the fighting spread on Friday, Peter Hazelhurst reported from Delhi that the . prospects of a political . settlement appeared extremely bleak. India believed : that the refugees would not , return to East Pakistan uni less Pakistan withdrew its | army from East Pakistan. He also reported that > India was trying to provoke i Pakistan into making a first ! strike which would start a war in the west India would . then launch an .offensive t against East Pakistan with I nine divisions. ■ From Rawalpindi, David 1 Housego reported that the r President was desperately : anxious to avoid a full-scale war, and was clinging tb the ■ hope that a combination of - Great Power restraint the ! resilience of his Army, and ) his political measures would t somehow save the day. > On the other hand, Indian - intransigence made large ; political concessions difficult f because they would be regarded as submission to i Mrs Gandhi. Pakistan was i fed up with the mess, and if 1 a face-saving formula could : be found , would be willing to t extricate itself. : Alas, it now seems too late.