Thrust into Cambodia

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32776, 29 November 1971, Page 14

Thrust into Cambodia

The South Vietnamese thrust into Cambodia seems to be largely a repetition of an earlier strategy linked with the defence of South Vietnam itself. The North Vietnamese must know that they now have little hope of overrunning Cambodia—if they had such a possibility in mind. The main object has been, and remains, the creation and control of bases and supply routes for an eventual and, they hope, decisive campaign against the South. In August, the Cambodian command launched an operation to secure Route 6, towards the provincial capital of Kompong. The effort did not succeed, and it was clear that the Communists would again attempt to keep it under their control. The highway gives access from the capital, Phnom Penh, to the Great Lake region, rich in resources of rice and fish, which are as essential to the invaders as they are to the defenders. They are, indeed, vital to the three or more Communist divisions in eastern Cambodia, held in readiness for another thrust towards Saigon.

The new South Vietnamese offensive looks like an attempt to forestall a Communist drive on Saigon, and possibly on Phnom Penh, by destroying the invaders’ supply bases. If it succeeds, it might have considerable significance for the future of the struggle in Cambodia, quite apart from South Vietnam. It is known, for instance, that the Communists in recent weeks have suffered heavy casualties, especially in their bid to break through the stubborn Cambodian defences on Route 6. Aerial attacks, American as well as Cambodian, are thought to have inflicted most of the casualties. Now the effort to harass the Communists is being renewed. They must attempt to hold their bases. Last year they apparently hoped to overrun Cambodia, but failed. Now they are opposed by a greatly strengthened Cambodian Army, expanded from 35,000 men to more than 200,000. American aid, needless to say, is of vital importance. The Government has been assured that this aid, economic and military, will continue on an increasing scale. Aid for Cambodia remains an integral part of President Nixon’s programme for Indo-China as a whole.