The Press SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1971. Rhodesian agreement better than none

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32775, 27 November 1971, Page 16

The Press SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1971. Rhodesian agreement better than none

Few of the critics of the Smith regime in Rhodesia will be pleased by the agreement between Mr Smith and the British Foreign Secretary (Sir Alec DouglasHome). It does not settle the racial and representation problems that led to the dispute between Britain and Rhodesia: but it could open the way to a better deal for the African population and, what is even more important, it could prevent further consolidation of the apartheid policies towards which the Smith regime has been heading. Some will argue that Britain has given too much weight to threats of Communist intervention in Africa and has come to terms with Mr Smith far too lightly. There is not much sense in arguing along these lines; for those who are prepared to ignore the threats, or are even happy to observe them, are presumably prepared to allow the Smith regime to do its worst in the meantime. There is no comfort for the oppressed Africans in such a view.

Because of its uncertainties, and because almost everything depends on how conscientiously the terms of the settlement are pursued by investigatory commissions and by the Rhodesian politicians, the agreement, at this stage, is certain to be branded as a “ sell-out The point now is that everyone concerned about Rhodesia—and this includes almost everyone, since the United Nations is vitally interested—should do their utmost to ensure that the agreement is exploited to the best advantage of the Rhodesian Africans. Of course, the “ acceptability ” of the settlement has yet to be tested in Rhodesia. The method of testing opinion might seem less than perfect and the rate of progress towards equal representation and eventual majority rule will depend very much on the success of the plan to assist the economic advancement of the African people. But if, when judged according to the past performance of the Smith regime, the arrangements do not promise early majority rule, what is the alternative to them? In all probability, no agreement at all. Almost certainly the conditions of the Africans would become worse with no promise whatever of improvement. Assuming that Mr Smith has had a change of heart forced upon him, and that he has yet to “ sell ” the agreement to his supporters in the electorate, it is probably the best settlement that could be won. If he has had no real change of heart it is undoubtedly the best. In either event there is no other Rhodesian representative with whom the British Government can usefully negotiate. Furthermore, it is an agreement that provides for a steady chipping away at inequalities and injustices over a period in which the white Rhodesians should be able to adjust themselves to political change.

It must still be hoped that the day of equal representation will be hastened; pressure for less rigorous conditions of enfranchisement will almost certainly be found by Lord Pearce’s commission next year; and this might well be translated into an amendment to the settlement. Further assistance to raise the economic standing of the African people would also hasten the day. The settlement, as it now stands, need not be the’ last word on the whole knotty question: but as a first word it is (better than none.