The Attacks on the Rhine bridges

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32661, 17 July 1971, Page 10

The Attacks on the Rhine bridges

The Race for the Rhine Bridges. By Alexander McKee. Souvenir Press. 488 pp. The subject of this book might be thought to concern the famous rush for the Rhine bridges by Patton et al. So it is, but much else besides, for it begins with the German invasion of the Netherlands in May, 1940, examining this first “rush for the Rhine bridges” as a prototype of what was to come when the allied armies came back in 1944-45. On the whole, the German plan emerges as the most subtly calculated, cleverly executed and militarily successful of the lot Their use of small, expert groups of men, each detailed to a particular target, paid handsomely. Four hundred parachutists captured the important bridges over the Albert Canal at Vroenhaven and Veltwezelt, and so made it possible for the German Sixth Army to cross the Dutch water lines with comparative ease. More spectacularly, 85 engineers were landed in gliders right on top of the vast Eben Emael fortress, and succeeded in keeping the Dutch garrison of 1200 pinned down until ground forces arrived. These successes were matched by others equally spectacular. Glider and paratroop forces of very moderate size succeeded in destroying the Dutch air force at the end of the first day by capturing almost all the major air force bases. The Dutch fighters had, in fact, been doing well. But deprived of their bases, they had to land in open country, and even where not damaged in the process, were often not able to get airborne again. Some tactics did not succeed. The troops dropped on The Hague to capture the Government and Royal Family failed. Others were wrongly positioned, and found themselves in open country, unopposed, but also with nothing worthwhile to capture. For a while, the allies consoled themselves with the thought that the Dutch had been beaten because of a fifth column. Eben Emael was taken, so the

story went, because of an attack by Germans who were growing chicory in underground caverns nearby. As the truth emerged, so the British and American planners began to assess the suitability of the German blueprint as a guide to success in an allied advance through the Netherlands and Eastern France, and over the Rhine. Alexander McKee’s account shows that, on the whole, the allies’ use of combined ground and air attacks was more pedestrian than the German; that the assaults generally succeeded as much because of an overwhelming superiority in numbers and firepower as because the plans put the Germans off balance. At Wesel, for instance, Montgomery launched an assault across the Rhine so overwhelming that one can only compare it to using a rifle to kill flies. At Oppenheim, Patton’s men crossed virtually unopposed. Where the Germans opposed the allies in force, however, as at Nijmegen and Arnhem, in September, 1944, severe deficiencies in the planning and execution of the attacks manifested themselves. Nijmegen was taken and held only with difficulty, while Arnhem proved, as some had feared, “one bridge too many.” The airborne forces took the bridge and part of the town, but the ground troops were unable to keep up with an impossibly optimistic timetable of advance, and reached the Rhine only just in time to aid the paratroops in their evacuation. All in all, as Mr McKee shows, the Arnhem operation was a dismal failure. Worse, not all who fought there fought well. It comes as a shock to one reared on legends about "the heroes of Arnhem” to leam that a group of paratroops, including an officer, spent almost the entire battle huddled in a trench, adamant in their refusal to come out! There are cowards in every army, however, and heroes. Mr McKee, drawing on a remarkable range of personal reminiscences, listed in an appendix, shows how the rest of an army, the

ordinary soldiers, who do their duty when necessary, who attack even though in their heart of hearts they would rather be staying where they are, who defend grimly when they find themselves surrounded, and who rejoice when a spell of inactivity frees them temporarily from the duty of killing or being killed, felt about the Rhine operations. To the planners, a damaged bridge might mean a limit on the ammunition or fuel available, and hence a change of objectives. To the ordinary soldier it signified a disruption of the N.A.A.F.I. service, or a temporary drop in rations. Relying upon these two strengths, an understanding of the strategic and tactical considerations involved, and a wilingness to convey the thoughts and feelings of the combatants, Alexander McKee has written a satisfying account of the Rhine operations. He does not shirk judgments when they are necessary, and his evaluations are sound. Yet at the same time he eschews partisanship, and never seeks to arouse a spurious interest by attacking accepted opinions or conclusions simply because they are accepted. Sober but not dull, brightly written and usefully illustrated, “The Race for the Rhine Bridges” offers a satisfying account of why the Rhine Was strategically important, how and when the bridges were attacked and taken, and how it felt to be taking them.