Pakistan facing crisis of confidence

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32634, 16 June 1971, Page 20

Pakistan facing crisis of confidence

(By

RALPH JOSEPH)

TEHERAN.

Where do the Pakistanis go from here—with the civil wai virtually over, the economy in ruins, a famine looming on the horizon in both wings, the Prime Minister-elect in gaol, the majority party banned, and the scar of a deep suspicion dividing the two parts of the country more thoroughly than the physical distance between them.

From the looks of things some sort of mantle of office is about to fall on Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who performed the magic of keeping a minor political controversy alive even while the civil war was raging and the strictest martial law regulations had stunned all other politicians into silence. Bhutto has suggested not directly, but by a series of clever nuances that power should be transferred to a civilian government before July 1, when the country’s next budget becomes due. He has even indicated a willingness to share power with Yahya Khan. Nobody, of course, doubts that he means power should be transferred to him in West Pakistan. Because Bhutto thinks mainly in terms of West

Pakistan, and his political philosophy of the eastern wing has always been a kind of dark blob: a little mysterious perhaps, but mostly un-

important He has the feel of the West Pakistani mass mind, but so thoroughly lacks an understanding of Gengali feeling and thinking that he was unable to sink roots for his party in the east and did not put up even a single candidate there for the December elections. The last time he visited East Pakistan, he had to have a private guard of Pakistan People’s Party volunteers carrying sub-mach-ine guns. As of now he does not appear awfully keen to revisit the place.

Cautious approach

Bhutto, in fact, may have missed the chance of sinking roots for his party there, and if power is transferred to him in the western province, the colonial character of the eastern wing is going to be more emphasised than it has ever been before.

Moreso after the purge of Bengalis from the military and civil services. Even if Bengalis are taken back into their civilian posts, as many 1 probably will be, the West Pakistanis are going to be wary of putting guns into i Bengali hands again. The revolt of the East Bengal 1 Regiment, which appears to 1 have started the civil war, will always be brought up as ; an argument against this. The regiment, which was formed considerably before the crisis developed, to answer the criticism that Bengalis were not properly represented in the army mutinied about the time the West Pakistan federal troops were landing in Chittagong- They murdered all their West Pakistani officers, and the details of the story gradually trickling out are gory. As one report has it, their West Pakistani colonel was taken prisoner, along with his wire and 14-year-old son, and tied to a tree. The mutineers ripped his wife's stomach open in front of him. They then beheaded his son, and placed the head on his wife’s , chest while she was still alive. After this they killed > the colonel. . I Other Incidents may have closed the doors permanently I to Bengalis in other parts of I the armed forces. As another ’ story is told, after the East 1 Bengal Regiment’s revolt, a < group of 120 commandos ' rom West Pakistan were dropped in the Chittagong area. One of them, who happened to be a Bengali, defected to the secessionists and informed them about tire positions of the others. The secessionists moved in, captured all 119 of the commandos, and butchered them, j There were no prisoners. 1 Occupation force ‘ With small chance of the < regiment being revived, and with the border police known j as the East Pakistan Rifles j having lost the confidence of ‘ the government, West Paki- ‘ stanis are going to have ex- S cuse enough to keep the federal army stationed in the ( eastern province more or less { permanently, very much like j an army of occupation. By their brutal action when r they began hitting back, the » army may have taught the t Bengalis to respect them, but <

right now armed West Pakistanis are about the only ones there are in the province. Civilians, including key executives, do not feel it safe to return to their old Rosts.

As one West Pakistani businessman told me, “I’ve got a Bengali clerical staff there," but the top men who know the ropes, mostly West Pakistanis, still think it too much of a personal risk to go back, with or without their families. Indeed, there is also a large number of richer East Pakistan families still lingering on in and around Karachi, trying to make up their minds to return. They fled from the province before the fighting began, and have been living through the nightmare on whatever savings they were able to bring with them.

The colossal economic crisis the country is currently encountering may finally be lived through over several vears. Pakistanis have a way of roughing it, and after all did survive when the country started from scratch in 1947. But how long it will take to

overcome the colossal Crisis of confidence and understanding between the two wings, or whether the crisis will be

overcome at all, is still anyone’s guess.