Supersonic flight

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32568, 30 March 1971, Page 16

Supersonic flight

The adverse vote in the United States Senate on the Boeing Aircraft Corporation’s supersonic transport venture raises fresh doubts about the future of supersonic flight Unless promises of hundreds of millions of dollars are received in the next few weeks from non-Government sources—such as a consortium of United States and Japanese aviation interests—America’s “ S.S.T. ” seems doomed to be stillborn. The project has already cost $B6O million, and will have cost some $llOO million by the time all unexpired contracts have been paid for or compensation paid. The causes and consequences of the decision to abandon such a costly project are a fascinating study. Economists and ecologists have—for once—found common cause in opposing the S.S.T. A leading article in the “ New York Times ” summed up their arguments by saying that a vote for allocating more money to the project would be “ a vote to waste public funds and to endanger “ mankind’s environment ”. There was no public demand for supersonic transport, the article said; and no social or human need would be met by it The rejection of the project by both Houses of Congress is a serious rebuff for President Nixon, who sent the request for money to Congress with his unqualified approval. Despite clamorous loboying, a nation-wide $350,000 advertising campaign by a group called “ Labour and Industry for the S.S.T. ”, and a favourable recommendation by the powerful Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives, Congress ignored the President’s appeal. The only remaining hope—and it is a slim hope—of salvaging the project is that the money might be raised outside Government sources. The abandonment of the American supersonic venture raises serious doubts about the future of any supersonic aircraft If Britain and France carry through their Concorde project, the most likely customers are afflines flying the Atlantic. Having abandoned their own S.S.T. at least partly for environmental reasons, the Americans are hardly likely to allow a foreign-built supersonic aircraft to land at any of their airports. If the Concorde cannot fly the Atlantic there is no other major air route with traffic densities high enough to make a fleet of Concordes economic. Russia, as usual, is less communicative about its plans and intentions in supersonic flight than any of the Western Powers. But if, as is likely, the Kremlin is tempted to develop a supersonic airliner for its prestige and technological value, it would probably not make a single sale to western airlines. For one thing, the supply of replacement parts and spares could be cut off at the whim of the Kremlin. The Russians, said the “ New York Times ” recently, “ can proceed with this dangerous toy because they “ can ignore their own public opinion ”, President Nixon cannot afford to ignore his public opinion, as his latest rebuff from Congress has shown: nor can Mr Heath or Mr Pompidou, although their respective • electorates have not yet been so deeply aroused on this issue as was Mr Nixon’s. The American rejection of supersonic flight is likely to give new impetus to the efforts of conservationists and economists in England and France; the next chapter in the history of supersonic flight will be played out on Europe’s side of the Atlantic