Invasion of North Vietnam remains a possibility

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32566, 27 March 1971, Page 24

Invasion of North Vietnam remains a possibility

(By

CHARLES SNYDER)

HONG KONG More than four years ago, the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, was reported to have itold the United States through the French Foreign Ministry that Peking would intervene directly if America invaded North Vietnam. Early in March as South Vietnamese rangers and United States firepower bit deep into the Ho Chi Minh

Trail in Laos, Chou was back in Peking after a fourday visit to Hanoi. That pledge of 1966 must be haunting him today as surely as the spectre of a second Korea pads the corridors of the Pentagon. Chou’s long-ago promise—and numerous other statements from Peking on the Indo-China war have taken on keen emphasis with his Hanoi visit, since only a definite request from North Vietnam would sway China’s obvious determination to avoid direct involvement.

Although such a request would run counter to Hanoi’s current policies, a reference by the South Vietnamese President, Nguyen Van Thieu, to possible invasion of the north—-coupled with the Laos drive—clearly have prompted reassessment at the highest level between Hanoi and Peking. Yet the spectre of Chinese intervention, although by far the most dramatic recent development in the war, should not overshadow aspects of the Laos operation which have inajor significance in the long term.

The greatest irony of the United States-backed invasion of Laos is that it may have weakened Saigon’s bargaining power in Paris, thus delaying any settlement with Hanoi. The rangers who have been battling through Communist supply lines since early February already have proven no match for the tough North Vietnamese forces. Their weaknesses certainly will allow Hanoi’s leaders to question the need for a peaceful settlement Vital supplies This does not mean the North Vietnamese are taking a casual view of the Laos drive: any interruption of the vital lines to National Liberation Front fighters in the south could be very dangerous, since supply work is at a peak during the first quarter of the year. With the rainy season less than three months off, Hanoi now must make sure most of the year's supplies get through as quickly as possible.

It is this consideration which has led the North Vietnamese to “stand and fight.” (During the Cambodian invasion, there was no major engagement. The supply season was almost complete and whatever supplies were seized could be replaced fairly easily.) Now, however, the most important section of the Ho Chi Minh Trail has been attacked; some areas lie within 50 miles of the point at which the trail leaves North Vietnam. Other points include major crossroads where supplies are channelled to destinations farther south. But these technical factors do not explain fully the tough resistance put up by North Vietnamese troops in Laos today.. Hanoi feels the South Vietnamese operation there is only a prelude. In short, Hanoi believes there is a very real possibility of an invasion of North Vietnam.

Since the breakdown of the 1954 Geneva accords, the north from time to time has charged the United States and South Vietnam with invasion schemes. These charges became muted after President Johnson halted fullscale bombing of North Vietnam in 1968 ahd the Paris talks opened in January 1969. But with the resumption of limited bombing last November—and the spilling of the war into Cambodia and Laos—the accusations have gained frequency and intensity. Mounting unease At first they did not mention invasion specifically. A December 10 governmental appeal to the people for greater war efforts included a charge that the United States was "plotting new military adventures” against the north. But as Saigon began to move large numbers of troops northward, as the Americans began to evacuate villages and to resettle I people farther south, Hanoi’s unease mounted.

North Vietnam’s ruling Workers’ Party met at the end of January to ’’discuss and decide on tasks of the resistance against United States aggression;” it concluded the Americans “have not yet renounced their evil design to invade our country.”

On February’ 3 Radio Budapest broadcast an interview with Nguyen Thanh Le, a Hanoi delegate to the Paris talks, in which he said one of the aims of the Laos invasion was to “set up a new front in Laos against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.” He added: "Operations against Cambodia and Laos thus are linked with the threat of a direct attack on the D.R.V., and the resumption of the bombings. So the war in Indo-China has become total and has entered its most dangerous stage . . .” Such talk is far from idle speculation. Some informed sources here feel forays by South Vietnamese forces into North Vietnam may indeed occur. On February 25, Thieu himself was quoted as saying such a move was only a matter of time. Thieu later denied saying this; but the fact remained he had been quoted by Saigon’s official news service. Great dilemma If North Vietnam were attacked, the situation probably would not be altered radically. Any South Vietnamese move north of the demilitarised zone could not be on a sizeable scale. And for even the. best of Saigon’s troops, any such operation would prove suicidal. Like wise, Hanoi clearly would be reluctant to send forces across the zone where they would meet American troops and risk slowing United States withdrawals. An invasion of the north—wen a small one conducted solely by South Vietnamese forces—would pose a great dilemma for Hanoi’s allies, notably the People’s Republic of China. Whether Peking would hold to Chou’s 1966 pledge is problematic; it is still not clear whether Chou was referring to an invasion by United States troops or by South Vietnamese forces.

If Chinese soldiers began to stream into North Vietnam—and then only at the explicit request of Hanoi—the greatest danger would be to North Vietnam, in the form of United States retaliation. Besides, Vietnamese have deep rooted anti-Chinese sentiments: only if Hanoi saw no alternative would it call for Peking’s help. On the performance of the South Vietnamese in Laos, however, this "no alternative” situation seems unlikely to surface. Not only will Saigon seek to avoid further losses and humiliations, but the United States doubtless will go to great lengths to dissuade the south from mounting an attack. Yet a sad and bloody decade in Vietnam has shown even the most careful intentions can go awry. An invasion of the north' remains a probability with which Chou, his finger on the pulse of the greatest supply of manpower ever known, is confronted today.—lntrasia News Service.