Limiting arms

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32561, 22 March 1971, Page 14

Limiting arms

Both the Soviet Union and the United States seem to be genuinely anxious to reach agreement in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (S.A.L.T.), which entered their fourth negotiating phase in Vienna on March 8. The talks are held in strict secrecy, but it is likely that definitions have been a major difficulty. When, at the beginning of 1967, President Johnson sent a letter to Mr Kosygin suggesting talks between the two Governments, Mr Kosygin replied that they must cover both offensive and defensive weapons. The Americans accepted this. “To be “ stable and satisfactory ”, said President Nixon recently, “ an agreement should include limitations “on both offensive and defensive systems ”. But the Russians have apparently had second thoughts, and have been saying that agreement on defensive weapons alone would be “valuable”. Whether the terms of reference can be clarified during the current deliberations remains to be seen. Mr Kosygin said again in February that his Government would welcome an agreement; and the leader of the Soviet delegation, Mr Semyonov, would like to be able to report some progress when he returns to Moscow shortly to attend the Soviet Party Congress. When the last session ended before Christmas, two or three major issues remained undecided. A recent article in “ Pravda ” said that missiles and aircraft capable of carrying them should be covered by the negotiations. The Americans say that short-range weapons are tactical; the Russians say they are strategic. The Russians have no aircraft-carriers—but in three to five years they are expected to have a ballistic missile submarine force as large as that of the United States.

The Russians have also suggested that the anti-ballistic missile defence systems should be confined to Moscow and Washington. The cost of installing these systems in each of the large centres of population in Russia and the United States would be prohibitive; even the great wealth of the United States would be strained to provide such massive protection. The cost of nuclear defence is a powerful argument in favour of limiting arms; and the rest of the world can only hope that financial and strategic considerations alike will lead to an agreement to halt the most dangerous arms race in history.