INDIA’S CHINA WAR-WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE?

Press, Volume CXI, Issue 32524, 6 February 1971, Page 10

INDIA’S CHINA WAR-WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE?

India’s China War. By Neville Maxwell. Cape. 443 pp, Notes. Maps, Bibliography and Index. When the world learned on October 10, 1962, that fighting had broken out between China and India on the border at the eastern end of the Himalayas there was almost universal sympathy for India, at least in the West, and a general assumption that the Chinese were to blame. Border Incidents, apparently started by the Chinese, had been frequent for several years; India’s pacifist attitude and intentions were-axiomatic to outside observers. As the Chinese advance swept forward, almost to the plains of Assam, Western States reacted with military aid for India and diplomatic protests at this latest example of Chinese “aggression.” The shock of the invasion, and India’s inability to counter it, were only matched by the shock a month later when the Chinese suddenly withdrew from the area they had overrun and unilaterally observed a cease-fire against an enemy which appeared to be all but beaten. Until now, India’s innocence and China’s aggressiveness have seldom been questioned; no adequate explanation was available for the Chinese withdrawal in the wake of their overwhelming military success. The effects of the war have been there for all to observe: Indian rearmament and the consequent disruption of economic development leading to internal politi'cal disturbances; concern in Pakistan at India’s growing military strength leading to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965; a growing rapport between Pakistan and China, and between India and Russia in the light of the Soviet Union’s own border quarrels with China; a certain smugness in the West towards earlier Indian professions of neutrality, non-alignment and the rejection of military means for settling disputes. “India’s China War” is an attempt

to set straight the record of what really happened before and during the border war of 1962. The result is an indictment of Indian politicians and some Indian Army officers which contrasts sharply with the official version of events. Not that the Chinese escape blame on occasion; the only heroes are the ordinary Indian soldiers who were asked to fight against impossible odds and with poor equipment in defence of a Government policy which was politically dishonest and militarily absurd. Neville Maxwell must expect strong criticism of his book, especially in India, but an unbiased observer will be hard put to find fault with the author or his evidence. Mr Maxwell was India correspondent for “The Times'* from 1959 until 1967; he is now with the Commonwealth Institute at Oxford University. He admits freely that before and during the 1962 war he was convinced that India was the victim of Chinese aggression, and that only China’s stubbomess in refusing negotiation forced India to fight a defensive war for which it was unprepared. But in the wake of the war he gradually began to learn, especially from some senior army officers in India, a different version of what had happened. As a result, he set out to explore the events leading up to the war as fully as possible, to document his evidence, and to present it without bias. The result is an outstanding piece of scholarship and contemporary historical research, not overloaded with detail, but sufficiently spiced with anecdote and incident to make easy reading in spite of its length and complexity. In essence, the story he unfolds is one in which the Indian Government, determined to press claims to a border which had been fixed unilaterally by the British Government and never acknowledged by China, turned more and more to a policy of military harassment of Chinese border posts in the disputed area. India was confident that the Chinese would never respond in strength, that India’s reputation for non-violence must deter the Chinese

from appearing as the aggressors even while it won support in the outside world for India’s territorial claims. Not least,' the Indians were determined to refuse Chinese overtures to negotiate, while always appearing to be the conciliatory party. Then, as now, China’s reputation in the West as a dangerous expansionist power, was India’s strongest weapon. If the worst came to the worst, India could depend on Western help just because its adversary was China. Indian troops, poorly clothed and poorly equipped for fighting at altitudes up to 17,000 feet, thus found themselves at both ends of the Himalayas facing more numerous and better armed Chinese in situations where the orders from New Delhi were to push back the “invaders,” by force if necessary. The military outcome was all too evident to the Indian officers on the top. Net the least important and revealing part of Mr Maxwell’s book deals with the way in which officers called on to perform the impossible tasks responded some by resignation, some by heated protests to their superiors which led to their transfer and some by attempting to carry out orders with a courage not deserved by the stupidity of the civilian “strategists” they served. As Indian harassment in the disputed zones increased, with each side building fortified posts among those set up by the other so that the troops were within shouting range and could even exchange rations on occasions, Chinese patience dwindled away. An Indian attempt to displace a Chinese post by force in an area where even the Indians believed their claim to a border adjustment was based on dubious evidence, led to the Chinese advance. China’s attack was a demonstration to India that the border dispute could never be solved in India’s favour by military means. The Chinese withdrawal was, equally, designed to show that Peking was still prepared to negotiate a settlement on the situation as it existed before the war. Indian equip-

ment captured in the rapid Chinese advance was handed back in good condition; some of it had even been repaired. The Communist Chinese appear in Mr Maxwell’s book in a light which the West is not accustomed to. This alone gives “India’s China War” an importance which transcends the incidents it describes. Entering their 21st year, Corgi paperbacks showed the book trade something they called their solid gold back list, made up of their top-selling fiction authors. The solid gold cad at the very top is apparently one Mickey Spillane, whose aggregate is now up to 5,063,000 copies. The success of his Mike Hammer stories offends some, like the television interviewer who said to him: “It’s a terrible commentary on American reading habits, but in the top ten fiction sellers of the last 50 years you have seven.” Spillane replied: "Aw, shut up! You’re lucky I didn’t write three more."