The Press TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1970. The law on fingerprints

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32474, 8 December 1970, Page 16

The Press TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1970. The law on fingerprints

Many citizens will surely be dismayed to learn that Mr Justice Macarthur has felt compelled to overrule the Magistrate’s dismissal of a charge against a man who refused to allow the police to take his fingerprints. Mr H. J. Evans, S.M., after considering the prosecution of Mr K. Duffield in Christchurch last June, was persuaded that the police had sufficiently identified Mr Duffield by other means. The point on which the argument turned was the interpretation of words in the Police Act: “as may be deemed “ necessary for the identification of that person ”. The Magistrate was faced with the choice of two courses: to accept the police view that they were to be sole judges of what was “ necessary ” and that this referred to past, present, and future purposes of identification; or to accept a defence that Mr Duffield was already known to the police and recognised by them, and that no further identification was necessary

The Magistrate chose the latter, which in his opinion was the proper course because it appeared “ less calculated to touch the inviolability of the “ subject and the presumption of innocence pending “ proof of guilt ”, It is important to note that in this prosecution the police did not show—and apparently had no wish to show—that fingerprint identification was material to the charge on which the defendant was originally held. They had no fingerprints of Mr Duffield on record; they did not show that fingerprints had entered into, or were likely to enter into, the investigation of the alleged offence. Had they done so. the Magistrate might well have ruled differently. The police wanted to defend a practice they had followed, unchallenged, for many years and which they believed was “ necessary ”, The Supreme Court decision, given on the Police Department’s appeal, confirms the practice. In particular, it confirms that the police do not have to show reason for taking fingerprints if challenged. If the Supreme Court is compelled to interpret the law In this way the law itself is wrong and should be amended. It should be revised to ensure that the proper work of the police is not obstructed, that the courts can entertain a reasonable defence for refusing fingerprints, and that the liberty of the subject will be curtailed only when the police are able to show that fingerprinting is necessary in a particular case—not just to sustain a routine practice.