BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM Deterrence held to be motive

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32462, 24 November 1970, Page 15

BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM Deterrence held to be motive

(N.Z. Press Association—Copyright) WASHINGTON, November 23. The big United States air strikes against North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia at the week-end were apparently ordered by President Nixon to deter the enemy from offensives throughout Indo-China in the coming months, the New York Times News Service reported. ‘ ,

Official silence on the raids continued, but the Defence Secretary, Mr

Melvin Laird, said the Pentagon would hold a briefing at 11 a.m. today. Mr Laird said on Saturday that the attacks were intended to protect American pilots flying unarmed reconnaissance aircraft over North Vietnam and interdicting the flow of enemy supplies on the Ho Chi Minh trail in southeastern Laos. “STRATEGIC RESPONSE” However, authoritative informants described the strikes as a “pattern of strategic response” against the rapidly growing enemy build-up along most of the Indo-China fronts. Administration sources said that the bombing raids were a reprisal for the downing of a reconnaissance plane over North Vietnam on November 13. Speaking privately, Administration officials said that for the moment no additional raids would be undertaken against North Vietnam. But they said that they would not rule out new attacks —such as those conducted today—on areas in Laos and Cambodia. Informed sources said that the raids had been consistent with Mr Nixon’s often-stated policy of reprisals if the enemy took advantage,

through increased military action, of his programme of gradually withdrawing United States forces from South Vietnam. In this connection, they called attention to a passage in Mr Nixon’s speech to the nation last April 20, when he announced the withdrawal of 150,000 more men from South Vietnam by May, 1971. President Nixon said: “It I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardises our remaining forces in Vietnam I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.” Ten days later United States and South Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia for a two-month incursion designed to destroy enemy sanctuaries and act against what Mr Nixon had termed the enemy’s increased military action. Two days after the incursion began, United States planes carried out a series of attacks on North Vietnamese targets in what the Administration explained at the time as “protective reaction” against firing on unarmed reconnaissance planes. SMALLER SCALE Informed sources said yesterday that this week-end’s strikes followed the previous pattern, although on a much smaller scale and without the involvement of ground forces. The sources said that Mr

Nixon evidently had been concerned by reports of a rapid enemy build-up in most of Indo-China after Hanoi rejected his peace plan of October 7 and after American forces in South Vietnam had been cut to 384,000 men on October 15. Reports of what appeared to be major enemy build-up efforts, “presaging possible new offensives,” began reaching Washington late last month, near the end of the monsoon season, as infiltration routes down the Ho Chi Minh trail started drying. Early last week, senior Administration officials said that the infiltration this month was running at twice the rate of last year. Simultaneously, intelligence evaluations showed that Hanoi was concentrating units in southern Laos —presumably to protect the Ho Chi Minh trail—sharply increasing its forces in northeastern Cambodia and possibly preparing thrusts against the Central Highlands in South Vietnam and the area south of the Demilitarised Zone. NEW STOCKPILE Reconnaissance flights also revealed new supply stockpiles in North Vietnam, either to feed the troops moving south or to support moves against the area below the Demilitarised Zone. Informed sources said that a series of high-level meetings were held in Washington last week by Mr Nixon and the Washington Special Action Group, which comprises officials of the White House State Department, Defence Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Central Intelligence Agency. According to these sources, the meetings resulted in re-

commendations to warn Hanoi to desist from offensive preparations. The final decision for the air strikes—the most intensive aerial action against North Vietnam since the bombing was halted in November, 1968—was reportedly made last Thursday at a session of the National Security Council at the White House.