GULF POLICY C4UTIQUS BRITISH MOVES AMID QUARRELLING SHEIKS

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32360, 28 July 1970, Page 16

GULF POLICY C4UTIQUS BRITISH MOVES AMID QUARRELLING SHEIKS

~ (Reprinted from Un "tconomiit" bn arvanooment) It is right that the British Government is taking a long, cool look at the'situation in the Persian Gulf before it decides whether or not to keep a military presence there. Although the rulers of the Gulf sheikdoms had convinced themselves that the Conservatives would reverse Labour’s decision to withdraw from the Gulf by the end of 1971, this is not what Mr Heath’s Government is- committed to. What the Conservatives said before the election, and what the ..Foreign Secretary (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) has confirmed since, is that they will consult the interested countries to see what Britain can do for the peace and stability of the areal

The implication is that if these consultations show the need for a continuing British presence, the Government will not flinch from supplying it. But the consulting has bnly just begun. ' Sir Alee Douglas-Home got his. priorities right in flying to Brussels to talk first with the Shah of Iran, Whatever Mr Heath may have thought the Shah said to him when they met in Teheran in April, 1909, the Iranian Government has since made it plain that it wants the British withdrawal to take place as planned. Iran has . strong grounds ; for- fearing that revolutionary : Arab regimes could establish ■ themselves in Kuwait, Bahrain and the Trucial States. The Iraqi Ba’athists make no secret of the fact that they are aiding the revolutionaries in these States. Of course, the Shah is against this; but his argument is that British garrisons would provide both a rallyingpoint and a target for the revolutionaries and would therefore make things more unstable. No Welcome Mat More recently, Kuwait has echoed Iran’s demand that Britain should withdraw. The Saudi Arabians are keeping their cards close to their chests, but Kiftg Fefsal will certainly not publicly dissent No independent Arab ruler can afford to be caught putting out a welcome mat for the British. So it looks as if the three already independent States in the area trill all urge Britain to complete the withdrawal on the promised schedule. ■ But it ,is not the same with the rulers of the States which Britain is still committed to defend until the end of next year—Bahrain, Qatar and the seven Trucial sheikdoms, in which the 7000 British troops are actually stationed. These men do not see the departure of the soldiers as a means of preventing trouble. On the contrary, they regard the British presence as a protection against internal subversion, against any attempt by their more powerful neighbours to swallow them up, or by one sheikdom to take over another. This is the core of Britain’s problem. The Labour Government had hoped that by the end of 1971 the nine States would have formed a viable federation, the Union of Arab Emirates, which would take its place as a sovereign country in the Arab League and the United Nations, and would have the resources to look after its own military problems. No Dividends These hopes have not been fulfilled. The negotiations for a federation have moved at a snail’s pace, and Britain’s policy of refraining from putting the rulers under any pressure to settle their quarrels has paid no dividends. Yet if there is to be any sort of stability in this part of the Gulf some form of federation, at least of the Trucial States, i$ essential. Sir Alec Douglas-Home should not allow the rulers to imagine that Britain is prepared to treat with them individually. That would stop the hope of federation in its tracks. The right policy is to apply pressure on the recalcitrant, and to make it clear that these States cannot hope for British military support unless they unite. But, if they do unite, the resulting Union of Arab Emirates will need help in its early years. Britain is best placed to provide it If the Trucial Oman Scouts are to retain their independence, and their reputation as

should be tackled during the general negotiations about the area that Sir Alec is now embarking on. Unrest In Oman A third complication is the internal situation in Muscat and Omap. Rumours of unrest among the Omanis in the northern part of the country and of plots to overthrow the Sultan have been gathering strength- It remains to be seen if his son, Sultan Qabas Bin Said, can unify the country. There are fears among the Trucial rulers of an Omani rebellion which could spread into their own States. It will not be easy to pull all these strands together into an agreement that meets Britain’s interest in the stability of the Gulf. Clearly, the grounds for keeping British troops there are not

as strong, and will not last as long, as in South-East Asia. But there is an argument for extending the time r limit of the eventual British withdrawal to give the Union of Arab Emirates a chance to get on its feet, and to buy . time to tackle the Gulf's i frontier disputes. i This is not to argue that . British responsibilities should then end. If and when the . Suez Canal is reopened the ( Soviet navy, probably with a i base at Aden, will certainly ■ make its presence felt in the . Gulf. It is here that Britain i can make its longest-lasting ' contribution. A continuing British naval presence is likely to be welcomed by ' Iran; and although the Iraqis i would never say so, it might i suit them, too, if the waters , of the Gulf were not solely in ; the hands of the Shah and t Russia.

. a fair minded umpire in tri- . bal squabbles and border disi putes, British officers should be available to command ; them. British officers could also continue to help in train- , ing the union’s defence and . police forces. " 1 The Shah of Iran has hinted ; that he might not oppose a defence agreement if it was ' freely negotiated by an independent union government

And there are good reasons why Britain would like to hold on to the ILA.F. base at Sharjah. The base on Masirah Island farther south, which is leased from the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, is threatened by the rebellion against the ancient and idiosyncratic ruler whose deposition in favour of his son has just been reported. - Sharjah is a useful alternative. It would also provide a valuable training base for the R.A.F. and possibly for Army units But any .agreement to lease Sharjah will have to be made with a union government—which must first be formed. There are other complicating factors which will have to be sorted out before a withdrawal can safely be made. Iran’s claim to the islands of Abu Musa and the Tumbs in the neck of the Gulf is one. Another is the Saudi Arabians’ renewed claim to the Byraimi oasis and to large chunks of Abu Dhabi's desert regions. Both these plaints