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Middle East Stalemate

Amid the welter of speculation on the possibility of peace talks between Israel and the Arab States, it is pertinent to compare the Russian and American viewpoints. President Nixon says there can be no peace settlement while Russian-dictated Arab policy is to keep Israel militarily weaker than its opponents. The Russian counter appears to be that there can be no peace while Israel feels strong enough to stand fast on the cease-fire lines as they were at the end of the six-day war in 1967. President Nasser professes to have accepted the American proposals for new talks without qualification. His own words, in a nation-wide broadcast, reduce that claim to absurdity. He demanded, apparently as a precondition to talks, that the United States should cease supplying arms to Israel, which would make a farce of any further diplomatic bargaining. Then he reaffirmed Egypt’s intention to liberate the occupied areas. “If diplomatic action fails”, he said, “we “ will have no alternative except military action If, as seems likely, Israel’s willingness to test anew initiative by Dr Jarring is also qualified, the impasse will be no nearer resolution. The Israelis mistrust the proposal for a limited cease-fire, not because they question Washington’s good faith but because they fear that Egypt, with Russian connivance, would use the 90-day truce to install, in more forward positions, anti-aircraft and other missiles covering the Suez Canal. Mr Nixon is now said to have assured the Prime Minister (Mrs Meir) of his endorsement of Israel’s refusal to retire from the cease-fire lines before a peace settlement and of Washington’s intention to maintain the military balance of power in the Middle East.

In this context, President Nasser’s comment to a conference of the ruling Arab Socialist Union, that Egypt wanted peace but regarded the chances of achieving it as remote, suggests a cynicism as cold and calculating as at any time since 1967. If no peace can be negotiated, the obstructor will not be Israel; it will be Egypt, defiant under the broadening cover of Russian weapons. The Palestinian reaction to the peace plan was to be expected, and poses no threat that Israel would not be able to handle. Should the. guerrillas continue their raids, cease-fire or not, the Israelis will retaliate. The dilemma of King Hussein must in these circumstances become progressively more painful. There is certainly little to encourage optimism in the present flurry of argument and consultation. What is most disturbing is that President Nasser, with Russian encouragement, still seems to think that he can have it both ways—regain control of the lost zones and crush Israel at the same time. So long as he cherishes such hopes he must expect Israel to spurn any suggestion of cease-fires and talks.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19700728.2.114

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32360, 28 July 1970, Page 16

Word Count
459

Middle East Stalemate Press, Volume CX, Issue 32360, 28 July 1970, Page 16

Middle East Stalemate Press, Volume CX, Issue 32360, 28 July 1970, Page 16