THE AMERICAN SCENE—III Presidential Dilemma Over Vietnam

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 32234, 28 February 1970, Page 17

THE AMERICAN SCENE—III Presidential Dilemma Over Vietnam

(By SIR LESLIE MUNRO, M.P.)

After writing of some of the ills of the United States—not forgetting that we have problems too—l propose to deal at some length with the American involvement in South Vietnam. Informed Americans, by the way, are well aware that our contribution in troops to Vietnam is minimal. In fact; a young Englishman from Oxford, a reporter on one of the Philadelphia papers, asked me —I thought rather maliciously—why this was so.

I replied in terms of ou contribution to two Worl Wars and in Korea. I sai that there was a limit to ou resources in manpower, could have added ths Britain, though a member c 5.E.A.T.0., had not contr bated forces in Vietnam. I have delayed writing o the Vietnamese conflict unti I have considered, howeve briefly, some of the domesti Problems of the Unite' States. Many Americans, cei tainly many of those voca consider their domestic evil stem from their commitment in Vietnam. Had it not beet they say, for this costly entei prise, billions of dollar could have been expended t remove the slums and ghetto of the United States and t make the new America o which Mr Nixon has ek quently spoken. No-one knows the answe to this hypothetical questiot for the Vietnamese war ha occurred tad continues. Th victories of 1918 and 194 were far from eliminating a a result the slums of th great cities of the Unite States. Noone can be sur of the exact meaning of M Nixon’s “irreversible” de cision to continue America: troop redeployments. Wise Silence Does it mean, as one pai ticulariy astringent commer tator has said, that after with drawals 100,000 American sei vicemen will remain ii Vietnam indefinitely to guidi and help the South Vietnam ese in. conflict? Nobod; knows at this stage an< perhaps for a long time ti come. The Administration i wise to be silent and reticent Not altogether silent. Thi Secretary of Defence. M: Melvin L. Laird, is a talkativi man and sometimes it is han ' to reconcile his pronounce ments. The Nixon policy o withdrawal is “irreversible.’ But the “Washington Post’ Service in Saigon reports Mi Laird as saying there tha United States combat troop: would remain in Vietnan after American forces hat given up the primary combat responsibility in the war. Ht said such United States com hat forces would be necessary to protect American suppor troops left to help the Souti Vietnamese. All this is far from pleasin! to doves like Senator J. W Fulbright, described as tin leader of the doves. Mr Deal Acheson, in his book, “Pre sent at the Creation,” dis cusses the policy of limiter engagement—the aim. stulti fied for a while by Genera MacArthur —in the Koreai War. “In its execution, thii policy invites dissent ant criticism from both those wh< are afraid that the balanc: is being tipped against th: possibility of keeping th: war limited and from thos: who fear that keeping i limited precludes the possibil ity of victory and who believ: that “there is no substituti for victory.’ The former, nov called 'doves,’ reduce th: national objective with ever; reversal and soon wish t:

ur scrap the whole effort. The ■ld ‘hawks’ would raise the sights lid with every success and call ur for unconditional surrender.” Il ia ‘ Only Course of: J ri-l Mr Acheson’s definition of doves today fits Senator Fuk on: bright. Chairman of the til:Foreign Relations Committee, er land Senator Mike Mansfield, tie: the Democratic Senator ed'Majority Leader. On my *r- reading of their statements al, they urge a withdrawal from ils South Vietnam of all Ameriits can forces as speedily as m, possible—a scrapping, in •r- Acheson’s words, of the whole trs effort In fact Senator Fulto bright has asked the quesos tion: “Does Vietnamisation to mean that all American of troops will be withdrawn 10- or only our ground combat ; troops, leaving a ‘residual’ er force of 100,000 or 200,000 or m. 300,000 men?” as I have no doubt that Mr he Nixon’s policy of withdrawal 45 (whatever its precise limits) as and Vietnamisation has the he support of the great majority ed of the American public. No re other course, an eminent dr Republican told me, is le- politically possible for the an President Two other responsible Americans told me that they wanted peace, but peace with honour. This is one, perhaps the leading one, of ir- the issues upon whose sucn- cessful outcome depends Mr h- Nixon’s hope of a second >r- term. in Two of Mr Fulbright’s staff ie consultants, both former n- Foreign Service officers, have jy made an inspection trip to id South Vietnam and have to found that the assumption is underlying current Adminisit tration policy “rests on far ae more ambiguous, confusing Ir and contradictory evidence re than pronouncements from rd Washington and Saigon indi-e-cate.” of As one writer in the “New .’’ York Times” Weekly Review t”!of February 8 has pertinently [r said: “While larger, better at'trained and more thoroughly is equipped, they (the South miVietnamese forces) are still id beset with serious problems it;of leadership, motivation and [e morale. The army desertion n- rate remains cripplingly high ry'as a result of bad pay and rt a quixotic, maladministered th leave policy.” For one thing the South Vietnamese do not igi relish fighting at night V.j “t Public Opinion e-' I had the opportunity of s-' speaking to an American id serviceman on leave from ti-1 Vietnam. His view was that al as long as the South Vietin namese believe that the Americans will carry the heat is and burden of the fighting, id. they, the South Vietnamese, io ; will not exert their full fightce ing capacity. But he believes ie that under compulsion they ie would prove that capacity. se Mr Laird, along with others, it believes that there will be 11- some temporary set-backs and re that the road to Vietnamisate tion is not going to be free »w of some hard knocks and ae some disappointments. It is ry difficult not to share this to conviction.

e The public approach to the s war has to take into account 11 the attitude of the Negroes. ’’ A big proportion of the American forces in Vietnam is Negro. As many Negroes do not attend universities f they do not escape early I- induction into the draft. I e was surprised when the >, President of Columbia Uni1, versify told me that there, r were only some 800 Negroes: y on his campus. s American leaders of public; n opinion see a distinction i- beteen the former Korean s war and the conflict in Vietn nam. They regard the South e Koreans as having the will I- to win. They are not per-: i- suaded that the South Vietn namese have this will. They: a are disgusted with the booby a traps, treachery and terrort ism of the Vietnamese war, I’ disgusted with the realisation r that the quiet-moving, inscrutable peasant in the day may rbe the guerrilla fighter in il the night. ). It may be too much to say e that the war has got on y American nerves. Certainly a the leaders of the Democratic t party are working hard for s total American withdrawal b from a conflict they regard r as useless—far too costly in t blood and money and not in b the interest of the United , States. Mr Nixon must count: f on the steadfastness of the '-[“silent majority” of his r countrymen. 1 ' (To be concluded) r r