The Press TUESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1970. Nigeria After Biafra

Press, Volume CX, Issue 32194, 13 January 1970, Page 8

The Press TUESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1970. Nigeria After Biafra

All the signs are that the beginning of the end of the war between Biafra and Federal Nigeria is at hand. Some kind of resistance might still be possible on the part of the secessionists but it would merely prolong and increase the sufferings of the courageous Ibo people. The only hope now is that the prospect of victory will induce in Lagos a more magnanimous and more just appreciation of the factors that led to the Biafran secession 2| years ago—mainly the fear of massacre which possessed the nine million Ibos in the Eastern Region. General Ojukwu hw apparently left the country, which suggests he has abandoned all hope Of organised military resistance. General Gowon has promised the Ibos they will have Federal protection if they submit, and that they need not fear reprisals. Events will show what sueh assurances are worth; but there Is at least the hope that Federal troops, now better disciplined than earlier in the war, will observe the code of conduct laid down by the Government, especially in their treatment of refugees. Massive outside aid will be needed to alleviate the Biafrans’ suffering, The United States, France, and Britain, among others, have already promised substantial aid. Notwithstanding this country’s normal policy of concentrating its overseas aid on under-developed countries round or near the Pacific, New Zealand should announce without delay its commitment to the rescue and rehabilitation of Biafra. The prospect ot disaster is imminent; only an international rescue operation can stave off hunger and privation for hundreds of thousands—and, hopefully, induce the authorities in Lagos to act magnanimously in victory.

If the bitter struggle is indeed ending, there will be scope in Lagos for a statesmanlike approach to the re-establishment of order jn the Eastern Region, from which Biafra emerged. The Federal attitude has consistently been that there could be no peace talks until secession was abandoned. General Ojukwu, on the other hand, wanted a ceasefire and consideration of a Constitution guaranteeing Biafra independence and equal status with Federal Nigeria. In the aftermath of defeat he will not get concessions of that order. A realistic view in Lagos, nevertheless, should admit the justice of the earlier Biafran plea for a looser form of federation, with limited regional autonomy, which General Ojukwu had sought General Gowon will be aware that the crushing of Ibo hopes will not end tribal unrest in the vast area under Federal control The 13 million HausaFulanl and the 12 million Yoruba are far from satisfied with the status forced on them when Lagos carved out the 12 new Nigerian states in 1967, one of which was designed to separate the Ibo from the non-Ibo tribal components of the East

Larger state units grouped round a looser centre —which is what the Hausa, the Yoruba and the Ibo have all sought—may be the only solution if any semblance of unity is to be restored and the Federation made workable. It has already been argued that Lagos could remain a capital territory, and that defence could be co-ordinated there, with area commands for largely indigenous forces in the regions. In Biafra’s special case, it is thought, sharing of the oil revenues could be subject to compromise, because the largest reserves are offshore, and exploitation would be a Federal rather than a regional responsibility. Biafra has tragically illustrated what can result from intransigence at the centre. The Hausa and the Yoruba will assuredly be watching what results from any assuagement-of Ibo fears and any adjustment of Ibo claims.