U.S. Diplomatic Problems

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 32077, 27 August 1969, Page 6

U.S. Diplomatic Problems

(From DAVID ZXZL, N.Z.P.A. itaf! correnpondtnt) SINGAPORE, Aug. 25. The extremely delicate task of diplomacy facing the United , States in its efforts to reduce its military commitment in Vietnam was dearly in evidence in the last week. United States policies ran Into trouble on the battlefield, where the Viet Cong refused to make withdrawal easy; In Thailand, where foreign policy makers are beginning to show their determination not to be caught wearing pro-West colours if they should suddenly become obsolescent; and in Saigon, where President Nguyen Van Thieu made a bid for independence by appointing General Tran Thien Khiem as Prime Minister. President Nixon’s decision to postpone an announcement of further troop withdrawals must have taken all these factors into account, balancing them against the domestic political kudos to be won by pressing ahead with disengagement from the war. The postponement of further withdrawal decisions will bring some hope to several South-East Asian countries, which have been watching American actions rather than listening to American words in judging the degree of confidence to be placed on assurances <rf continued American support. Disillusionment

Had President Nixon moved recklessly ahead in announcing further withdrawals in the face of the latest Communist offensive, disillusionment would have been widespread.

A run on the bank of Asian confidence in American intentions could easily have had ugly repercussions—particularly in the Philippines, now in the throes of an election campaign, and in Thailand, where a degree of nervousness exists already. Both these countries have troop detachments in Vietnam. Thailand has recently

giv«n notice of intention to reduce its contribution, and the Philippines Civic Action group has been, and could easily become again, an explosive political issue. Recent patterns of military activity in. Vietnam indicate that the American President has every chance of being able to announce further withdrawals, without giving rise to immediate charges of “surrender,” within a few weeks. Military analysts say that the -Viet Cong and North Vietnamese are unable to mount a sustained offensive, and the likelihood is that the recent high point will soon give way to a politically useful battlefield lull. Bargaining Position The Communists, however, have made their point. Their offensive, now seemingly on the wane and unsuccessful though it was, was mounted in the face of the clearest possible statement of American willingness—even keenness—to accept much less than victory as the price of withdrawal. By refusing to accept the bait for a continuation of the battlefield lull, the Communists have maintained their bargaining position that the Americans are being driven from Vietnam, not leaving because their military task is complete. President Nixon, in calling for a suspension of progress in withdrawal, has acknowledged that tactics in Vietnam must be keyed to many fronts.

President Johnson had the problem—never solved of carrying the American people with him in escalating the war.

President Nixon has the even more complex problem of carrying with him, in his programme of de-escalation, not only the American people but also the government of South Vietnam and of Thailand, with a wary eye to be kept on other Governments in the region. Thieu Independent President Thieu signalled his independence—and the noh-eonformity of American and South Vietnamese Gov-

ernment interests by appointing a Right-wing Prime Minister (albiet a very able administrator) in the face of American hopes for a more broadly-based government, hopefully to be closer to a government likely to be acceptable to the Viet Cong. Thailand chose to demonstrate the deteriorating climate in relations With the United States by calling for immediate consultations on the withdrawal of American troops from bases used to bomb Vietnam and Laos. It is strongly argued in Thailand that the country

cannot afford to “drag its heel” in any move towards a climate of accommodation

with Communists in Vietnam. Anti-Americanism, always latent in Thailand, can be used as an overt symbol of changing attitudes. President Nixon’s postponement of an announcement of further withdrawals will lessen any impression of a hel-ter-skelter troop evacuation. But a long period of diplomatic coaxing lies ahead in the doube-barrelled attempt to lessen military commitments while retaining political influence.