VISIT TO ULSTER THE COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO MR CALLAGHAN

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 32076, 26 August 1969, Page 18

VISIT TO ULSTER THE COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO MR CALLAGHAN

[By David Watt. Political Editor of the “Financial Times.” London./ [Reprinted from the “Financial Times” by arrangement] To Mr Wilson and Mr James Callaghan the Bogside district of Londonderry must seem well-named. As soon as British troops were committed there on Thursday the British Government set their feet in a morass, and now that their soldiers are deployed in Belfast itself they are in up to the neck. They have, of course, gone in with their eyes open. No-one in Whitehall has the slightest illusions about the dangers involved. Nor, I think, can any reasonable person blame them.

The only alternatives to a military intervention from Westminster were a gradual descent into civil war as the Royal Ulster Constabulary’s frail grip on the situation was progressively weakened or the mobilisation of the “B” Specials which would have come to much the same thing in the end. So long as one accepts that Northern Ireland is an integral part of the Unitecj Kingdom, and not (as one is sometimes tempted to think) an outlandish interloper from the seventeenth century, its inhabitants cannot be denied protection of their lives and property by the armed forces of the Crown. Tenacious Ground Yet there is no getting away from the fact that this Irish swamp seems likely to have all the main characteristics of its kind—it will be extremely unwilling to let go its hold and it will offer no firm ground on which Its victim can rest. Mr Callaghan has put it out that both the Londonderry and Belfast operations are temporary measures. But it is very hard to see how the troops are to ’ be extricated in short order. , Either their presence will ' prove salutary, in which case ; the dangers of removing them ' will be only too obvious; or ' alternatively they will arouse the enmity of one side or ! other in which case they will , have to be reinforced. Nor is it only the troops ' themselves who are impli- ; cated. The British Govern- . ment itself is now firmly ' saddled with the responsi- , bllity for what goes well or ill in the two main cities of I Northern Ireland. The Gov- , ernment has been careful, and understandably so, to emphaj sise that the troops are not ’ the “mercenaries” of the Nori them Ireland Government, but remain under the exclusive control of the General ' Officer Commanding Northern > Ireland and, through him, of . the Westminster Government, i This means not only that Mr Wilson and his colleagues will now be held to have failed if rioting breaks out under the noses of their soldiers but it is they who will eazry the can if there is a single incident of carelessness, brutality or over-reac-tion bn the part bf their men. One must hope, and believe, that none of these sins of commission or omission will be perpetrated. But it is only fair to point out that the troops are in what is theoretically the most difficult and dangerous of all situations—-caught between two hostile groups and in . such small numbers that if , real trouble starts they will : have almost no choice but to ’ use “excessive” force in order 1 to defend themselves and maintain the status quo. The Main Hope In this situation, the British Government’s main hope of

finding firm ground lies in two possibilities. The first is to maintain a vice-like grip on the activities of all troops on the ground. But more important, since the first is so difficult, will be to try to influence the over-all political climate in which the troops are operating. There are, in theory, three possible lines of policy open to the Government. They could act, so far as possible, as the agents of the Stormont Government, hoping that Major Chichester-Clark and his Cabinet will be able to tackle the root causes of the present troubles if British troops can only give them the breathing space to do so. The second alternative would be to write off Stormont as being hopelessly compromised and incompetent and institute a period of direct rule from Westminster. Finally, one might aim for a compromise solution under which the lines of responsibility were blurred. Let us consider these alternatives in turn:— 1. Britain supports the Status Quo. The arguments for this course are much stronger than it is now fashionable (particularly on the Left wing) to suppose. The Stormont Government is the legally constituted authority of Northern Ireland. It was freely elected, and though some of the individual results were notoriously jerrymandered in favour of the Unionist Party there is no reason to suppose that even in the most impartial electoral system Major Chi-chester-Clark would not be Prime Minister. The Government constitutes the only serious existing force for stability in the Province arid it would be undeniably risky, as well as offering a premium to violence, to undermine its authority still further. On the other hand, to be realistic, it is now extremely doubtful, after the events of the past three weeks, whether the Stormont Government as at present constituted commands sufficient respect among the Catholic third of the population to be able to hold the situation while the necessary reforms are carried out. After the General Election in February and the resignation of Captain O’Neill, it looked for a while as if Major Chiehester-Clark would be able to achieve what his predecessor had failed to bring about—that is to carry the

Unionist party in the reform of the electoral system and the allocation of housing to the advantage of the Catholic minority. This prospect has now been dashed partly through the folly and weakness of the Northern Ireland Government itself, but, partly, to be fair, through reactions in the Protestant and Catholic communities which it was extremely hard, to control. It Has to be faced, therefore, that the effdrt to sustain the present Stormont Government against the animosity of the Catholic population would demand British forces on a scale far greater than any British Government could contemplate. And what is I more, the attempts to do so would identify British troops, in the long run, with the Stormont Government, thus exposing the troops themselves to the violence of Catholic mobs and forfeiting the British Government's ability to calm the situation.

2. Britain assumes direct control. The obvious alternative to supporting the Status Quo is to destroy it by force and this option has undeniable attractions particularly to the Left for whom the Unionist Government is the embodiment of a corrupt Right-wing machine. The argument runs that the only way for Westminster to sustain its impartiality and freedom of manoeuvre would be to suspend the Northern Ireland Constitution, by repealing the Northern Ireland Act of 1920 when the Government of the Province would revert to Westminster. Not only would this enable Mr Callaghan to be in firmer control of the maintenance of law and order, it would also permit him (perhaps through the agency of an appointed commission of all-Party moderates) to put through civil rights reforms and lay the foundation of the new balance of power between Protestant and Catholic which is the essential political prerequisite of peace. This is all very well in theory but it has serious practical disadvantages which make it virtually certain that the British Government will reject it, except in the direst possible circumstances. The first difficulty, which must weigh heavily with a practical politician like Mr Callaghan, is that he would be very unlikely to get all-party support in the House of Commons for such a policy. The instinctive reaction of the Conservative Party, quite apart from its links with Ulster Unionism, will always be in favour of supporting an established government against violent rebellion. Nor will Mr Heath and his colleagues be anxious to make a rod for their own backs by allowing the British Government to assume daunting responsibilities likely to last well beyond 1971. The more important diffi-.

culty; however, would arise in Northern Ireland itself. For just as the intervention of British troops on behalf of the Northern Ireland Government would in the long run probably alienate the Catholic minority, an intervention which entailed the overthrow of the Unionist Government would most certainly enrage the Protestant majority. It might be argued, however, that tn fact the Protestants have nowhere to turn but to London, since the ultimate alternative is either abject poverty or Dublin. However, we are not dealing with a situation in which this kind of rational calculation is made. The Rev, lan Paisley and his boys will certainly not be restrained by it from unleashing merry hell on a Government which appeared to be “pandering to Papists” or which could be presented as preparing a “sell-out to the South."

’ 3. Britain tries to compromise • If it is conceded that 1 neither of the two extreme • courses of action is really pos- ’ sible, Mr Callaghan has no ! choice but to try to strike a ’ balance between them. How 1 is this to be done? Ideally, ’ of course, the trick would be ■to combine the essential ! features of each of the first ’ two alternatives while avold- ’ ing their drawbacks—that is, i to sustain a stable continuity at Stormont, but to change it ’ radically without having to ’ accept the responsibility for i doing so. This is no doubt what Mr Callaghan will try to achieve ' this week. If he could persu- , ade Major Chichester-Clark to . broaden the base of his Gov- . ernment by setting up a coali- ’ tion containing Catholic and J Civil Rights Ministers (perl haps adding the safeguard of ‘ some advisers from London), he might provide the promise i of reform which is required and maintain “de facto” con- . trol of his troops without . stirring up Protestant outL rage and without being forced . to carry the can if things , went wrong. : Prisoner Of Party i The difficulty, of course, I will be to get the Northern , Ireland • Prime Minister to . agree. He is, like Captain j O’Neill, to a considerable r extent the prisoner of his . Party, and to many of his colleagues any real compromise with the Catholics is i still regarded as the ultimate ' betrayal of all that Unionism : was created to achieve. Yet Mr Callaghan has a . strong hand to play. Northern Ireland cannot exist . economically without heavy • subsidies from London, and i it has now been demonstrated ‘ that it can scarcely exist ■ politically without the assistance of troops from the same J source. It is possible that , compromise will be the first step on the slippery road to ’ extinction for the Unionist Party, and it will certainly involve considerable loss of face. But when the only other alternatives are the humiliation of a British takeover or the annihiliation of civil war, compromise may seem the lesser evil.

The British Home Secretary, Mr Callaghan, is visiting Ulster this week for discussions on the spot. This article outlines the courses of action open to Mr Callaghan.