‘Peace Is An Unsettling Condition'

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 31987, 14 May 1969, Page 17

‘Peace Is An Unsettling Condition '

(N.Z. Press Assn.-Copyright)

WASHINGTON, May 12.

Peace is an unsettling condition. The mere rumour of it coming to Vietnam has frightened the Australians, the Thais, Malaysians and other Pacific and SouthEast Asian, peoples, writes Louis Heren, of “The Times.”

For instance, President Marcos of the Philippines has warned that he might have to come to terms with China if American forces in Asia are reduced. Mr Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, is in the United States to seek reassurances from President Nixon. The fact that little or nothing has happened since President Johnson tried to get peace talks going for more than a year has not prevented rising apprehension, and no wonder. The Americans have been too prone to act without consulting their allies. The decision to stop completely the bombing of North Vietnam last year was largely an electoral campaign decision, and

Canberra and other friendly capitals were merely informed a few hours before the public announcement was made.

Rightly or wrongly, these Governments believe that President Nixon must begin to withdraw from Vietnam before, the summer is out if he is to avoid another war at home.

The thought that their future national security depends upon the circumstances of American domestic politics is enough to frighten most of them badly. Mr David Packard, the Deputy Defence Secretary, is also in charge of a review Qf American overseas commitments, and although a Pentagon chief is hardly likely to propose the abandonment of Asia, clearly the United States haS fought its last guerrilla war in that continent.

Australia and New Zealand have the A.N.Z.U.S; Treaty, of course, and the Philippines and Thailand have their own trucial arrangements. Only last week President Nixon reassured Mr Gorton that A.N.Z.U.S. and S.E.A.T.O. were alliances fundamental to the American position and strategy in South-East Asia, and that he supported the Australian decision to maintain troops in Malaysia and Singapore.

Mr William Rogers, the Secretary of State, is on his way to meet these allies in Bangkok. The usual reassurances will again be repeated. As far as formal commitments are concerned few have any cause for apprehension, but it is there nevertheless and has best been articulated by the Singapore Prime Minister. Mr Lee needs no instruction in this column. He is as . hardheaded as any of the alumni of the special centres of international studies in the United States, and a good deal tougher than most. He does not scare easily, nor is he impressed by the trappings of super power. He is a politician who instinctively understands Mr Nixon’s difficulties. He is also an Asian who believes that the United States did not have to get involved in Vietnam, but must not now depart without giving the South Vietnamese some fighting chance of political survival.

Above all, he is convinced that the United States must evolve a new South Asian and Pacific policy and desperately hopes that the old mistakes will not be repeated. Mr Lee is one of four Commonwealth Prime Ministers whose countries now depend directly upon American arms and diplomacy for their security.

Perhaps they are still sentimental about the old comfortable arrangements, and certainly Mr Gorton was reported to have expressed the hope that President ' Nixon would lead the United States to a position of world responsibility reminiscent of the role Britain played for more than a century. One wonders if a comparison can be made, or if he had forgotten the fall of Singapore. Comparison does not seem to be particularly fruitful in view of the changed conditions. Was Britain any better at assessing Asian developments, and backing her commitments with the necessary po'-er? Was Imperial Japan a greater danger to peace than modern China, or such imperialism to the Communist concept of wars of national liberation? Has Vietnam blunted the appetite for such wars, or will the eventual American withdrawal open the door to similar conflicts in Thailand or Malaysia? ■ There would appear to be no obvious answers to these questions, but they are being asked more and more here, by American officials and visitors such as Mr Lee. Then there is the larger question of whether the United States is prepared, if necessary, to stay in Asia

for a century or more. The answer is by no means clear. Indeed, Congressional opposition to the national security policies Mr Nixon has inherited. from his two predecessors, especially Mr Kennedy, suggest that it is unlikely.

In naval terms, of course, the United States sees itself as a two-ocean power. The Seventh Fleet will certainly be on station for the foreseeable future, but the assumption that the United States must be prepared to fight two wars and one or two minor conflicts simultaneously is under attack. If it goes, the defence of Europe will take precedence over Asia and the aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet will not be much use against the black-pyjamaed guerrillas of national liberation wars. Hence the nervous tremors among America’s allies * hen peace in Vietnam is mentioned and the recent anxious knocking at the White House door. Most are persuad d that the United States cannot possibly quit Vietnam until the South Vietnamese are ready to take over from American and allied troops. Some believe that largescale withdrawals before the end of the year would be disastrous.

Mr Nixon is, in fact, being asked to hang on to demon-

strate that national liberation wars are not the war of the future. That was one of the announced objectives of the American involvement in the first place. Since the challenge was accepted, the allies are naturally concerned that the point must be made, but what then?

I have heard no ready answers, and none seems available. The S.E.A.T.O. Foreign Ministers are soon to meet in Bangkok, but little is expected of them. If Vietnam has proved anything, it is that the Dullesian alliances are of little value. This is generally admitted, but the larger question of Asian and Pacific defence still remains unresolved.

It is a vexing situation, and one visitor tried to answer it by asking other questions. One was, does the domino theory have any validity? He went on to recall that it did not exist until somebody in the Eisenhower Administration invented it. The inference was that the Americans set a trap for themselves, and that such traps should be avoided when the time comes to withdraw from Vietnam. Mr Nixon seems to agree, but at this stage the only certainty is that peace in Vietnam will mark the beginning I of a period of considerable instability.