Conflict In The Kremlin?

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 31974, 29 April 1969, Page 14

Conflict In The Kremlin?

The picture of the Rumanian leader, Mr Ceausescu, sitting coldly at one more Communist leadership conference in Moscow and refusing to applaud another defence of Kremlin policy in Czechoslovakia gives sharper point to recent speculation on the state of the Communist alliance. Rumours of a split in the party hierarchy, and about the future of Mr Brezhnev himself, continue to come from East Europe. Whether Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin will lead the Soviet delegation to the much-talked-of international conference—assuming that it convenes at all on the planned date, June s—must now be open to doubt. The ‘ Economist” reports evidence suggesting that all was ready last December for Mr Brezhnev to assume full control of the party, combining the offices of Prime Minister and Chief Secretary. Mr Kosygin, it was believed, would retire for “ reasons of health ”. The ruling group in the Kremlin is said to be sharply divided on the direction of policy. One section ; takes the view that efforts to come to terms with . China must be continued, despite Mao Tse-tung’s; rejection of Moscow’s offer of new talks on frontier delineation. The other view, apparently favoured by the Brezhnev-Kosygin faction, is that reconciliation with the West has been made more urgent by Mao’s intransigence. If this is in fact the aim of current Kremlin diplomacy, the subjugation of Czechoslovakia appears more than ever as a clumsy blunder. But the effort to secure some understanding with the United States, and possibly West Germany also, is apparently being continued, and might well fit into the pattern indicated by the recent Warsaw Pact proposal for a European security conference—a proposal which has failed to arouse enthusiasm in the capitals of the West. That dissensions within the Kremlin have placed Mr Brezhnevs position in jeopardy can now hardly be doubted. If he gets his June summit meeting at all. it will certainly not express the solidarity for which he has been pleading. In theory, all the parties, whether Asian or European, would have to be invited But there would be some notable absentees, including Cuba. Albania, and North Vietnam, which flatly oppose pressure against China; and among those who might attend there would surely be delegations ready to repeat their condemnation of the brutal suppression of liberalism in Prague. Mr Brezhnev might think it better to have a small conference that he could handle than a large one ready to criticise and oppose. Either way. there would be a damaging loss of prestige. The next few months mav show what is in store for Mr Brezhnev. If he really intended a complete take-over in December, obviously he was thwarted by a stronger faction, which might yet push him out altogether.