U.S. Bases In S.E. Asia Likely For A Long Time

Press, Volume CIX, Issue 31922, 25 February 1969, Page 21

U.S. Bases In S.E. Asia Likely For A Long Time

<N.Z. Press Assn.—Copyright) WASHINGTON, February 24.

The United States may find it necessary to maintain bases and a limited number of troops in South-East Asia for many years—no matter how the Vietnam conflict eventually is resolved, writes Stewart Hensley, of United Press International.

This is the view of United States officials and analysts concerned with long-range planning. For obvious reasons they prefer not to talk about it publicly at a time when the emphasis is on ending the present war and withdrawing American and North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam. Much, of course, will depend on the kind of peace agreement reached between the allies and the Communists —assuming that some form of agreement is possible. Short Life A Vietnam peace plan which does not include an international agreement to guarantee the neutrality of South Vietnam—as well as neighbouring Laos and Cambodia—is not likely to last long. The result could be more instead of less chaos in the area. Even neutrality of all South-East Asia under an agreement backed by the big powers would be unlikely to bring real peace. Aside from the immediate peril of Communist invasion of South Vietnam and Laos, the longer-term danger to other South-East Asian nations comes from Chinesesponsored subversion. Experience has shown that international guarantees and policing arrangements cannot prevent this. Those in charge of United States foreign policy must deal with the harsh facts. While supporting every effort for international agreements to make South-East Asia neutral, American officials must be sure they do not lose their influence in the area until some foolproof system is developed. Not Likely Some Americans would like to see the United States leave the area entirely after getting some kind of face-saving solution in Vietnam. This is not on the cards. Any United States Adminis-

tration, Republican or Democrat, must face certain realities which make it virtually impossible for the Americans simply to cut and run after a Vietnam agreement. The most apparent of these is the United States commitment to Thailand under the S.E.A.T.O. Pact.

This treaty obligation of the United States has been made more binding by Thailand’s willingness to permit the Americans to establish six air bases in Thailand, station 43,000 United States troops there, and use the country as one staging area for the Vietnam war. Prime Target Thailand, which is troubled by a Communist-led insurrection in its north-eastern provinces, would be a prime target for Peking and Hanoi if the United States left the area.

The Communist-led insurgents in north-east Thailand are being trained and supplied by Peking and Hanoi, and their tactics are very similar to those of the Viet Cong in the days before North Vietnam’s invasion of the south. Another hard fact of life to be faced by the United States is that Britain’s planned withdrawal by 1971 of the rest of her forces in Malaysia and at the big Singapore naval base—now about 26,000 men—will leave a power vacuum in that part of South-East Asia which neither Australia nor New Zealand has shown any willingness to All. New Zealand lacks the resources but, according to United States officials, Australia could do it except for domestic political considerations. Public Opinion Administration officials are well aware that the American public and Congress would oppose the United States becoming bogged in another frustrating war like Vietnam elsewhere in Asia.

For that reason, Washington will have to devise ways to carry out its remaining commitments in the area in a way which would preclude introducing any massive American forces on to the continent.

Some high officials believe the ideal defence arrangement for the area ultimately would be a regional alliance of non-Communist and neutralist Asian countries

which would receive military equipment and advice from the United States and other foreign nations—but no troops Others think that regional rivalries and other factors would make it most difficult, if not impossible, to form such an alliance and hold it together. The United States, once Vietnam is settled, would like to revise or get rid of the S.E.A.T.O. alliance, preferably get rid of it. Of its eight members, France and Pakistan have lost all interest.

Britain takes no active role and the Philippines wavers in its support. This leaves only the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Thailand as active participants. Asian Pact

But Washington can not afford to break up S.E.A.T.O. until there is some other security arrangement to replace it. Otherwise, Thailand would be cut adrift with no treaty authority to insist that United States’ bases and forces remain to offer some measure of protection. The United States realises that any Asian defence alliance of which America is a member is bound to intensify China’s hostility to the regional,members of the pact. That is why the idea of some purely Asian pact of nonCommunist nations appears attractive to some United States officials in spite of the obvious difficulties. Such an alliance would have a better life expectancy if Japan or India could be induced to participate or, at least, serve as an Asian sponsor and “back-up” power. However, neither of those two countries shows any inclination to become involved. Both hope the chaos in South-East Asia will run its course without involving them. Main Worry

United States officials when considering post • Vietnam security arrangements in South-East Asia, are not so concerned about possible overt aggression by Peking or Hanoi. They are worried more about Chinese or Hanoidirected subversion which feeds on economic discontent and political disarray. A look at the nations involved shows why Washington is concerned. LAOS: Although officially neutral, Laos is a battle-

ground on which 70,000 troops of Souvanna Phouma’s central government are holding off an equal number of Communist fighters—3o,ooo of them Pathet Lao rebels and 40,000 North Vietnamese in the country in violation of the 1962 Geneva agreement. The United States covertly helps Souvanna Phouma’s forces and United States aircraft based in Thailand attack Communist forces and supply lines.

Laos is the poorest country in Asia, with a per capita gross national product of about 60 dollars. It is a collection of 13 tribes with little knowledge of the world farther than the tribe over the next hill. Its government is likely to collapse under Communist pressure when Vietnam is settled, no matter what the settlement. CAMBODIA: This country, governed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, tries to balance Communist China against the Western Powers. Most observers assume that Sihanouk will go with the winning side in South-East Asia if and when it becomes apparent which side that will be. He broke relations with the United States in 1965 because of American attacks on his territory. The Americans claim Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers use Cambodian territory as a staging area and supply route. Sihanouk acknowledges he is “caught between the Communist devil and the American deep blue sea.” He frankly admits he will act in the future in any way he deems most effective for his nation to survive as an independent state. BURMA: This country’s position is described by United States officials as “spongy.” By that they mean that it offers some opportunity for Communist penetration and subversion but may be able to resist without being totally undermined. General Ne Win’s seven-year-old dictatorship has tried to maintain neutrality, after settling its border dispute with China. However, battling ethnic minorities, plus groups of Peking and Moscow oriented Communists, keep the country in continual ferment and the economy has deteriorated under Ne Win’s clumsy efforts at socialism.