CALL FOR COALITION REALITIES HELD TO RULE OUT NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN U.K.

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31866, 19 December 1968, Page 16

CALL FOR COALITION REALITIES HELD TO RULE OUT NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN U.K.

(Reprinted from the "Economist” by arrangement)

LONDON, December 14.—This is not the week to defend Mr Wilson. But neither is it the week to bury him, either by city rumours or editorial contumely. “The Times” said on Monday that it detected the “smell of Weimar” about the Government, and it dismissed the Prime Minister in two brutal phrases: “No need to condemn him; scarcely now any need to discuss him. .. ” This is very odd talk. It is the language of the putsch, and merely helped to encourage the city’s hysteria until it heard Thursday’s trade figures. The immediate political prospects may be depressing—even more so because the Government is not entirely to blame for the present low standard of politics. The fact is that there is no prospect at all of a national government: the political realities rule it out.

The first reality is that Mr Wilson’s Government is not composed entirely of knaves or fools, and if it has its share of both species it is not unique. Its economic record is lamentable, it is deservedly unpopular in the country, and it has been governing for the past two years without the confidence of the electorate. It has been complacent, irresolute, stubborn and timid, but its record —certainly since devaluation —deserves better consideration than the slanging match which now masquerades as the British political dialogue. Devaluation Too Late

Devaluation came far too late (but would Mr Heath have done it earlier?), and the more Mr Callaghan reveals how long was his prior knowledge of its inevitability the more he condemns himself for his total unpreparedness for the event when it came. Mr Wilson is in that dock too. Yet many of Mr Jenkins’s attempts, since he became Chancellor, to retrieve that disastrous position have been widely supported. Too many critics in the City, in industry, in politics and in the press have arrogated to themselves a right of post facto judgment which they deny to the Government. That is politics, and it is also journalism. But instead of trying to shout about how right they all were the papers—and the other critics —ought to be shuddering about those other quotes which show how optimistic, ill-informed and wrong they certainly were, just like the Government.

Even now the Opposition and the papers have combined to create the impression that the British people have been smashed into the ground by the Government’s economic policies. This is rubbish. If it were only partly true, if wages and earnings had really been restrained, if prices had risen as expected, if consumption had been cut back, the balance of payments might now be in surplus, and Friday might be just another day on the foreign exchanges. That it has not happened is the Government’s responsibility, but only partly its fault Three Conceptions It may now be too late to expect the Government’s policies to be judged rationally. In politics what people believe is an Objective fact and the evidence of the opinion polls apd by-elections is overwhelmingly that the electorate has no confidence in the Government’s competence. It is true that for one week this autumn the Tory lead in the “Daily Mail’s” National Opinion Poll fell to less than 4 per cent (although In- the next byelection there was still a 10 per cent swing to the Tories). That will not happen again for many months; indeed, the Government may never again get so close. The immediate prospect is that if the Government stays in office it will do so against the wishes, and without the confidence, of the great majority of its citizens. Not surprisingly, therefore, there are many outside Parliament who search for a government which would have confidence in itself and command the confidence of the country. The three most popular conceptions of how this might be achieved are through (a) a coalition (b) a general election (c) the replacement of Mr Wilson as Prime Minister. Painful and disillusioning as it might be, it is worth considering these alternatives calmly. Chimera Dismissed A coalition is the most naive proposal and the easiest to dismiss, although many who advocate it are motivated by a deep sense of patriotism. Unfortunately, their sense of political reality is not quite so strong. The decisive argument against coalition is that neither the Labour nor Conservative parties desire it or believe it is necessary; therefore it will not happen. It is pointless to waste much time arguing that this is not 1931 (how many Labour politicians joined that so-called coalition?), or 1940 (who is the acceptable dominant personality who could unite the country against that obvious physical danger?). But in order to dismiss this chimera once and for all it is worth asking its proponents two questions: do they really believe that if there were a bipartisan economic policy which would unite the country—which is what a coalition is supposed to be about—that Mr Wilson would not long since have grasped it as a drowning man clutches a lifebelt? And if there is no such policy, what would the policy of the coalition be? Unless they are arguing for a dictatorship drawn from outside the party system, they must be arguing for a government which would carry out the Tory party’s alternative policies. And that is not a case for a coalition, but for a general election. There is a ease for an early general election. Everv new government is granted a honeymoon, perhaps only for

six months, by the electorate, and in that time a Tory government could introduce measures which are beyond the compass of the present Labour Government. But the “Economist” also believes that a Conservative government under Mr Heath (or anyone else) would introduce at most one and a half of the three measures which we consider will be necessary to meet the next monetary crisis when it comes. He might be more ready to control the money supply, and he would certainly make contracts enforceable on trade unions. But on floating exchange rates and a wage freeze Mr Heath’s mind seems to be as closed as any in the present Government. The danger is that Mr Heath’s honeymoon would be squandered to as little immediate purpose as Mr Wilson squandered his chances after October, 1964. And to argue that any change from the present Government must inevitably be for the better is not only over-emotional, it also overlooks the damage that such an election at this moment might inflict on the British political system. What Size The Rump? There can be no doubt that if Mr Wilson threw in his hand now as Mr Attlee did in 1951. the Labour party would he annihilated. The size of the rump that would be re-elected to the Commons is arguable: what is not arguable is that rump is all that it would be. No-one can reallv believe that Mr Wilson is likelv to court that disaster. But how long can a democrat continue governing against the wishes of the majority of the country? This problem deserves to be argued out, for there is no simple answer. The case can be made that one of the unwritten law? of British politics is that a Government which is elected with a large majority Contracts not to abuse that majority in return for a five-year period of office.

But the difficulty is to judge how much damage an increasingly unpopular government can do to the unwritten rules by insisting on the contract being fulfilled to a day. Sir Alec Douglas-Home was justified in not dissimilar circumstances, in not going to the country in April. 1964. But his contract had only six months to run: Mr Wilson’s has over two years. How long he would be justified in hanging on, like Sir Alec, in the hope that the tide will turn is very debatable. A System To Be Lost In practice, the argument is likely to be decided on the ground of what is least evil for the Labour Party. But that should not cause too many shudders. Mr Wilson would have to call a General Election if an influential group of the Cabinet broke away and split his party. That prospect is not in sight. He might choose to have a General Election if he thought the Labour party would fare even worse at the end of its term. That requires a judgment approaching the godlike. He might choose to hold a General Election if what a lot of electors thought was a bankers’ ramp, or extrapolitical forces, appeared to be on the point of bringing down his Government. Such an attempt, whether successful or not, would be disastrous for the democratic process in this country. It would embitter British politics for at least a decade, and it would have to be resisted as strongly as any notion that the trade unions are entitled to attempt to bring down a Conservative government by their direct Action.

There is nothing to be gained by annihilating the Labour party in this way, and there is a whole political system to be lost. There is no great reservoir of nonsocialist radical talent anxious to flock to a new radical party—the poverty of the Liberal party is confirmation of that—and a huge, semipermanent, Tory majority, inflated with mediocrity, would not even be welcomed by sensible Tory leaders. Replacing Mr Wilson? Of course, a Labour Government does not have to continue under Mr Wilson. The “Economist” does not believe that Mr Wilson should be dismissed with contempt, nor that he is not worth discussing. We have said before, and we still believe, that if the occasion ever arose where a serious monetary crisis could be resolved by the departure of Mr Wilson, then he would take the honourable course. But again, the advantages of replacing Mr Wilson are by no means clear cut. It is perfectly possible to argue that, bruised as his reputation has been recently, Mr Jenkins would prove a more efficient, more attractive, more]

credible prime minister. But he would still be a Labour Prime Minister, with all that that entails, and it is far from certain that the Labour Party regards Mr Jenkins as Mr Wilson’s natural successor. If Mr Wilson went, Mr Jenkins, Mr Callaghan and Mr Stewart would all throw their hats into the ring. It would be a rash man who predicted the outcome of that contest; it would be rasher still to believe that Mr Callaghan or Mr Stewart would be any great improvement. So politics in Britain are likely to remain what they have always been: sometimes brave, often squalid and invariably regarded as inadequate. But it is one thing to be depressed about the competence of some existing political leaders and the quality of the political dialogue in which they indulge. Such rough patches have occurred before and will happen again. Shallow Debate What is damagingly wrong is to suggest that the political system is in imminent danger of breakdown. The party system could probably survive even an economic calamity. What it will survive only with difficulty is a continuation over the next two years of the present appallingly shallow party political debate. Both Government and Opposition are to blame. The slanging matches across the floor of the Commons, the fatuous antics of the back- | benchers, the antiphonal ' accusations every week-end are not what Britain’s economic situation demands. Both sides must lift the level of debate. The Government must recognise that it has a real loss of confidence to retrieve and that no quick gains are possible. The Tory party must accept that it is still two years from office.

Mr Heath could lead the way. He has an impatient party snapping at his heels, and he has the problem of his own worrying inability to break through in the opinion polls. But the shrill phrasemaking which he has substituted for economic argument recently does not become him, and could conceivably ditch him in the end. What Britain needs as much as anything else is a little calm and moderation all round. And that includes a recognition by the public, and by the newspapers, that it is still true that a country gets the politicians it deserves.

The party system is not really in danger in Britain for all the huffing and puffing, but it could be if politicians and newspapers just go on slanging instead of thinking, says the “Economist.”