Wahine “Doomed” From Time Of Hitting Reef

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31862, 14 December 1968, Page 1

Wahine “Doomed” From Time Of Hitting Reef

(New Zealand Press Association) WELLINGTON, December 13. Because of the weather and sea conditions, the inter-island steamer Wahine was a “doomed ship” from the moment she struck Barrett’s Reef at 6.41 a.m. on April 10, the report of the formal marine inquiry into the ship’s loss said today.

The Court of Inquiry noted that the primary cause of her loss was that she was struck by wind of great violence in the worst weather recorded in any part of New Zealand while in turbulent seas in narrow waters. *

She sheered off course when there was no visibility- and went out of effective control.

The Court found that the main cause of the capsize off Steeple Rock about 2.30 p.m. the same day was the build-up of free surface water on the vehicle deck.

Fifty-one people, including three children, died after the 8948ton Wahine was abandoned.

The report of the findings of the inquiry was tabled in the House of Representatives todav by the Minister of Marine (Mr Scott).

The Court was a Wellington Stipendiary Magistrate, Mr R. D. Jamieson. During the inquiry, held in Wellington in June and July, he had the help and advice of four assessors. Three of the four assessors expressed certain qualifications to some aspects of the findings. The Wahine carried 734 persons, and for a long time after she came off the reef it appeared that the only chance of life for those persons was that the Wahine would survive long enough for abandonment to become possible. These conclusions were drawn unanimously in the report of the Court of Inquiry. However, in an annex to the report, numerous qualifications, many of them technical, are expressed by Captains E. H. Hopkins and W. J. Keane, nautical assessors, and Mr A. Wall, engineering assessor. Mr G. C. Apperley concurred with the report.

| The Court cleared the : master of the Wahine, CapI tain Hector G. Robertson, i aged 56. and his chief offiI cer, Mr R. S. Lilly, of charges of causing the loss of the ship and 51 lives by wrongful acts or defaults.

In dismissing charges against the chief engineer, Mr H. Wareing, the Court declared it was "somewhat surprised” that charges had been laid. The Court also exonerated the Wellington Harbour Board and the owners of the ship, the Union Steam Ship Company. The Harbour Board and Union Company had to wait until today for a verdict on the charges against them. Not On Standby Although dismissing charges against Captain Robertson, Mr Luly, the Harbour Board and the Union Company. the Court said it regretted that “owing to the cumulative effect of errors and omissions” on their part all suitable rescue craft were not placed on standby before 12.30 p.m. on April 10 and later instructed to move, as opportunity offered, as close to the Wahine as possible. Mr Jamieson declared that more could have been done to ensure that suitable rescue fleet was as near to the Wahine as possible when she capsized. The Court said it was critical of Captain Robertson’s

'failure to advise shore authorities that the Wahine’s 'draught had increased [by I about sft] to 22ft after strik- ; ing the reef and the fact that there was water on the Ivehicle deck. | No Information i “The master in fact, sent no information about damage I until asked for it. This was wrong.” - Such information would J not have averted the loss of the ship the Court said, but] “it would, or should have given a greater sense of urgency to those ashore in preparing for the worst.” Of Captain Robertson’s action the Court said this

amounted to an error of judgment but was not a wrongful act or default. Mr Jamieson ruled on August 1, two days after the Wahine inquiry ended, that charges against the master 'and his two chief officers ‘were not proved and that no reason had been shown why their certificates should be cancelled or suspended. Captain Robertson subsequently went back to sea and is in command of the Union Company freighter Kowhai, now on a trip to Sydney from Tauranga. Back On Run Mr Luly is- working in Wellington on the raising of the wreck of the Wahine and Mr Wareing is back on the Wellington-Lyttelton run. Among recommendations from the Court was one that another senior officer should be carried on ”essels similar to the Wahine so one senior officer could be free in an

emergency to deal exclusively with damage control. The Court also suggested a distinctive uniform for crewmen, particularly certificated lifeboatmen to make them conspicious to passengers in an emergency. On *he question of water on the vehicle deck the Court said every possible practical means of removing such water should be provided. Actual Track Among the fourteen pages of qualifications the assessors concede it was not possible to work out the actual track of the Wahine through the Wellington heads from the engine tapes, especially as no evidence of direction of the ship’s head after about ‘6.15 a.m. was given. “We can, however, arrive at a conclusion of what the master was attempting to do from the definite movements of the engines," they said. At 6.15 a.m. both engines were put full ahead with the helm hard to starboard, apparently to correct the sheer to port. At 6.14 a.m. the port engine was put on full astern and the starboard engine was kept on full ahead with a call for maximum power on both engines. These movements were continued for 3} minutes on the port engine and for 5 minutes on the starboard engine. This was a definite attempt to turn the ship to port. Extreme Swing Whether those engine movements were to correct the extreme swing to starboard, which the master did not admit happened, or to continue the original swing to port and so head out to sea which he did admit, did not appear from the evidence to be resolved conclusively.

If the latter reason was accepted, then, said the assessors, they were at a loss to understand why those movements were not persisted with instead of those recorded from 6.20 a.m. to 6.26 a.m.

“In our opinion this is the vital period which decided the fate of the vessel and the lives of 51 persons.

“Had the master referred to his compass heading instead of manoeuvring by instinct, and had persisted with the endeavour to turn to nort at 6.20 a.m. as had been established from the evidence of Mr Young (who was watching from his Breaker Bay residence) —the ship appeared to be in her normal position but heading out to sea, it would appear that the manoeuvre the master states he was attempting was practically completed.” Nil Visibility If, as had been stated in evidence, the master was acting from instinct in a condition of nil visibility the only kid he had left to him to gain some measure of control over the ship was by use of his anchors. The assessors said this was not done due to the fact that no preparation had been made for such an eventuality. It would appear that this basic precaution to be taken when entering Wellington Harbour had. over the years, been disregarded in this particular service, they said. Although difficultv was exnerienced in reaching the fo’c’sle head when the belated decision to drop the anchors was made, no such difficulty would have been experienced when entering the harbour with a following wind and sea. The assessors considered that the chief officer should have been ordered to man the fo’c’sle in accordance with the normal practice of good seamanship. Damage Report The assessors also maintained that as the ship was in constant communication with the shore the information concerning the extent of the damage should have been immediately made known to Captain A. C. Crosbie (Chief Marine Superintendent of the Union Steam Ship Company).

It is difficult to understand why no information was passed ashore until after a request at 10.10 a.m. when incomplete information was sent to Captain Crosbie, the assessors said.

Had Captain Crosbie been informed at 8.30 a.m. that the shin was flooded at both ends including lower F deck, and that the draught was 22ft he! would no doubt have reached the conclusion that the ship!

was in an extremely dangerous condition. His technical adviser could ■ have advised him that the ship was apparently extensively damaged over her entire length and was virtually floating on the inner bottom of the remaining intact compartments. “Had he been aware that from 8.30 a.m. onwards there was a slow build-up of water in the vehicle deck he would have been advised by bis technical officers that capsize of the ship was just a matter of time,” said the assessors. The importance of having this information regarding the damage passed ashore is not that anything could have been done, or any information passed to the master, which would have been any help to him in the predicament in which he was placed. Its importance lies in the fact that a full appreciation of the extreme danger the ship and the passengers and crew were in would have been stressed upon the responsible people ashore. State Of Readiness Under such circumstances all possible measures of rendering assistance should have been kept on an immediate state of readiness, the asses- I sors said. They said they could not agree that the master should not have been informed at once that water was entering the vehicle deck, and they were also concerned about the conflict of evidence regarding the amount of water stated to be on this deck at the prelininary inquiry and at the Court of Inquiry. In view of this serious development precise information should have been sent ashore instead of the messages stating the “flooding was under control” which had no foundation in fact. Tonnage Regulation The assessors said it appeared that the scuppers were fitted to comply with a now out-of-date tonnage regulation, and their ability to clear a considerable volume of water from the vehicle deck was a secondary consideration.

“It is our considered opinion that severe criticism should be directed to the administrative authority responsible for the application ofj the tonnage regulations in the building of the Wahine,”! they said.

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