In The Kasserine Pass

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31802, 5 October 1968, Page 4

In The Kasserine Pass

Rommel’* Last Victory. By Martin Blumenson. Allen and Unwin. 352 pp. Illustrated. Appendices. Index.

The Battle of Kasserine Pass was, in many ways, of as much strategic significance as El Alamein. It* result dictated the end of Axis power in North Africa by May, 1943, and enabled the subsequent landings in Southern Europe to take place. Of more importance, Allied command and American troops were blooded in the Tunisian hinterland at the hands of an acknowledged master, Rommel, and survived fortuitously to demonstrate their over-riding power on the battlefield* of Europe. How fortuitous the survival is well related in Blumenson’s book. By New Year, 1943, Rommel was well aware of the need to drive a wedge between Montgomery’s advancing Eighth Army and Eisenhower’s heterogeneous force from Algeria, if there was to be any hope of holding Tunisia and eventually turning the tables. He was also aware of the importance of the Germans’ first major encounter with the Americans . . . “Psychologically it is particularly unfortunate when the very first battle of a war ends . . . in a disastrous defeat, especially when it has been preceded by . . . grandiose predictions. It makes it very difficult ever again to restore the men’s confidence.” Rommel’s plan to strike a crippling blow through the mountain passes of southern Tunisia and Algeria to Constantine —before Montgomery reached the Mareth Line—could well have brought disastrous defeat to the Allies in North Africa and adversely affected the whole future trend of operations in Europe, notwithstanding the Nor-

mandy landings. The fact that his attack stopped short at his crucial victory at the Kasserine Pass cannot be attributed solely to his own ill health and related vacillation. The unrealistic requirements of Hitler and Mussolini played their inevitable part, as well as the rivalries and division of command between Rommel, Arnim and Messe. A truly unified Axis command would have seen a very different end to the war in North Africa.

On the Allied side, Blumenson paints an appalling' picture of ineptness and inexperience, compounded by lack of modern equipment and a command structure where there were too many chiefs and not enough Indians. Forces were squandered, tactics were largely notable by their absence, and eventual salvation came, not from Allied striking power, but from Axis withdrawal and the efforts of an outstanding few. Blumenson, an American, pulls no punches when-either blame or kudos are banded out He spares few of his fellow countrymen, is critical of unsympathetic British com-

manders, and gives the Free French their due for a clearer understanding of terrain and tactics. For the first time, the whole structure and story of a vital phase in Allied operations are given a full airing. From the Battle of Kasserine Pass, the Allies learned the value of more definitive command, unification of forces in the field, and the need to allocate distinct zones of action for each national army. The Americans gained vital battle experience that enabled them to take on an enemy with greater resolution and know-how. For Rommel, Kasserine was technically his last victory. But broadly it brought final defeat of hi* African ambitions. Unsupported, let down, sick and dispirited, the master tactician was defeated not by an opposing army but by the system for which he fought Martin Blumenson is to be congratulated for relating the full story of one of the last war’s most significant battles. His style is easy but his facts well documented and his objectivity unimpeachable. This volume is an important addition te the bibliography of World War IL