Japanese Influence Grows

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31802, 5 October 1968, Page 13

Japanese Influence Grows

(From DAVID EXEL, N.Z P.A. special correspondent) SINGAPORE, Oct. 3. The forthcoming visit to Japan of Singapore’s Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, highlights the rapid expansion in Japanese influence in South-East Asia.

Mr Lee last visited Japan in March of last year. In the 18 months since then, Japanese trade, aid and political persuasion have combined to put beyond doubt the question of whether Japan, as a major world Power, is carving for herself a sphere of influence in South-East Asia. So far, the influence has been purely economic in its base: Japan’s armed forces have been kept rigidly in home ports and bases, and the Japanese have fought against any defence orientation in regional groupings. Japan has, nevertheless, a relatively small but remarkable well-equipped Navy and Air Force. As the editor of “Jane’s Fighting Ships” has pointed out, Japan’s, naval shipbuilding programme will put her “in the forefront of European naval powers” by the 19705. A good many South-East Asian observers feel that when the British Far East Fleet departs from §;pgapore

in 1971, it will not be long before Japan’s Navy is on patrol in the area protecting the vital sea lanes in the South China Sea. About 100 Japanese merchant ships a month (average 4000 tons) call at the port of Singapore at present. With two-way trade between Japan and South-East Asia worth more than SUS4OOOm a year, it is not to be expected that the trade routes will be left to the mercy of pirates or the protection of Russia's Pacific fleet.

The extent of Japan's economic expansion in the area is indicated by statistics released today by the Japanese Embassy in Singapore. Japan easily leads the list of overseas investors in joint ventures in Singapore, having supplied 32.6 per cent of the foreign capital, compared with Britain’s 4.7 per cent. The capital involved (less than SNZBm) is only a small part of the total Japanese effort. Japan is represented in Singapore in 24 “joint venture" efforts, with several more under consideration. More importantly, there are in Singapore more than 20 Japanese trading firms: five shipping companies, three insurance companies, two banks. Japanese exports to Singapore have climbed steadily by between 10 and 20 per cent a year, to the stage where Japan is now the single most important source of Singapore’s imports. Textiles, steel and electri-

cal equipment lead the list. Total Japanese exports to Singapore will probably reach SNZI7Om this year. Singapore expbrts to Japan, although also growing at about 10 per cent a year, lag far behind, giving Japan a vastly favourable balance of trade. Technical Aid Technical aid under the Colombo Plan has so far been hardly greater than New Zealand’s in scope, but is increasing. Japan has established a prototype production and training centre to encourage new manufactures and is setting up a SouthEast Asian fisheries development centre in Singapore. Japan’s political influence is indicated by the ease with which Singapore’s plans for this year’s South-East Asian ministerial conference were upset. Singapore invited Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Ceylon to send observers. As the host country, Singapore felt it had the right to extend invitations to countries acceptable to the majority of participants. • Not so, said Japan—and the observers sat out the conference in the limbo of attending public sessions only, while being excluded from any meaningful discussions. The only other organisation through which Australia and New Zealand could provide a balance to Japan's increasing influence is Aspac—the/Asian and Pacific Coun-

cil. Unfortunately, countries such as Singapore, Cambodia and Indonesia have shied away from the efforts of Aspac “hawks” (such as South Korea and South Vietnam) to colour the organisation with anti-Communist propaganda. Japan’s influence on SouthEast Asia, on balance, is probably favourable to New Zealand. At least it can be hoped that in the long term a stable boundary can be drawn between Chinese and Japanese spheres of influence. But it is in New Zealand’s interest —and in the interest of social stability in the area —to temper, where possible, the rigorous terms of trade and aid Japan is capable of imposing on underdeveloped countries. “All Feeling Weight” The Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore are all feeling the weight of Japanese political pressure to an extent which matches their varying needs of trade, development capital, and aid. A counter-weight from what Japan calls “Oceania” —Australia and New Zealand —could pay dividends not only in terms of protection of markets for New Zealand manufacturers, but in terms of increased Asian stability. What is required is not opposition to Japanese expansion, but the finding of alternatives when the price of Japanese assistance becomes too high.