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The Press SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1968. Middle East Deadlock

The repeated United Nations calls, \through the Security Council, on both Israel and Egypt to respect the cease-fire in the Suez Canal area have had no discernible influence on either. The latest shooting duels across the canal and the blowing up by Israelis of houses on Jordan’s west bank and in the Gaza Strip have moved the Security Council to make another appeal for tolerance and restraint. But as long as Arab terrorists make raids across cease-fire lines into Israeli-held territory, the Israelis are certain to hit back. The Defence Minister, General Moshe Dayan, has warned the people of Hebron that if they want war again they will get it

Whether the exchange of views patiently assisted by the United Nations peace envoy, Dr Jarring, is achieving anything is not clear. So much that is devious and contradictory has come out of Cairo in the last year that Arab policy is impossible to define. As the “ Economist ” said in a recent article, Egyptian statements, public or otherwise, are like the Bible: “If you look diligently you will find a quotation to “ fit your thesis ”, Arab hints of compromise seldom develop into firm proposals. A statement attributed to the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mr Riad, that the Arabs were now prepared to accept the reality of Israel, was promptly repudiated. Then there was talk of President Nasser’s return from Moscow in a mood to make concessions. It was suggested that Egypt might agree to a settlement that would internationalise the Gaza Strip while waiving earlier demands for the demilitarisation of Sinai and the repatriation of Palestinian refugees. It was suggested further that the United Arab Republic might come to terms with Israel through a “ declaration of peace ”, to be endorsed by the Security Council and the major Powers.

This was regarded by Israel as merely a device for avoiding direct confrontation at the conference table—a condition on which Israel has refused to compromise. Israeli intransigence, indeed, may be as great a hindrance to effective mediation as Arab vacillations and equivocations. Lately, however, there have been suggestions that Israel might now be willing to compromise; moderate elements, including the Foreign Minister, Mr Eban, were reported to be prepared to seek peace by means other than direct negotiation. They have apparently failed to win a majority of the Cabinet to their way of thinking. The second congress of the Arab Socialist Union, which is Egypt’s only political party, may present President Nasser with an opportunity to make some positive approach to a settlement with Israel. At the congress he might come under renewed pressure from the younger elements in Egyptian political circles who are both fearful of the future and exasperated by the continued deadlock. The moderates seem to be convinced that any settlement with Israel must be political, and that a second war would be no less disastrous than the war of 15 months ago. If this realistic assessment becomes generally accepted in Egypt, President Nasser may be compelled to renounce his determination to wipe out the “ blot “of defeat”, at least by military means. He will be wise to concede that while Arab provocations continue, there is a real danger of time and Israeli patience running out together.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19680914.2.85

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31784, 14 September 1968, Page 12

Word Count
545

The Press SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1968. Middle East Deadlock Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31784, 14 September 1968, Page 12

The Press SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1968. Middle East Deadlock Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31784, 14 September 1968, Page 12