Comment From The Capital A POSITIVE CIVIL DEFENCE SYSTEM IS BEING SOUGHT

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31660, 22 April 1968, Page 10

Comment From The Capital A POSITIVE CIVIL DEFENCE SYSTEM IS BEING SOUGHT

(From Our Parliamentary Reporter I WELLINGTON, April 21.—A more positive system of civil defence, in which the chain of command is more clearly indicated, has been recommended after a series of discussions in Wellington in which leaders in the Ministry of Civil Defence, local body officers and leaders of voluntary organisations have taken part. The Civil Defence Act is under close examination and may be reframed, though some eminent legal authorities believe that the improvements can be made within the framework of the existing Act.

In the actual operation of emergency action, the following improvements have been suggested:— 1. It should be clearly defined who is in command in the event of a widespread emergency. 2. A system of “early warning” similar to that used during air raid alarms in time of war should be adopted in order to give the civil defence forces, particularly the voluntary ones, a chance to call out their members. 3. A system of regional "contingency planning” should be adopted, in conjunction with the establishment of regional headquarters, so that in any situation a detailed basic plan is prepared for immediate operation. The Wellington Crisis In the Greater Wellington crisis, the main factor was a southerly gale gusting up to 146 knots (the intensity of a Caribbean hurricane). This produced an all-over emergency, as well as the specific crisis centred about the plight of the vehicular ferrv Wahine. Because of the wind direction and intensity, the areas of greatest danger were in the harbour-mouth and the southern parts of Wellington. The cliffs and high country on the northern side of Cook Strait acted as an aerofoil, producing a type of suction which literally "exploded” roofs and small buildings into the air. Yet a civil emergency was not declared in these areas. The only local body to declare a civil emergency was in Upper Hutt, some 25 miles north. The Mayor of Wellington (Sir Francis Kitts) has claimed that the disaster taking place on the harbour was out of his area. He has stated that nothing would have been gained by declaring a state of emergency in Wellington. Such a declaration, he claims, would have emptied 50,000 people into the streets, where they would have been endangered by flying roofingmaterials and glass. The Mayor of Lower Hutt (Mr P. Dowse) has called for a clearly-defined chain of command. and for a definition as to whether the police, the Army, or the Civil Defence organisation was in charge. Troops Stood To The Prime Minister (Mr Holyoake) has expressed his

doubts about some parts of Civil Defence. The Leader of the Opposition (Mr Kirk) said, after a caucus meeting of the Labour Party, that Civil Defence should rid itself of its “pseudo para-military background.” He believes that the police should be in control (though the police, of necessity, are organised on “pseudo paramilitary” lines). It is worth noting in this respect that Army personnel, though highly organised, were not used in the Wahine crisis. All troops at Fort Dorset stood to for six hours from 7 a.m., teleprinters alerted other organisations, and an Iroquois helicopter was “laid on” if required. It was not asked for. It has become apparent that in regions like Greater Wellington (or Greater Christchurch - Lyttelton) an unequivocal over-all control is needed. Though Wellington and Lower Hutt are at opposite ends of the same harbour, each runs its own civil defence scheme, and the harbour and airport are under separate controls. The tragedy of April 10 is that many voluntary organisations were left completely out of the picture. Individuals, variously qualified, were left to operate on their own—or in many cases were turned back from vital points by police guards. A central control might have obviated this, but any such system would be the better for the introduction of an early-warning system, plus a series of carefully-worked-out plans covering specific situations. Contingencies Covered The idea of “contingency planning" is borrowed from the procedure adopted by the Military Advisers of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation. For many years they have devised a series of plans covering any foreseeable situation in the SouthEast Asia area: and also allowing for the fact that the forces of member countries may be committed only with their Government’s consent ■

In an area like Greater Wellington, plans could be worked out in advance to cover specific situations, one of which would inevitably relate to a large ship in trouble in the harbour entrance in southerly conditions. If this had been done, the casualty list of April 10 might have been significantly reduced. Foresight would have established that in any such disaster, survivors would inevitably be driven across the harbour on to the rocky and treacherous shore between Eastbourne and Pencarrow. Even at 1.30 p.m., when the ship began to roll and settle, prior planning could have saved lives. The soldiers who had been standing by at Fort Dorset for six hours could have been rushed by truck to the other side of the harbour. Small craft (which had all the morning to be made ready in their sheltered harbours in Evans Bay and Oriental Bay) could have been called in as soon as the wind began to fall. Surf life-boats belonging to the life-saving clubs could have been in operation even before this. And any time up to late on the fatal afternoon, the foreshore south of Eastbourne could have been packed with variously qualified people—surf life-savers trained in first-aid, rescue in heavy seas and the application of expired-air resuscitation; ambulance officers with their similar first-aid knowledge: scout and guide groups: residents with all kinds of specialised knowledge. As it was, there is a depressing record of would-be helpers and even blankets and other equipment being turned away. Almost as disturbing is the reaction of some civil defence wardens who have spent up to four years in training for just such an emergency, and who were not called out. These people are very sensitive at being “made a laughing-stock,” and have expressed a wish to resign.