This Is How They Did It

Press, Volume CVIII, Issue 31595, 5 February 1968, Page 13

This Is How They Did It

(N.Z.P.A.-Reuter—Copyright) SAIGON, Feb. 4.

The Viet Cong commandos who stormed the American Embassy on Wednesday and held the grounds for six hours rode into Saigon concealed in a truck-load of flowers.

The Viet Cong employed deceit and surprise to launch their attack—tactics as old as war itself.

But hiding beneath colourful blooms was only one method used by the commandos to infiltrate a city happily preparing to embark on the annual celebration of Tet, the Vietnamese lunar new year and, traditionally, a time of peace and tranquility. The Viet Cong arrived in provincial buses, in taxis, on motor-scooters and on foot. It is now known that they had managed to secrete 600 commandos and troops in the city in the days before the new year celebrations. Arms Stockpiled None in this assault force brought weapons with them—the Communist infra-structure had already stockpiled arms, explosives and munitions in dozens of innocent-looking hiding places. One such was at No. 266 Tran Qui Cap Street, just two blocks from the home of General William Westmoreland, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. forces in Vietnam. The Saigon police discovered two caches of automatic weapons, grenades, and red armbands in this house two days before Tet.

The schoolteacher and his daughter who lived there did not talk. The Communist infra-structure includes people from all walks of Saigon life with one thing in common: they are dedicated to the Communist cause, and do not break easily. Surprise was one Communist tactic. Deceit was another. The Viet Cong announced that they would honour a seven-day truce at Tet and the allies half believed them, despite the sorry Communist record of truce violations over the years. But as the battle of Saigon continued into its fifth day today, it became apparent that the major reason for the Viet Cong’s successes in the South Vietnamese capital was its painstaking organisation in the months preceding the onslaught The Saigon police were

vaguely aware of big events building around them on the eve of Tet. But their worry dissolved in the gaiety of the Tet festivities and the comforting, innocent roar of the fire-crackers.

They have since learned that the Communist commandos test-fired their weapons during all this din. And nobody noticed.

The Communist assault on Saigon was launched in two parts. The most spectacular was given to the commandos, who were assigned to attack the United States Embassy, the Presidential palace, and the Saigon radio station. These were suicide mis sions.

The second part of the onslaught, launched in coordination with the commando attacks, was the infiltration of the populous Saigon suburbs by uniformed regular soldiers who had been secretly assembled outside the capital during the first day of Tet. Their mission was not sui cidal but, by its very nature, heavy casualties could be expected. The Communists proved to be masters of detail. All the sappers killed at the American Embassy carried forged curfew passes that would have defied the closest security. An elaborate system of recognition signals was used, one group fastening the top button of their civilian shirts, another donning colourful shirts of similar patterns. The sappers used official United States vehicles they had stolen months earlier to drive up to the radio station.

A total of five Communist battalions—all Viet Cong and recruited in the populated,regions of the Mekong Delta and the provinces around the city—are believed to have been committed to the battle for Saigon. South Vietnamese security officers have determined that only a few of the Communist regulars and commandos had ever been to Saigon before; the capital’s infra-structure provided the necessary maps and guides. Perhaps, on security grounds, the Communists deliberately used strangers to the area for the battle.

The police report that none of the prisoners captured so far has been able to give the location of houses where they picked up their weapons and ammunition.

They say they were issued with their weapons at night by the cell leaders. The Communists have lost many troops, but their infrastructure remains in perfect shape in Saigon. Security Relaxed The Communists planned and executed their assault on Saigon with perfection, but they managed to do so only because of the unintentional assistance given to them by the Saigon authorities. The predictable relaxation of security during the Tet holidays played directly into the hands of the Communists. The city curfew was lifted completely for Tet, permitting the Communist commandos to move into position effortlessly in the early hours of Wednesday morning, when the co-ordinated attacks began. They simply rode in cars

and on motor scooters into position, unchallenged. During the normal midnight-to-dawn curfew, they would have been accosted long before they reached the environs of the United States Embassy. The success of the Communists in gaining easy access to the city and staying for at least three days also throws into doubt the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese security in and around Saigon. Senior American commanders had high hopes that the Vietnamese Army would effectively take over the security role in the provinces around Saigon, the 199th Brigade having broken down Communist forces to squad size in the province of Gia Dinh, which surrounds the capital. But in the month since the 199th Brigade had departed, the Communist forces had rebuilt to battalion and even greater strength. A similar picture emerges from every other Government administrative centre in Vietnam which was attacked by the Communists in the last few days. General Westmoreland may be forced to deploy United States troops in defence of these cities and towns, a role he has hoped would be carried out by the Vietnamese. A veteran of the French Indo-China war commented: “I trace the French defeat in Indo-China to the time when they were forced to use French troops to defend the cities. There are just not enough troops to fight both in the cities and in the jungles.”