Likely U.K. Defence Cuts Will Hit N.Z.

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31560, 23 December 1967, Page 28

Likely U.K. Defence Cuts Will Hit N.Z.

(London Correspondent of "The Press") LONDON, December 22. A speedier withdrawal of British forces from the Far East is almost certain to be a central feature of a prospective major review of external defence spending by Britain.

New Zealand defence planning has taken account of the earlier British decision progressively to pull out the East -of - Suez forces by the mid1970s—but an acceleration of the withdrawal will demand an early reassessment by New Zealand in consultation with Australia.

However much the decline of Britain as a world power may be resented, not least in Britain itself, it is increasingly evident in London that a major reduction in external defence spending would have far fewer domestic political consequences for the Wilson Government than almost any other steps it could take to counter the present economic difficulties. As the issue is being widely presented in terms of either spending less abroad or cutting back social services in Britain, there is an especially strong political inducement to make defence cuts one of the first lines of external retrenchment.

The British Minister of Defence (Mr Healey) has so far said nothing which directly suggests a speedier British withdrawal east of Suez. But nor has he taken any pains to counter the growing contention that British interests in South-East Asia are neither so valuable nor so greatly threatened as to justify keeping 50,000 men there.

S.E.A.T.O. Topic How to set about filling a gap left by the hastened withdrawal of British troops from South-East Asia will probably be discussed among Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore early in the New Year, and presumably will be a priority topic at the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation meetings in Wellington in late March and early April. Even if it is accepted that

it would be unrealistic to attempt to replace the British contribution in terms of manpower, the logistics involved will alone face New Zealand and Australia with a much heavier expense. The cost of maintaining the base at Terendak, which is now borne largely by the British, should be a very considerable item apart from anything else. Difficult Time

In London recently, the Deputy Prime Minister (Mr Marshall) said that New Zealand regretted the necessity for the decision by Britain to withdraw by the mid-19705. His regret is likely to be a good deal more pointed if the withdrawal is accelerated, because New Zealand could hardly be in a less favourable position economically to face the prospect of having to increase its overseas spending on defence. Mr Marshall also said that in spite of the withdrawal plans, New Zealand hoped that should the need arise it could still rely on Britain for support in the area. But Mr Marshall, or indeed anyone who has observed the signs, is bound to accept that some fundamental changes are taking place in the British attitude towards overseas involvements and the role of Britain in the world power structure generally. Reaction Noted The recent withdrawal of British forces from Aden caused virtually no adverse public reaction, in London at least. Indeed most people seemed to think it was a very good thing. Even the vigour with which the British Government has dismissed recent suggestions that it would contemplate a reduction in its defence com-

mitments in Europe can be explained by domestic political considerations rather than by a continued desire to retain world-power status. The point is that for so long as it remains British policy to join the European Common Market, it will also remain firm British policy to keep forces in Europe. For the present it is apparent on every side that if it comes to a choice, the British are far more likely to withdraw from South-East Asia than they are to withdraw from Europe or from the Persian Gulf. Devaluation Result

The British relationship with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore may seem to present a continuing political purpose for Britain to maintain a strong military presence in South-East Asia. But some observers think that the devaluation of sterling has removed one of the most compelling reasons for this presence—the need to please the Americans in return for American support of the pound.

In Britain, most people seem much more interested in the effects of devaluation in immediate cost-of-living terms than they are in what the move may have done to British international standing. In these circumstances there hardly seems any reason to expect that the ending of a costly military presence many thousands of miles away is likely to evoke a strong reaction. And at a time when party political considerations must be more than ever an influence on the British Government, because of its declining popularity, this fact can give no comfort to those who want to see Britain retaining its role in South-East Asia as long as possible.