PROFILE THE ONE MAN WHO CAN SAY “NON” TO DE GAULLE

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31542, 2 December 1967, Page 12

PROFILE THE ONE MAN WHO CAN SAY “NON” TO DE GAULLE

(By

SIMON KAVANAUGH)

. Maunce Couve de Murville has the reputation of being the only man in France who can say “Non” to de Gaulle. It is also said that he is the only man in France who isn’t tempted to do so; “they can hold a conversation by looking at a map in silence,” a Quai D’Orsay diplomat said recently—such is their spiritual accord.

It is fortunate for both men that they have each other; de Murville, though he has complete autonomy in foreign affairs, can fall back on

“consultations” with the President whenever it suits his purpose; de Gaulle can rely utterly on his Foreign Minister to pursue ruthlessly the most grandiose of schemes, mowing that he has few equals anywhere in international politics. He is a diplomatist in the grand tradition of Talleyrand, Briand, Richelieu.

Script Adapted It is fortunate for France that de Murville was available at the right time to adapt an 18th century script for its 20th century , political drama. Certainly no other man could have stage-managed the audience too. For de Murville not only makes France’s foreign policy; he imposes policies on others. His domination of the Common Market countries is not necessarily a logical one through economic power, world trade or geographic considerations. Its foundations were laid when Germany was the powerhouse of Europe and when Britain was about to knock at the door. Germany lost its economic dominance and de Murville appointed himself doorkeeper. Now hap.less Britain and her friends

have to reshape their economic policies to suit the convenience of France, not France’s theoretically-equal partners.

The Market negotiations are but the latest chapter of a political success story that is without parallel in Europe. Couve de Murville was born in 1907, the son of a public prosecutor in Rheims. He went into the civil service from university, where he studied law and economics, and by his late 20s he was already a senior executiveno mean feat in an administration as traditionally conservative as France’s

Diplomatic Plums When the war came he used his . rank under the Vichy

Government to communicate secretly with the Allies in Spain and North Africa, and eventually left to become an adviser to the Americanbacked Giraud regime in Algeria.

His “advice” led to the Giraud-de Gaulle agreement which virtually destroyed Giraud's influence, but greatly increased his own with the new master, de Gaulle. After the war rewards came thick and fast: diplomatic plums such as ambassadorships in Washington, Cairo, Bonn nd Rome, then a policy-making desk in the Foreign Ministry. When de Gaulle became President, de Murville’s appointment as Foreign Minister was automatic. His position has been unassailable ever since.

His only failure was an ironic one; he failed to get elected. Earlier this year he fought for a seat as an MP (French Cabinet Ministers are not normally Deputies, though they are encouraged to run, then hand over their seats to less-celebrated colleagues) but lost out to an opponent who concentrated not on the higher issues and “la gloire” but the provision of local parks, lavatories and roads. Deeply affronted, de Murville offered to resign. De Gaulle would not even discuss it “How,” he asked, “can we allow some little local unpleasantness in the Seventh Arrondisement to interfere with great matters of State?”

Why de Murville?

Nevertheless, the defeat still rankles with de Murville. Humility is not one of his virtues. He is sardonic, sarcastic, and self-assured to the point of arrogance. In his

personal dealings he is icecold with opponents, lukewarm with friends and unforthcoming to everyone. Biographers are still uncertain over the origin of his name. His father was an M.P. Edouard Couve; the de Murville only came to be added after he married Jacqueline

Schlumberger, the very rich daughter of another public prosecutor, and a keen socialite. While at the conference table de Murville constantly blocks and outwits the AngloSaxons, and especially the British, he is Anglophillc in his tastes, liking golf, bridge and dogs. He admires British traditions and culture, and has more than a sneaking regard for the aristocracy. While his opinion of George Brown is not generally known, he has made no secret of his respect for Harold Wilson, whom he describes (without admonition) as shrewd and wily.

Parrying Wilson It is thought that he enjoys immensely the academic exercise of fighting off Wilson’s assault; as fast as the British Premier finds a crack in the European defence, de Murville is there, weaving and parrying with the ease of a Court fencing master. He has a nice sense of timing, too. While the German Chancellor, Mr Kiesinger, was telling the dinner guests at Number 10 Downing Street that he was optimistic about the outcome of the Luxemburg talks, de Murville was making a short, unexpected announcement that virtually torpedoed them. Kiesinger’s stature diminished visibly between the soup and cigars. Such gestures delight de Gaulle, though no other Cabinet minister would dare make them spontaneously. So often, de Murville’s actions and words are exactly what the President would have done and said ' in the same circumstances. The dismissive description of the American Secretary of State as “le paysan Rusk,” the labelling

of Vietnam as “the unneces sary, sterile war,” thes words eould have come fror either man.

Search For Profit

Similarly, de Murville was virtually alone in aligning himself with the Arabs after the Middle East war. Alone, except for de Gaulle. To these two, emotionalism and previous friendships were of no consequence. Their sole concern was how France could best profit from the situation, a rigid rule applied to everything, from giving aid to underdeveloped nations (always accompanied by long and tangled strings) to membership of international bodies such as N.A.T.O. (abandoned instantly when no longer required) and the U.N. itself, which engenders no sentiment at all in the offices of French Foreign Ministry. Cold logic, realism, and self-interest are the basis of Mr de Murville’s policy for France. Together they form a formidable, but chilling, philosophy.