South Arabian Discords

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31521, 8 November 1967, Page 20

South Arabian Discords

Much as they would like to emulate Longfellow’s Arabs, the British in Aden may not be able to fold their tents and silently steal away. Their departure, on the contrary, may have the familiar accompaniment of gunfire while Arab factions renew a private struggle for power instead of making common cause against British troops and civilians. The resumption of the feud between the National Liberation Front (N.L.F.) and the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (F.L.0.5.Y.) in all probability reflects the failure of the Cairo meeting of the front leaders, earlier reported to be discussing amicably plans for sharing political responsibility in Aden. The proposal was that representation in a new government would be in accordance with each party’s influence and authority. There was talk when the Cairo meeting convened of an equal division of office. Then the F.L.O.S.Y. secretary-general, Mr Mackawee, indicated that his group would seek a two-thirds representation. The N.L.F. leader, Mr Ashaabi, promptly rejected the idea. The N.L.F., he said, already had control of a large part of South Arabia. He left it to be inferred that it was not likely to accept even a half share of power, and accused F.L.O.S.Y. of continuing to “ compromise ” with the British. Reports of fresh clashes between the groups can mean only that the negotiations between them have broken down and that, the date for a British withdrawal having been unexpectedly advanced, one of them decided that power might still be seized instead of achieved by peaceful agreement. An encouraging feature is the apparent ability of the South Arabian Army to enforce its authority. This army, newly organised, took over from the British only two months ago. Its stability as the guardian of the country’s security is yet to be proved; but its recognition of the N.L.F. as the only organisation representing the people of South Arabia appears to spell an end to efforts to bring the polical factions together by peaceful means. In June, there was a mutinous demonstration which the command handled courageously and prudently. The officers then rejected a suggestion that they should take over power on behalf of the Federal Government, already on the verge of collapse, and urged the British High Commission to transfer independence negotiations from the sheikhs to the nationalists. Having sided with the N.L.F., the army may now enforce a cease,*J r . e . “ f ffect ’ take control of the federation it the British withdraw according to plan. cll Yemen ’ the coup which removed President ballal from power in his absence from the country has yet to be explained, other than in terms of an army move, probably royalist-inspired, to prevent a swing -J, if. re P u hhcan elements supporting Mr banal. It looks once again as if Kremlin diplomacy has suffered a setback, if not a rebuff: Mr Sallal t 0 visit Moscow t 0 part in the celebrations marking the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution. A Russian military mission recently in aS ° pr ° mised Mr Sallal ’ s new Government ?^ alr c raft ’ and there was talk of a defence pact with the Soviet Union.

r«vp^ont alla L L ad earlier reconstructed his Government with the apparent idea of consolidating He may have misjudged the h n Th P F f » the Amy ’ under P ros Pect of release from ct™ Eg ’ Ptl > ai ? d Saudl Arabia n pressures; or the n g royahst element in the Army may have had reason to believe that Saudi Arabian support would end tht fi Who y Wlthheld despite the agreement to ®" d i he five-year war reached in Khartoum in August YemenT r« nt l^t SSer Kng FeisaL At any rate ’ the LT j 5 A IStS . Were watchf ul of Mr Sallal’s moves, irinn V a .u° regarded Russian advances with infprect w• " eit^er royalists nor republicans are eovemmen? proposals for the formation of a national go\ eminent. The royalists, on the contrary aunounced over their own radio early in OctobCT W d7 polsed t 0 pounce on the cells of Treason/ and tyranny .