The Press MONDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1967. Mr Rusk Hits Back

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31519, 6 November 1967, Page 12

The Press MONDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1967. Mr Rusk Hits Back

Critics of the United States Secretary of State, Mr Rusk, do him less than justice by asserting that, in an effort to justify American policy in Vietnam, he has turned to China “ as a bogyman whose menace *■ everyone will understand The aim of containing China to prevent the communisation of Asia—which the State Department considers to be the ultimate aim of Maoism—has for many years been fundamental to Mr Rusk’s thinking on Asian policy. His views, expressed in the policy to which the Johnson Administration is committed, are clearly related to the attitudes of past Administrations. President Kennedy’s decision six years ago to check Communist penetration of South-East Asia was dictated largely by “ geopolitical considerations revolving around “ China President Johnson has quoted both Mr Kennedy and President Eisenhower as accepting the strategic importance of South Vietnam as a barrier against the spread of aggressive communism. Finally, when Mr Rusk’s views were recently described in the Senate as “a continuing application of the “ strategic theory of John Foster Dulles ”, it was immediately answered that Mr Dulles had, in fact, merely adopted a judgment of Mr Rusk —formed when, in an earlier Administration, Mr Rusk was Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. Mr Rusk’s original appraisal of Chinese policy, now ominously reflected in Vietnam, does not show any significant modification today. Nor is his sudden attack on critics of the Administration necessarily to be regarded as an individual decision. It appears to reflect the judgment of the Administration as a whole that something must be done to stem the flood of protest, domestic as well as external, against the war. and to put the issues more clearly to the public. Other officials and leading Democrats have also been vigorously defending policy on Vietnam. The growing political implications of the anti-war campaign, apart from the conviction that the right policy was being followed, no doubt convinced the Administration that a counter-attack could no longer be delayed.

It is understandable that Mr Rusk should not wish to allow his opponents in the Senate to publicise their own views while subjecting him to a televised cross-examination. The temptation to make political capital out of such an inquiry would be irresistible to those who hope to see Mr Johnson defeated next year. Fortunately there are highly-placed members of the Republican Party, Governor Rockefeller and General Eisenhower among them, who feel that the war should be kept out of politics and that the Administration should be supported in prosecuting it. Mr Nixon and California’s Governor Reagan, in fact, make no secret of their view that more ruthless military means should be used to crush Communist aggression. At any rate the Administration has plainly decided to take the offensive against its critics. One of Mr Rusk’s chief aims will be to show that organised “ peace demonstrations ” not only divide the nation on political issues of major importance but also play directly into the hands of Hanoi’s propagandists.

Mr Rusk’s intervention in public debate on Vietnam should have a sobering and steadying effect on American opinion, which has been showing some signs of being affected by anti-war hysteria. His thesis—and that of the Administration —is that freedom in South-East Asia must be preserved. This has been significantly endorsed by Thailand in deciding to add another brigade of 12,000 men to its force in South Vietnam. The Thais have no illusions about what is being planned in Peking and Hanoi. In a news conference on October 12, Mr Rusk was not content merely to answer the Administration’s critics. He placed the Vietnam conflict in a recognisable context: “Within a decade or two there will be a “ billion Chinese on the mainland, armed with “ nuclear weapons, and with no certainty what their “ attitude toward the rest of Asia will be . . . From “ a strategic point of view it is not very attractive “to think of the world cut in two by Asian “ communism . . . These are vitally important matters “ to us, who are both a Pacific and an Atlantic power