Solution In South Arabia?

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31502, 17 October 1967, Page 16

Solution In South Arabia?

Britain will leave Aden in January oppressed by the sense of a failure which, paradoxically, may contain the seeds of success. It has been said that, after a presence of about 130 years, British policy has failed in South Arabia, as it has elsewhere In the Middle East, because of a refusal to admit the strength of Arab nationalism. The idea behind the South Arabia Federation was the creation of a viable, wellgoverned territory out of a group of backward and incompetently administered States. The authority of the sheikhs and sultans was to be bolstered by a British-trained inter-tribal army of 8000 men, with some 500 Arab officers. As the struggle for power developed between the rival nationalist groups, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen and the National Liberation Front, it became obvious that sentiment within the army would support the nationalists rather than the sultans.

As the influence of the N.L.F. expanded within the federation, the collapse of the Government was seen to be inevitable. Its dissolution in September, when two-thirds of the 16 up-country States were already under N.L.F. control, compelled the British Government to recognise that a transfer of power in Aden and South Arabia generally would have to be negotiated with the nationalists. Now there is a real prospect of hopes for a peaceful hand-over being realised. The leaders of F.L.O.S.Y. and N.L.F. have met in Cairo and agreed to co-operate in forming an interim government. What is more pertinent, the superior strength and authority of the N.L.F. in South Arabia has clearly been recognised by the Cairo-backed F.L.0.5.Y., which, as a preliminary to consultation, consented to the expulsion from its ranks of three members who defected from the N.L.F. when the split came on the question of Egyptian backing.

Of the two organisations, the NX..F, has probably been the more ruthless in its methods. But a spirit of compromise seems to have grown with the extension of its authority; and its dominance is likely to appear in the talks which must precede a British departure. Fortunately these welcome developments will allow time for reappraisal in London as well as in Aden and Cairo. President Nasser has already consented, in his agreement with King Feisal to end the war, to withdraw from Yemen. Yet for the Saudi Arabian ruler the consolidation of nationalist power in South Arabia must present its own problems. King Feisal has hoped, and indeed is still striving, to assist social improvement in his oil-rich country. He will not wish to have his hand forced by the growth of an internal revolutionary movement reflecting the nationalist pressures which are compelling change elsewhere in the Gulf region.

It is too early yet to see what sort'of substitute for federation the N.L.F. and F.L.O.S.Y. will achieve if they succeed in coming to a working agreement. But at least it cannot be as backward as were the feudal sheikhdoms, with their age-old emphasis on privilege and repression. The measure of their sincerity will appear in the approach made by the nationalists to the tricky tasks of government and reconciliation that will confront them.