LIFE IN VIETNAM-V HADRIAN’S WALL ON BORDER BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH?

Press, Volume CVII, Issue 31384, 1 June 1967, Page 12

LIFE IN VIETNAM-V HADRIAN’S WALL ON BORDER BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH?

(By

ALASTAIR HETHERINGTON

In the "Guardian”. Manchester)

(Reprinted bg arrangement)

Seen from Washington, the prospects of a negotiated settlement in Vietnam are exceedingly remote. The Administration’s senior men do not believe that Hanoi has shown any indication of readiness to talk. Nor, on their own side, are they willing to try another, longer pause in bombing the North.

But from discussions in the White House, Pentagon, and State Depart ment something else emerges—a shade less gloomy. It is the possibility that the bombing may be scaled down if, aftei’ occupying the demilitarised zone up to the Ben Hai River, the Americans can create south of the river an effective barrier to infiltration. Once infiltration has been curtailed, one of the main reasons for bombing the North will end.

One must be sceptical about this possibility. The barrier may never be built, or infiltration from Laos may be resumed on a large scale, or President Johnson may fly into another rage and order more bombing of targets around Hanoi and Haiphong. Or, worst of all, frustration may tempt the Americans to invade the North. Allowing for these hazards, however, one can see that a change of course may be coming—a welcome change that would reduce the risks of war with China, reduce civil casualties in the North, and in the end increase the chances of a peaceful settlement. It depends on success in creating something like a Hadrian’s Wall close to the border. View Of Negotiations Let us look at the Administration’s view of negotiations, of bombing the North, and of pacification in the South. On negotiations, its current view is that, although innumerable mediators have tried’ to bring the North Vietnamese to a meeting, none has ever produced anywhere a man from Hanoi who is ready to talk. There are caustic references to the multitude of seekers after Nobel Peace Prizes—British, Canadian, Polish, Hungarian, Burmese, and others. The Americans claim to have responded to all, or almost all, the proposals. But they say that even those who alleged that they had received undertakings of a response from Hanoi have not been able to substantiate their suggestions. It may be that the full story has not yet been told on any of the exchanges since 1964. It may also be that the Americans’ record is, in truth, better than is generally known. But it seems evident that the most promising of all peace efforts in the last three years—President Johnson’s letter to President Ho in February, which coincided with Mr Kosygin’s visit to: London—was wantonly destroyed by the Americans themselves.

Has Hanoi ever responded? The Polish peace effort at the end of last year is quoted as an example. Mr Lewandowski, the Polish member 6f the International Control Commission, met Ambassador Lodge in Saigon at the beginning of December. As a result, a secret meeting of American and North Vietnamese representatives was to be arranged in Warsaw in mid-December. But on December 13-14, the Americans renewed their bombing raids near Hanoi. According to the Polish version, the North Vietnamese then declined to come to the meeting. Half The Story? According to the Americans, the Poles have told only half the story. When it was reported that the December 13-14 raids bad had this effect, Washington about December 20 let the Poles know privately that it would again refrain from bombing targets round Hanoi—and it did refrain for four months. It suggested that if the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front were serious about de-escala-tion, they could indicate this by stopping their attacks in a comparable area around Saigon. During the four months there was no response from the other side either in seeking a meeting or in stopping attacks round Saigon. On April 20 the United States resumed bombing of targets round Hanoi and Haiphong. It is true that throughout this period, apart from the Tet truce in mid-February, targets elsewhere in the North were being bombed. The only complete interruption was during the Tet truce. That was also the time of President Johnson’s letter to President Ho Chi Minh. The letter was handed over in Moscow on February 8, the first day of the truce. It was the culmination of four or five approaches to Hanoi that Washington had made during December and January. It was the first time that President Johnson personally had addressed a proposal to President Ho. A Good Offer It was a good offer: indeed, from an outsider’s view, the best that the Americans had ever made. It proposed either completely secret and unconditional talks, or secret talks, subject to conditions the conditions being, first, the cessation of bombing in the North as Hanoi had long demanded, and, second, an end to infiltration from the North or the augmentation of U.S. forces in the South. Hanoi says that the letter did not reach President Ho until February 10: Washington says that it must have reached Hanoi the day It was handed over in Moscow, February 8. Its contents had already been communicated to Mr Wilson in London and he at the same time told Mr Kosygin. The two men then sought to clarify what was meant by an end to infiltration; they also sought both an extension of the bombing pause (due to finish on the night of February 11-12) and some response from Hanoi.

They obtained a two-day extension of the pause, but that was all. A longer extension was refused and the bombing restarted on the night of February 13-14. On February 15 President Ho replied to President Johnson, rejecting talks unless the bombing stopped unconditionally. Time To Consider Why did the White House allow only three to five days for the North Vietnamese and National Liberation Front to make up their minds? Why was the bombing pause not extended? Because, on.- is told, Hanoi's decision was already known. How was it known? One cannot be told. Also, it is said, the reply to the Pope’s appeal showed that Hanoi would not respond: but the reply to the Pope was a public one which

extending security in the South. The move into the demilitarised zone, begun on May 19, is directed against the supplies and bases built there by the North Vietnamese. It is also designed to establish American and South Vietnamese forces on the south bank of the Ben Hai river. Somewhere south of the river a “physical obstacle” is likely to be created. Already a strip about 200 yards wide has been cleared of vegetation by bulldozers for six or seven miles near the coast. This will probably be widened and lengthened. Whether a real Hadrian's Wall will be added to it—or something like the barrier between East and West Germany—remains to be seen. When I was in Da Nang there was some interest in the idea but the extreme difficulty of the jungle-

had probably been determined before President Johnson’s letter was considered. Further, it is said, the offer of no bombing in return for no infiltration had been made in the earlier approaches in December and January, so Hanoi had plenty of time to consider It. Why then did the President himself write to Ho? In order to try every possible way of bringing the North Vietnamese to the conference table, even though President Johnson thought it had not more than a 5 per cent chance of success. But then one is bound to ask, coming full circle, why the President’s own culminating offer was not allowed enough time to mature. Hanoi has its hawks and doves, after all, and some of the NLF leaders were probably dispersed in Cambodia and the South. The conclusion is inescapable: the Americans themselves torpedoed their best effort to secure negotiations. Opportunities Let Slip From this tangled story, two points emerge. One Is that the North Vietnamese, had they been anxious to negotiate, were given opportunities from December onwards. Whatever their reasons—distrust of the Americans, the expectation that they may yet win the war, or division within their own ranks—they let these opportunities slip. The second point is that if ever another bombing pause is attempted it ought to be for far longer than in February. That the chance of success then was not much more than 5 per cent may be correct But the way to negotiations must be kept open- and sooner or later a bombing pause ought to be tried again. At present, no senior man in Washington favours another pause. The build-up of supplies during the Tet truce and North Vietnam’s preparation for its offensives south of the demilitarised zone are cited as additional reasons for not trying that approach again. Instead, it is argued that if and when Hanoi decides to seek peace (even if a temporary peace) it will simply scale down the fighting and encourage the National Liberation Front to renew contacts with the Saigon Government. There have been such contacts in the past—including a few recently—and from these the outlines of a settlement could be agreed secretly. By this method, the Ha’ oi Government would avoid openly committing itself to a settlement. It would be free to restart the war three or four years hence if the Americans had left. And it would have avoided any public appearance of a retreat. This, at any rate, is the argument one hears in Washington. Move Into The D.M.Z. The Americans meanwhile intend to use every available means of stopping infiltration from the North and of

covered mountains to the West was emphasised. In Washington interest is also evident—much more so than even a short time ago—and it seems clear that action is intended. One of the most senior people remarked that the project ought to have been considered more fully in the past. The cost will be high but not necessarily as high as maintaining a bombing programme in the North. Bombing Phase Ending One is told that if Infiltration can be cut down by this “physical obstacle," then the bombing of the North will be reduced. In any event, the current phase of striking targets in the Red river delta and around Hanoi and Haiphong is said to be almost finished. The destruction of power plants, steelworks and cement works is near its end: so is the current “harassment” of the MiG bases. But the pressure on the North Vietnamese to negotiate will be kept up. And. however mistakenly, the Americans believe that bombing helps. Senior people in Washington recognise the risk that China may be drawn in if the North Vietnamese State looks like collapsing. But they insist that that danger is not near. To an outsider, the American bombing strategy seems perilous. It depends on an exact measure of psychological and physical effects—something that cannot be measured exactly. It aims at making life so uncomfortable for the Hanoi Government that they will call off their support for the war in the south. But it has to stop short of so undermining the Hanoi Government that the Chinese feel they must come in to sustain it A Terrible Risk The latter risk can be exaggerated, but It is a terrible one for the Americans to take. If, therefore, the current phase of bombing industrial targets is truly near its end, and if infiltration can be cut by means other than bombing the North, that will be a welcome turn of events. The war in the South will go on. No end there is in sight. As mentioned in previous articles, however, the Americans seem gradually to be extending the secure areas —and, so far as one can tell, the heaviest fighting is no longer in populated districts. That, at least, means a lessening in the human cost of the war.

No comfort can be found in the prospect of months or years of fighting still to come: nor would there be greater comfort In an early American withdrawal, for it would only mean another round of fighting between the Viet Cong and their opponents through the delta and other populated areas in the South. The Vietnamese do not deserve that fate; and the Americans, rightly in my view, will not leave them to it

In thia article, Alastair Hetherington of the "Guardian,” Manchester, traces the steps which have brought United States Marines to the Ben Hal River.