UN. EMERGENCY FORCE Presence In Gaza Strip Dependent On Egypt

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31375, 22 May 1967, Page 3

UN. EMERGENCY FORCE Presence In Gaza Strip Dependent On Egypt

The withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from the Gaza strip and the area of Sharm El Sheikh is a severe blow to the .diminishing effectiveness of the world organisation. It is, equally, testimony to the instability of the Middle East and the inveterate rancour between Israel and the Arab States. No wonder U Thant has gone to Cairo.

The emergency force could stay only while Cairo agreed.

The force, originally of nearly 6000 men—and at the time of its withdrawal 3400—was set up after the Suez crisis in 1956.

The Assembly’s intervention in the crisis led to the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces from Egyptian territory and to the formation, under the skilful and sometimes rather obscure direction of Dag Hammarskjold, of U.N.E.F. I vividly recall the long night of the Assembly’s debate on Suez. I did not speak until about 2 a.m. Earlier, amid general uproar and excitement, an attempt had been made to move the closure and only after an indignant protest could I secure the right to be heard. After the vote against the

British, the French and the Israelis, Mr Lester Pearson, now Prime Minister of Canada, made his historical proposal for the creation of U.N.E.F., which would supervise the withdrawal of the intervening forces from the Canal Zone and the Sinai Peninsula. The force would then move to the Gaza strip and the area of Sharm El Sheikh. Mr Pearson did not take part, somewhat to my surprise, in the midnight debate. I knew the strength of his feelings because the Canadian Government was strongly, almost bitterly, opposed to the British and French landings. Peace Prize Mr Pearson spoke by way of explanation of vote—almost an off-handed way of introducing a great proposal. However it probably enabled him to avoid a lengthy repudiation of the British action which an intervention in the substantive debate might have imposed on him. Mr Pearson’s proposal of U.N.E.F. certainly earned him the Nobel Peace Prize. Yet his proposal was not new. A similar one had been made by Sir Carl Berendsen, of New Zealand, in 1947, when he suggested that Jerusalem should be neutralised and its neutrality maintained by a United Nations force. New Zealand offered to contribute to the force.

The present New Zealand High Commissioner in London (Sir Thomas Macdonald) who was then Minister of External Affairs, came to New York with instructions to offer a New Zealand contribution to U.N.E.F.

Wellington was optimistic if it ever hoped for acceptance of the offer because our siding with Britain and France put us into the black books of Hammarskjold and, needless to say, Colonel Nasser. It was only after great difficulty that I persuaded the Secretary-General to receive Mr Macdonald. Nasser’s Consent The offer went unheeded. After all, Colonel Nasser’s assent was needed to the composition of the force. Amid the general condemnation of Sir Anthony Eden for his part in the AngloFrench intervention it should be remembered, as I pointed out in my book, “United Nations—a Hope For a Divided World” that the great and beneficial result of the AngloFrench action was that the United Nations interposed its own police force, a step which Sir Anthony Eden had desired from the outset. He had declared that the United Kingdom was ready and willing to give way to the United Nations in Egypt as soon as the world organistion was ready and willing to undertake responsibility.

No Success Unhappily, the cessation of hostilities in 1956 was not accompanied by a solution of the problems of the Middle East. After Suez, the Americans said that they aimed at such a solution and would work for it. No success has attended their efforts. When the British withdrew on the insistence of the Americans, they were entitled to a massive and urgent effort by the United States to contribute materially to a solution of the problem. There is scant evidence that this attempt was made.,

U.N.E.F. has been no more than a restraint, although, up to now, an all-important one. In 1957, during the Eleventh Assembly, I affirmed the New Zealand Government’s hope that there would be no complacent assumption that Israel’s withdrawal from Egyptian territory and the creation of more stable conditions along the frontier would mark the end of the Assembly’s task. No Obligation I added: “The Assembly cannot, admittedly, impose a permanent solution. Any settlement which is to last must be freely accepted by the parties. It would be a fatal mistake, however, to deduce from this that the United Nations is obliged to stand back and do nothing merely because an acceptable solution does not seem in sight. “The dangers of a policy of drift have been amply demonstrated by the explosion of pent-up violence which occurred last October. Only a

negotiated settlement will prevent a second tragedy.” The dangers of a policy of drift in the Middle East at present appear only too evident. Opportunities year after year have been neglected, notably in 1958 during and after the LebaneseJordanian crises. In that year the New Zealand Government pointed to the influence which the policies of the permanent members of the Security Council must inevitably exert on the future of the Middle East. Accordingly, the New Zealand Government regretted that in 1958 it was not found possible to arrange a meeting of beads of government within the framework of the Security Council. 1958 Hope This proposal could well be revived today. In 1958 it had been our hope that a meeting at this level within the United Nations setting would have encouraged frank exchanges among smaller groups of the countries concerned.

It would have permitted the consideration of proposals designed to safeguard the Middle East against domestic turmoil and external threat. And it would, in particular, have enabled the top-level participants to explore agreement on restraint of arms to Middle Eastern countries, on frontier guarantees, and on some measure of neutralisation of the area.

Surely these considerations are equally valid today. Many of the public may be surprised over Egypt’s right to demand the withdrawal of U.N.E.F. This right has, unfortunately, been inherent in the nature of the force, was enunciated in 1958 by Hammarskjold and was fundamental to Nasser’s acceptance of U.N.E.F. Soviet View It must be remembered that in 1956 the Assembly, and the United States in particular, left the settlement governing the principles of the establishment of U.N.E.F. very much in Hammarskjold’s hands. The Soviet Union has never accepted the validity of the force and, with its satellites, has never found a penny toward its cost. I wrote these words in 1960 and I see no reason to depart from them today:

The force, the creation of the Assembly as a result of the uniting for peace procedures, is of an ad hoc and temporary character. The force entered Egypt only with the consent of the Egyptian Government and can stay in the Gaza strip and the area of Sharm El Sheikh only so long as the Egyptian Government agrees. But as the United Nations and the Egyptian Government have each agreed that they will be guided by good faith in the interpretation of the purposes of the force, a decision by the Egyptian Government to leave would require discussion with the United Nations. Mr Hammarskjold I its this in language which I find rather difficult to understand. He said that

“an exchange of views would be called for toward harmonising the positions.” Perhaps some obscurity is justified.) The components of the force are from member States other than the Great Powers and are principally Canadians, Indians, Swedes and Jugoslavs. The sole purpose of the force, after the British, French and Israeli forces withdrew, was to maintain quiet in the areas it entered and particularly to prevent the recur-

rence of incidents in the Gaza strip. In this it has succeeded. U.N.E.F. is not to be used, accordingly to Hammarskjold, to enforce any specific political solution or to influence the political balance decisive to such a solution. (But in my judgment it is very important to remember that ever since the force has been in the area of Sharm El Sheikh, the Egyptian Government has not attempted to reinstate its blockade of the Strait of Tiran and Israeli ships have sailed freely in, and from, the Port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba. This development is a significant political result of the presence of U.N.E.F.). The force can fire only in self-defence and can never take the initiative in the use of arms. It is much more than an observer corps but much less than an army having military objectives. The force helps to maintain order and has power to arrest infiltrators. Patience Needed U.N.E.F. has been one of the most beneficent institutions of the United Nations. That Nasser has the power to recall it may well be disastrous. Its temporary character arises because the Security Council has never succeeded in establishing a permanent United Nations force.

It is to be hoped that U Thant, Britain and the United States can establish moderation and patience in the Middle East and that U.N.E.F., through wise counsels, can return to the areas from which it has been most unhappily withdrawn.

■ This article is by Sir Leslie Munro, M.P., permanent New Zealand representative to the United Nations from 1952 to 1958, and president of the General Assembly in 1957-58.