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More Dangerous Phase In Vietnam War Predicted

(N.Z. Pre,, Association—Copyright)

NEW YORK, April 18.

If, as Washington believes, Moscow and Peking are putting aside their differences in order to assure a free flow of arms and materials to Hanoi, the Vietnam war may soon enter a new and dangerous escalation says Harrison Salisbury, of the “New York Times.”

Salisbury wrote: A warning that such an escalation could be expected was conveyed to the United States by Moscow through diplomatic quarters more than a month ago.

It was couched in conditional, but unmistakable, terms.

“We would like to see the war ended by diplomatic means,” a high Soviet diplomat said.

"But if, as it appears, the United States is going to step up its action on the land and in the air we will escalate our aid to North Vietnam step by step. “If the United States sends in more planes we will send in more missiles, more rockets, more MiGS. There should be no misunderstanding on this.” At the time the Soviet warning was delivered there was considerable doubt in Washington that Moscow could fulfill its promise. For months China had been interfering with the delivery of Soviet aid and arms to North Vietnam. Soviet shipments were refused transit on the China railroads or were delayed in transit In some instances, the Russians charged, the Chinese even removed Soviet missiles from railway trucks and converted them to their own uses. Critical Areas

In Hanoi early this year the North Vietnamese considered that there were three critical areas of the war—the air conflict over North Vietnam, the ground war in the South and the diplomatic struggle to keep essential supplies coming in from China and Russia.

Hanoi’s ability to carry on the struggle against the American air offensive and to aid and reinforce the South depended almost entirely on her success in maintaining the flow of supplies from her big allies.

This critical dependence had for months coloured almost every aspect of the Vietnamese war in Hanoi.

Indeed, fear that the supply route might be closed or pinched-off deliberately by China as a byproduct of China’s internal and external quarrels was considered to be a major factor in Hanoi’s emerging interest during the last northern autumn and winter in the exploration of diplomatic possibilities for ending the war—an interest which now seems at least temporarily to have been put aside. A mere listing of the supplies which Hanoi receives from Russia and China clearly shows the critical relationship of these shipments to the Vietnam war effort. Chinese Aid From China, she has been receiving foodstuffs, rails, and signal equipment needed to maintain the North Vietnamese railway and perhaps 20,000 maintenance - of - way workers to keep in working order.

China also provides small arms—rifles, machine guns, mortars, grenades, light antiaircraft guns and ammunition —and most of the small supply of consumer goods to be found on the Hanoi shelves.

The Soviet Union provides North Vietnam with her more sophisticated equipment—the 5.A.M.2 surface-to-air missiles which are the backbone of the North Vietnamese defence against the United States air attacks.

Moscow provides MiG2ls, the radar system which is essential to utilise the MiGs and S.A.M.’s trucks, petroleum products, gas oil, kerosene and aircraft fuel. Some petroleum is also provided by Rumania. How far-reaching the reported understanding between Moscow and Peking on shipments of supplies to Vietnam may prove to be is not yet clear. But if this should be confirmed it would substantially ease Hanoi’s ability not only to meet the stepped-up American action but to carry on the conduct of the war in general. One of the gravest problems the North Vietnamese have faced in recent months has been the uncertainty of

the delivery of critical supplies and the prospect that the whole supply route via China might be cut off at any moment. Less Vulnerable The Chinese rail line is regarded as a much safer and less vulnerable route so far as United States interference is concerned than the sea route to Haiphong. It would also not be affected by any United States escalation of the air war which might include the bombing of Haiphong or even Hanoi.

Both of these cities might be attacked by the United States, and indeed North Vietnam has been expecting such an attack since last July. The reported agreement also opens up the possibility that more sophisticated war

materials may be made available to Hanoi.

For example, the Soviet has a whole new advanced family of missiles which have a performance capability far beyond that of the S.A.M.2S. The Soviet is known to have been very reluctant to put these weapons into Vietnam when the Chinese might seize them or cut off the route for sending in supporting materials and supplies. Moscow may now release these and other advanced weapons to Vietnam. If, in fact, an agreement has been made between Moscow and Peking, Hanoi probably will find it possible to counter effectively the escalation of United States pressure, which has seemed inescapable. A new and more critical time of testing in Vietnam thus may be at hand.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19670420.2.221

Bibliographic details

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31349, 20 April 1967, Page 28

Word Count
852

More Dangerous Phase In Vietnam War Predicted Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31349, 20 April 1967, Page 28

More Dangerous Phase In Vietnam War Predicted Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31349, 20 April 1967, Page 28