ALLIES AGAIN HAS THE WESTERN ALLIANCE WON A NEW LEASE OF LIFE?

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31329, 28 March 1967, Page 12

ALLIES AGAIN HAS THE WESTERN ALLIANCE WON A NEW LEASE OF LIFE?

(By

MICHAEL GARDNER

of the "Economist")

The Western alliance may have achieved a new lease of life. After a long period of bickering which has almost done for N.A.T.0., the United States, Britain and West Germany at last look like reaching an agreement on the British and American troops stationed in central Europe.

This may not seem spectacular. Yet the decision that allied force levels in Germany shall now be defined by a study of the strategic needs in Europe, and not by the extent to which Germany meets the German currency costs of keeping the Anglo-American troops there, means far more than the opaque official jargon suggests.

Two different conceptions of “detente” have lately been competing in the West. One is that America and Russia should settle the peace and let objections from smaller Powers, especially Germany, go hang. The other, associated with President Kennedy in 1963, is that the “detente” will only stick if allies on both sides of the Elbe, east and west, can be persuaded to come along. Recently, the first conception has seemed to be uppermost. It has been implied, for instance, in the drafts of the treaty to stop countries like Germany, Japan, Italy, India, Sweden or Brazil from acquiring nuclear weapons. These drafts propose that these nations’ nuclear power programmes should be subject to international inspection—without the military nuclear powers, Russia, America and Britain, being subjected to the same controls. Germans Incensed The Anglo-American contention that allied troops should be withdrawn from Germany if Bonn fails to foot the Germany currency bill for maintaining them in Europe has been in the same category. This has incensed the Germans. Ei'.her the alliance needs the troops to be there, they say, in which case Germany should not pay the lion’s share of a general allied asset. Or else the Americans and the British think the troops are not needed, whatever the Germans say to the contrary. In both cases, German wishes are ignored by the Americans in their desire for agreements with Russia. Now, however, the decision of Washington and London that strategic instead of economic calculations should determine how many British and American troops stay in Germany marks a move towards the position that Western allies should stick together even in the “detente.” The signs of German nationalism reviving in the wake of French Gaullism have shown the dangers of sapping Western cohesion. They have underlined the basic dilemma of RussoAmerican relations. The super Powers are at one in wanting to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and of political conflicts around the world. But they remain rivals in Europe. The result is a step towards the old Kennedy idea that the best way to deal with the Rus-

sians is to take careful account of the real problems of other western countries—especially that vital piece in the middle of the board, Germany. This should be workable, since the Germans now accept the idea that their only hope of progress to reunification is through a “detente.” They are ready, for instance, to renounce having a hand in the control of nuclear weapons. What they rebel against is the unnecessary discrimination of accepting controls which do not apply to the military nuclear powers. They share this anxiety with other civilian nuclear powers like Japan and Italy. The N.A.T.O. agreement implies that more note will henceforth be taken of their wishes. The hint in this of a more collective Western approach to the “detente” may only be a flash in the pan. It may not be applied to other cases, like the treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. But other pointers suggest it may mean more than that; it may mark the unexpected survival of what used a few years ago to be called “interdependence.” Relevant Pointers The recent renewal by Western central banks (except the French) of support for sterling against flights of funds from London shows that, however diffidently, a Western monetary system is slowly evolving. The negotiators in the Kennedy round of talks to cut obstacles to world trade, now

reaching a climax in Geneva, are considering a world-wide agreement to fix grain prices and control production. If this went through, it would be a huge step towards international farm policies. If the military and civilian nuclear powers now arguing the toss finally hammer out an acceptable arrangement for inspecting fissile materials used in producing electricity, this too could be a precedent for growing international nuclear controls. A New Concept These efforts may fail. But the very fact that they are being fought over at the green tables of the world is quite new. Together, they suggest that international commitments may be relevant to the “detente” and are not just a left-over of the cold war when the industrial powers were organised in two camps. If so, the cold war could figure somewhat surprisingly in the history books as the preface to a new era of forced international co-operation in many fields. This is not what many statesmen have assumed in the last few years. They have thought that the “detente” meant the end of wideeyed international schemes and a return to the classical wisdom of the balance of power. But if they are wrong, so much the better. Pope said the last word about the balance of power over two centuries ago: Now, Europe balanced. neither side prevails. For nothing's left tn either of the scales.