OPPORTUNITIES IN THE AIR OVER SIBERIA TO THE FAR EAST FOR B.O.A.C.?

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31306, 28 February 1967, Page 16

OPPORTUNITIES IN THE AIR OVER SIBERIA TO THE FAR EAST FOR B.O.A.C.?

(By MICHAEL DONNE, air correspondent of the "Financial Times' ) (Reprinted from the "Financial Times" by arrangement) , . Bi itish Overseas Airways Corporation’s long-cherished dream of being able to fly to the Far East via Moscow and across Siberia may now be much nearer achievement as a result of the British-Soviet Prime Ministers communique of February 13

In agreeing that "it would be useful for the Ministers responsible to meet and discuss the expansion of the air services between the two countries, and the possibility of cooperation over international routes” the two Prime Ministers have moved closer towards what could become the biggest revolution yet in air communications to and from Britain, opening about one-sixth of the earth's surface to 8.0.A.C. Even before yesterday’s communique, there had been signs of a greater willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to open its air-space to foreign airlines. Pan American is starting a New YorkMoscow air link in May, following Air Canada’s MontrealMoscow link begun last November, while both Scandinavia and Japan recently signed significant new air pacts with the Soviet Union which gave them dramatic new opportunities. 3000 Miles Saved Several Western airlines, Including British European Airways, have services to Moscow and Aeroflot itself has expanded into the West and to the Middle East and Africa in recent years. But until now, 8.0.A.C. and other West European long-haul airlines have been denied one of their greatest wishes—the Siberian route to the Far East. It is estimated that by flying across the Soviet Union from London to Tokyo, British Overseas Airways Corporation could save over 3000 miles and about ten hours of total journey time, compared with the traditional route through the Middle East and India. Even the current shortest route to the Far East over the North Polar region (flown by such airlines as Air France, Japan Air Lines, Lufthansa, and Scandinavian Airlines System) take about 9000 miles and nearly 17 hours of flying (journey time is much longer, since it includes intermediate stops on the ground). This route involves a major “dog-leg” to Anchorage in Alaska and over the Aleutians and the North Pacific in order entirely to avoid flying over Soviet territory. By flying across Siberia, the “Great Circle” distance from Copenhagen to Tokyo is 5460 miles, with a flying time non-stop of about 10i hours. Sweden And Japan Before the Prime Ministers’ communique, the two developments that most encouraged hopes of a thaw in the hitherto total ban on Western airlines over Siberia were the

pacts with Scandinavia and Japan. The Scandinavian agreement gives the Scandinavian Airlines System the right to use international aircorridors across Siberia as soon as these have been set up for non-Soviet airlines (although not even a target date appears to have been 1 set for this yet). The pact also gives S.A.S. the right to overfly Soviet territory, with a ground stop in Moscow, Tiflis or Tashkent, on the way to Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Ceylon and points beyond, thereby ensuring a saving of several hours of flying. . Scandinavian Airlines Sys- i tern has also won a new ;

’ route between the Scandina- 1 1 vian capitals and Leningrad, i ' which is expected to be start- i ed this spring; reconfirmation ] of its existing rights to over- j ' fly Soviet territory on the < ' way via Warsaw to Rumania, . Turkey, Lebanon and the j 1 United Arab Republic; and | 1 reconfirmation of the Scandi- | navian-Moscow route. , But the Japanese agree- , 1 ment is the more immediately < ‘ significant. This sets up the first direct civil air service ’ between Moscow and Tokyo 1 ■ over Siberia. The Russians, , ; however, are playing ' the development cautiously. ! , Although the service between Tokyo and Moscow will be a joint one, the flights, start- 1 ' ing on April 17, will be by 1 Russian TU-114 turbo-prop i airliners, carrying the insig- ] nia of both airlines but with ' a cockpit crew of five Aero- ’ flot (Russian) staff and a 1 Japanese Air Lines “adviser.” 1 The cabin crew of 10 will 1 comprise a purser, steward and three stewardesses from 1 each airline. The aircraft will i carry 44 first-class and 72 1 economy-class passengers. I Secret Areas 1 i Under the agreement, i Japanese Air Lines will be t able to use its own aircraft 1 on the service within about two years, and only then will it become (unless Scandinavian Airlines System has got 1 there first) the first foreign 1 airline permitted to fly its 1 own aircraft over Siberia. ; Flights from April 17 will 1 initially be once-weekly in < each direction, with a flying i time of about 11 hours 50 I minutes from Tokyo to Mos- ' cow and 10 hours 50 minutes i in the other direction. These 1 times could be cut substanti- . ally if jets were used (as it seems likely eventually they i will be). Fares have been I fixed at £312 10s single and 1 £594 Us return for first-class i and £192 7s single and £365 i 8s return for economy-class, i There are many problems i which have to be overcome in i opening up Siberia for Wes- i tern airlines and aircraft. One : is the natural reluctance of 1 the Russians to allow large ’ numbers of foreign airliners c to fly over a territory which i has long been considered in s the West as one of the most 1 secret areas in the world, 1 both industrially and militar- 1 ily. <

There are probably many installations there that the Russians would not wish outsiders to see: the American U-2 flights over the territory East of the Urals, and current “overpasses” by American observation satellites, are indicative of the interest that the West has in the past taken, and is still taking, in this area. Thus, the Soviet Union must carefully delineate “corridors” across the territory that avoid areas it does not want covered. The Language Problem But, these considerations apart, there are other significant problems for Western airlines The language prob-

lem is one. Also, because Aeroflot (the Russian airline) is not yet a member of the International Air Transport Association, it does not necessarily subscribe to, and implement, the uniform Western international procedures for handling air traffic. Radio and radar facilities and techniques will probably need to be adapted either by the Soviet Union to meet Western standards or, more likely, by the West to meet Soviet requirements. In view of the many Aeroflot services in Siberia, however, there are probably more than enough airports available for emergency diversionary purposes, with radar and o’her aids. Consideration of all these matters is involved in establishing the new air “corridors” over Siberia, and this is why it will take so long for an airline to use its own aircraft, once an agreement is reached at political level. The function of the Japanese Air Lines “adviser” aboard the Moscow-Tokyo flights will be as much to learn about Soviet techniques as to advise the Soviet crew on procedures and techniques used in the West (J.A.L. is a member of the I.A.T.A. and thus subscribes to accepted Western procedures). Western Reciprocity Also, the Soviet Union probably feels a natural reluctance to allow foreign airlines to use its territory merely as a short cut. Few, if any, airlines operating out of Western Europe can have much intermediate traffic destined for such cities as Omsk, Tomsk and Novosibirsk, or even Vladivostok, and such traffic anyway can transfer to Aeroflot in Moscow. Thus, in order to gain the convenience of overflying the Soviet Union, Western airlines must have something significant to offer in return. Currently, few of them have, especially now that under the recent agreement Aeroflot can overfly Scandinavian territory on its way Westwards. Britain already offers London as a terminal for the Aeroflot service from Moscow, and can offer through-rights Westwards in return for a 8.0.A.C. service through Moscow to the Far East. Whether this will be enough, only the talks suggested in the communique can determine.