KY’S ROAD TO POWER HOW A SUPPRESSOR OF COUPS ROSE TO THE TOP IN SAIGON

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31275, 23 January 1967, Page 12

KY’S ROAD TO POWER HOW A SUPPRESSOR OF COUPS ROSE TO THE TOP IN SAIGON

(By a staff writer)

Flamboyant, outspoken, impulsive, swashbuckling, are not usually apt descriptions of Prime Ministers. All have been applied to Air Vice-Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, Prime Minister of South Vietnam. Still only 37, Kv has overcome many of the reservations held about him and in spite of 8 co ? fusion an l l nd ?. ed a PP re hension that some of his statements and actions have roused he has proved that he, if not the form of his governm S ° Uth Viet “” “ d ,he I, “ C “ SI, ' E

When Ky’s name appears in the “Who’s Who” directories, the entry will be along the following lines: KY, Nguyen Cao, Prime Minister of South Vietnam, June 19, 1965

Bom September 8, 1930, at Son Tay (near Hanoi); educated at Hue (South Vietnam) and Chu Van An High School Hanoi, until 1948; French Nam Dinh Reserve Officers’ School, 1949-52; Marrakesh Aviation School, ■ Morocco, 1953; Avord Aviation School, France, 1954; qualified as pilot, September 15, 1954; married French womanfour sons and one daughter; transport pilot French Air Force; commander of Tan Son Nhut air base, Saigon, 1955-56, after French withdrawal; training at United States Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Field, Alabama, 1956; learned colloquial English; operations director of South Vietnamese Air Force High Command, July, 1958; major and commander of 43rd Air Transport Group, January, 1959; flew night missions over North Vietnam dropping guerrillas and saboteurs; commander of Air Force from December, 1963, and continued flying attack missions against Viet Cong; joined gloup of young generals opposing coup against Government, September, 1964; supported MajorGeneral Khanh as Prime Minister, 1964; Minister of Youth and Sport, January 18 to February 16, 1965; led the first South Vietnamese Air Force raids over North Vietnam, February 8, 1965; Prime Minister, June, 1965. Married Dang Tuyet Mai, November 12, 1964—0ne daughter, Duyen. Recreation, cockfighting. Air Force Medal and Gold Wing; Air Force Honour Medal; Merit Medal, First Class; White Elephant Order, Second Class, Thailand. Address: Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Saigon; Office of the Prime Minister, Gia Long Palace, Saigon

How Long? Now that Ky and his junta have been in power for 19 months—longer than any South Vietnamese Government since that of President Diem—the question is how long be intends to hold the reins.

On January 15, 1966, Ky announced that he intended to

have a constitution drafted and, if it were approved by a national referendum in October, elections would be held for a civilian government in 1967. Plans for the return to civilian rule changed from month to month and in April, Ky promised elections within four months. In May he announced they would be held before September 11, 1966. Also last May, he said that the military would remain in control for at least another year. Elections for an assembly to draft a constitution were held on September 11. The result of its work has yet to receive the blessing of the military. Comment On Hitler

Eight months before he became Prime Minister, and soon after he had helped suppress a coup against the Government Ky made his now-famous comment on Hitler during a conversation with a British journalist. The' comment was quoted in the London “Sunday Mirror” in July, 1965. “People ask me who my heroes are,” Ky was quoted as saying. “1 have only one—Hitler. I admire Hitler because he pulled his country together when it was in a terrible state in the early thirties. But the situation here is so desperate that one man would not be enough. We need four or five Hitlers in Vietnam.” Aware of the outburst of protests this report caused, Ky issued an explanation: “When I referred to Hitler incidentally during one of my conversations with journalists I had in mind the idea that Vietnam needed, above all, leadership and a sense of discipline in order to face the criminal aggression of communism. The idea is far from me of praising Hitler or adopting his view, especially when here in Vietnam nobody j can forget the inhuman methods he used during the Second World War, methods! which the Communists are using right now on our land.” Record Of Events

Whatever reservations may be held about the means by which Ky came to power in Vietnam, the record of events, when matched against the loyalty he seems to command among his fellow generals, reveals a certain inevitability.

The intervention of military officers in South Vietnamese politics is by no means new. On November 11, 1960, a group of army officers, led by Colonel Nguyen Chanh Thi, failed in an attempted coup against President Diem who had ruled Vietnam since being appointed President by Emperor Bao Dai in July, 1954. The coup was crushed. At the time, Ky was a young pilot in the South Vietnam Air Force.

Many were arrested after the coup atttempt. Dr. Tran Van Do, the Foreign Minister in Diem’s first Cabinet (who accompanies Ky on his Australian and New Zealand visit as Minister of Foreign Affairs), was acquitted in July, 1963, of a charge that he supported the abortive coup of 1960. Dr. Tran is an uncle of Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister-in-law of President Diem who died in the November, 1963, coup against his regime. For many years. Dr. Tran deplored the efforts of the French to prevent and delay the creation of a “Nationalist” State in Vietnam and, at the Geneva talks in 1954, he ineffectually complained of the division of Vietnam. He was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Dr Phan Huy Quat in February. 1965, and has continued as Foreign Minister in the Ky Cabinet.

First Appearance Ky is not known to have had any important role in the overthrow of the Diem regime but, from November. 1963, the military, led first by Lieuten-ant-General Duong Van Minh and then by General Nguyen Khanh, and Tran Thien Khiem, increasingly intervened in South Vietnamese politics. Ky’s first public appearance in politics appears to have been in September, 1964. As commander of the Air Force he helped suppress a coup led by Major-General Duoc Van Due, commander of the 4th Army Corps (the Mekong delta region) against the Government of General Khanh. Ky later said that he restrained his pilots who wanted to attack the mutineers, but he warned the mutineers that his aircraft would attack if they moved against the Saigon air base. After negotiations between the mutineers and other gen-

erals, Ky announced that an understanding had been reached. The accused were all acquitted at their trial, during which General Duong said Ky had been informed of the plot and had promised support. In December, 1964, 30 generals, including Ky, formed the Armed Forces Council, with General Khanh as chairman. The council dissolved “? m >nated legislature (the High National Council), and accused it of hampering the reorganisation of the armed forces. The move dismayed the United States Ambassador (General Maxwell Tayior) who told Khanh that the United States regarded t “ s st sl e of affairs as untenable. Khanh replied with an Order of the Day in which he said: ‘We make sacrifices for the country’s independence and the Vietnamese people’s liberty, but not to carry out the policy of any foreign country. ...” The generals eventually reiterated an undertaking made four months earlier to return to military affairs; but in the Government reorganisation hat followed in January, 1965, four officers were put in the Cabinet. Ky became MinT S er ?! Youth and Sports. The others resigned their • military commands. Ky re- • ? sed . t 0 give U P command of • the Air Force. Elections Ordered Elections for a National . Congress were ordered for 1 Mare h 21. Buddhist groups s en ewed their agitation . against the Government and s “ February, Dr. Phan Huy ( Quat formed a new Cabinet i composed of military officers, j civilians, and representatives , of the major religions and , regions. The Armed Forces • Council simultaneously hinted I that the elections must be . postponed and said the miliI tary would return to its milit tary mission after a legisla- , tive body had been set up. . The council would act as an “intermediary” until a Government had been elected di- : rectly by the people of South Vietnam.

Within hours Ky’s arrest was ordered by a rebel colonel. Pham Ngoc Thao, who seized control of Saigon on February 19. Ky was at Bien Hoa air base and threatened to bomb Tan Son Nhut airport and the General Staff Headquarters in Saigon if the rebels did not yield. Fighter bombers flew over Saigon. General Westmoreland. United States commander in South Vietnam, appealed to ■Ky not to bomb the airport where 6500 American troops were stationed. The rebels gave way with little resistance the next morning. The Armed Forces Council met immediately. Apparently influenced by Ky’s chief rival for power, General Nguyen Chanh Thi (then commanding the Ist Army Corps in the Hue area), the council voted no confidence in General Khanh. This ended the power of the three generals— Khanh, Minh and Kiem—and left the “Young Turk” officers in control. They elected Ky as one of five to form a governing committee of the Armed Forces Council.

Some Buddhists were agitating for peace negotiations and a cease-fire. Dr. Quat replied that South Vietnam was fighting a war of self defence and he would not accept the idea of a truce to be exploited by the Viet Cong.

When four navy officers arrested Rear-Admiral Chung Tan Cong and a mutiny in the fleet at Saigon appeared likely on April 8, Ky once again ordered his fighters to (ly over the city. Political affairs in Saigon, with little enough influence through the rest of the country, were approaching their lowest ebb. Council Dissolved The Armed Forces Council dissolved itself on May 6 because of "the progress achieved by the Government.” and the need for officers to “devote themselves entirely to the conduct of the war.”

Within weeks a major crisis arose. Dr. Quat announced Cabinet changes. Two Ministers refused to resign. A constitutional deadlock prevailed. He asked the generals to mediate. President Phan Khac Suu. the Cabinet the National Legislative Council, and the generals met on June 11. It was decided that the President, the Cabinet and the Council should all resign and hand over power to the generals. Two days later Ky was chairman of a junta of three officers. General Taylor was reported to have once again opposed the plan. The rise of Ky to supreme office certainly alarmed the United States. The junta formed a “Committee for the Direction of the State” and Ky was nominated by his fellow generals to name a Cabinet which would be responsible to the Directory. Buddhist and Roman Catholic leaders objected. The United States objected and openly opposed a military commander as Prime Minister. Ky resigned his command, but the American Embassy in Saigon was more disturbed by the temperament of Ky and his lack of experience. Ky’s endurance was a slowlyunfolded surprise. ;