THE FRONT-LINERS ZAMBIA VIEWS EFFECTS OF MANDATORY SANCTIONS

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31237, 8 December 1966, Page 20

THE FRONT-LINERS ZAMBIA VIEWS EFFECTS OF MANDATORY SANCTIONS

(By

RICHARD HALL,

in th* “Guardian", Mancheittr)

(Reprinted by arrangement?

The decision to cross the mandatory sanctions watershed will, if taken with some show of resolution, give Mr Wilson a chance to get back on speaking terms with the Zambians. President Kenneth Kaunda would be prepared to forgive all (or nearly all) as long as Britain seems to mean business against the Smith regime.

Mandatory sanctions will undoubtedly have massive implications for Zambia. The wider the range the greater the implications. In Lusaka there is a readiness to face this—if the goals are clearly defined and if Whitehall understands that Zambia is in the front line. Already there are signs of combat fatigue. It explains the bitterness of recent remarks by Zambian Ministers. But the fatigue is less the result of economic bombardment than uncertainty as to whether the chairborne generals of Whitehall were planning to advance or retreat.

Profound Distrust This profound distrust of Mr Wilson accounts for President Kaunda’s avoidance of all things British during his present tour. He has met the President of Chile and Mr Lester Pearson; he is having a private audience with the Pope. But his itinerary dodged even a touch down in Britain. At the United Nations the Zambian leader would not talk to Lord Caradon. Ever since the shock of the first “talks about talks” in April, the Zambian front-liners have been sitting stubbornly in their trenches. Every time an emissary flew overhead to treat with the enemy, they cursed a little harder. This is not to say that Dr. Kaunda and his colleagues are completely reckless about the dangers of bringing down the Rhodesian rebels. They know Britain’s economic weakness and sympathise. Although they still call on Mr Wilson to fling a couple of divisions across the Zambezi, they know it is now a dream.

So mandatory sanctions are the next best thing in Zambia’s view—assuming they are effective. Dr. Kaunda will want them to be short, sharp, and ruthless—he has had enough of attrition. Sanctions must mean oil.

Standing eyeball to eyeball with lan Smith in his final defiance could be a horrid experience for Zambia. Anything might happen. Dr. Kaunda will expect Britain to give him maximum backing. There is great irritation in Zambia about the £14,500,000 in “aid” from Britain. Ministers point out that it is not aid at all, but assistance for losses through applying sanctions—and inadequate at that.

Heavy Losses They refer to Mrs Judith Hart’s statement in the Commons on November 8: “This is assistance for the intensification of sanctions." It is estimated that Zambia’s losses so far are at least £35 million—and probably far more —for fighting Britain’s battle.

Some of the effects on Zambia are hard to put a

price on. Race relations have definitely suffered because of the tensions built up since U.D.I. Precious administrative skills have been pulled off development projects to cope with importing problems. Copper exports without which Zambia would be one

of the poorest countries in black Africa instead of the richest—are badly hurt by the lack of coal for smelting and the physical problems of getting wirebars out. This is why Zambia insists that Mr Wilson must do it quickly or not at all. If he feels in his heart he cannot beat Smith, they would rather he said so now. This would almost certainly mean Zambia's leaving the Commonwealth and taking some other countries with her. But the brooding and nagging would be ended in one tumultuous bust-up.

Testing Introduction Zambia is only 25 months old. No new country has had such a nerve-racking introduction to international affairs, trapped in the Rhodesian problem. The Cabinet, trying to push progress at home, wanted straight and simple answers abroad. Dr. Kaunda started off with an unquestioning trust in Mr Wilson’s Administration. For him it seemed almost a portent that Labour should come back to power in Britain after long years in the wilder-

ness, in the very same fortnight that Zambia achieved independence. What is needed, if mandatory sanctions are on. is a plain and public statement from the British Premier to the Zambian President, urging that bygones be bygones while all interested parties co-ordinate their efforts. Such a statement would be the first step and the wording would need to be generous. After all, the Zambians feel Mr Wilson has plenty to apologise for; they say that their forecasts six months ago that he was wasting everyone’s time in trying to negotiate with the rebels have been proved now to the hilt. Britain must also accept that Zambia has already had tight petrol rationing for a year. With the rainy season approaching its peak and the Great North road—the lifeline to Tanzania—axle-deep in mud, Zambia's toughest moment is upon her.

Railway Links Mr lan Smith may well hit back at mandatory sanctions by cutting off completely the railway link with South Africa upon which Zambia greatly depends. A massive airlift to Zambia could be essential; fortunately the huge new airport at Lusaka is now ready for use. In London, Salisbury, and Lusaka there are no illusions: the crucial moment has come. In belatedly deciding that lan Smith is really his enemy, Mr Wilson has the chance to prove to Dr. Kaunda that he is still his friend. It is also the last chance. The repercussions upon Britain’s permanent relations, both political and economic, throughout all of the new Africa, will be of great importance.

Richard Hall, editor of the “Times of Zambia," assesses President Kaunda’s attitude to mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia.