Saigon’s ‘Other War’

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31235, 6 December 1966, Page 19

Saigon’s ‘Other War’

(N.Z.P.A.-Reuter—Copyright) WASHINGTON, Dec. 5. President Johnson’s determination to press ahead with “the other war” in Vietnam—the struggle to pacify the countryside will begin to pay off by the end of next year, in the view of the United States authorities. Officials predict that the pacification programme, to which South Vietnamese forces are to be largely assigned in future, should begin to show significant results in 12 months’ time and perhaps signify to the Com-

munists that Saigon, with American help, can win control of the rural areas. Under strategy now agreed upon, United States forces will be largely responsible for search-and-destroy operations against North Vietnamese and the larger Viet Cong units in South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese Army will concentrate on clear-and-hold tactics against the guerrillas. These tactics are judged to be essential in the effort to win over hamlets and villages and help the peasants advance politically, socially and economically. Washington believes that by mid-1967 South Vietnam should have a constitution and by the end of that year a representative Government under civilian control. The present emphasis on pacification grew out of the Honolulu conference last February between President

Johnson and the South Vietnamese leaders, and was given further emphasis by the Manila summit conference in October attended by President Johnson. Authorities in Washington say it will take time to accustom the South Vietnamese forces to a new role in which they will be primarily responsible for clearing areas of guerrillas and then holding on to them while political cadres come in and set up political links with provincial and, eventually the central authorities in Saigon. Their optimistic outlook is based in large part on the success of the tactics of General William Westmoreland, the United States commander, in his search-and-destroy operations this year. They predict further successes against the larger Communist units, thus keeping those forces from Interfering with the pacification programme and possibly freeing some United States troops to help in reconstruction plans. Recent official estimates have shown an increase in the numbers of men being infiltrated into the South from North Vietnam. One theory is that the Viet Cong’s manpower supply is drying up through casualties and defections and that, perhaps, North Vietnam is being forced to send more men to fill up holes in Viet Cong defences. Present defection rates were said to indicate that the strength of the Viet Cong might be starting to decline.