War With All Advantages

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31215, 12 November 1966, Page 12

War With All Advantages

(By

GENERAL MOSHE DAYAN,

former Commander-in-Chief of the Israeli Army)

QNE of the mistakes of General Giap, the leading Viet Gong commander, lies in his estimate of the feeling in the American Army. The American Army is not tired and is not getting tired of the fighting in Vietnam. Of course, there is fear in the heart o f every pilot who takes off on an attack and of every soldier who lands in the jungle. And, of course, everyone impatiently counts the days remaining before he can return to his home in the United States. But for the Americans this is a comparatively light war. It does not involve very strenuous prolonged physical effort.

Troops are flown everywhere by helicopter or plane and do relatively little moving on foot. The weather is much more agreeable than winter in Europe or Korea. Food, clothing and medical services are first class. The term of sei-vice is short—only one year—and during this period, they go on leave to places like Hong Kong, Bangkok and Honolulu.

They never had a war with such advantages: warplanes, artillery, armour, modern communications, aircraftcarriers, helicopter-cavalry, against an enemy that has none. Such advantages are not only of physical military value. They also have a psychological impact. They give the individual being flown in a helicopter the feeling of superiority over his enemy, bowed down by the weight on his back in the jungle.

Army Satisfied

It is possible that Washington, for political reasons, domestic or foreign, may decide to call a halt to the war before achieving total victory. But the pressure for this will not come from the army commanders. The American Army, as a whole, as a military body, gets satisfaction out of every day it spends in Vietnam. It trains its troops, tries out its equipment, tests its commanders, develops its weapons, builds its strength. Most of the commanders, officers and leading n.c.o.’s are regulars. They are professionals; and I have no doubt that these would volunteer for service in Vietnam even if they were not posted there. The American career soldier wants to become expert in his profession. And his profession is war.

The American generals know that theirs is the only country which possesses a serious expeditionary force: aircraft-carriers, air force helicopters, marines, airborne units. America is today the only country capable, without any special preparations, of despatching a strong military force equipped with nuclear or conventional weapons to anywhere in the world.

Part Of Careei

Russia can send missiles with nuclear warheads which can wreak havoc among her enemies; but she has built no carrier vessels and her army is not organised to intervene in distant parts of the globe. The American commanders see their forces as intended for global activity, and so the war in Vietnam is not strange to their thinking. It is bread and butter to them.

It is precisely for wars in such areas that the Sixth Fleet and the Seventh Fleet were built and the marines and the air cavalry and airborne forces were established. The men of these forces do not “get tired” of the war in Vietnam. They regard it is a natural part of their careers.

and they are prepared to continue it for a long time—years and years. But the Americans also know that to gain their purpose, it is not enough to defeat the army of Hanoi. They must also bring the Vietnamese civilian population to support the Government of Marshal Ky and convince them that an anti-Com-munist regime is preferable for them to a Viet Cong administration.

Alic aiiici icclll W<H 15 CUIII- - and the methods adopted in the struggle to secure it are also diverse. The military slogan is “Search and destroy” or “Search and kill,” while the civilian motto is “To win hearts and minds.” Of course the combined slogans—“To search and kill and to win hearts and minds” —may sound like a tasteless joke; but the truth is that this conflicting combination expresses the American approach to the war in Vietnam.

Winning Hearts

To win the “hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese is also of decisive military importance. The Viet Cong need the help or at least the passivity of the populace for it to conduct guerrilla warfare: and conversely, Government forces will be unable to overcome the guerrillas if they cannot rely on the support and co-operation of the public. General Johnson, the United States Army Chief of Staff, whose visit to Vietnam coincided with mine, invited me to dinner with a number of senior officers and in the course of our discussion stressed the special importance attaching to the character of the military activities here.

The purpose of the war, he said, was to bring about a situation and create conditions in which the constitutional Government could fulfil its functions governing and administering the country. “How do this? By defeating the enemy.” He emphasised the word “defeat” and not “destroy.” “We have no interest in destroying the Viet Cong troops, only in defeating them. We do not seek to annihilate the enemy, only to force his surrender.” I have no doubt that General Johnson is no fervent adherent of “search and destroy.” He is alive to the conflict between this and the “winning hearts” approach, and would wish to see the accent put on the latter. In another observation, too,

I detected his dissatisfaction with the nature of the current fighting. “We have not enough information. We act with ruthlessness, like a steamroller, bombing extensive areas and not selected targets based on detailed intelligence.”

Vietnamese Losses

Nor was he happy about the large number of United States troops here. “But there is no escape. It was essential for the full burden of the campaign to be borne by the American Army. The army of the Saigon Government was not capable of doing the job. Last year they had already suffered some 40,000 casualties. Relative to the size of the population, this number was equivalent to the United States figure of her killed in the Second World War—--430,000.” The “regional system” in Vietnam also has a decisive impact on the “character of the war” here. There are no clearly defined front lines in the Vietnam campaign. The regions which are under Government control comprise more than 50 per cent of the population. About 25 per cent are under Viet Cong control and the rest are “undefined.”

The attitude of the Saigon Government and the American toward the population of the Viet Cong-con-trolled and the undefined regions is that toward a hostile people. Villages in these regions are shelled with the aim of hitting Viet Cong units and their fields are sabotaged by bombing and chemical spraying to deny the rice to the enemy. Such “hostile populations” are not faced by questions of political philosophy, by ideology, by “hearts and minds.” What they face is a hard physical choice. If they do not wish to be regarded as enemies of the Government and become the targets of attack, they must evacuate their villages and abandon their property and move to the coastal zone which is under the control of Government forces.

Campaign Strategy

The problem worrying them is not whether they favour the Viet Cong regime. Their problem—and it concerns almost half the population of the country—is that “going over” to the Government side means literally that—the physical act of fleeing from their land and moving to refugee camps within Saigon Government control.

Moreover, the Southern forces are not hastening to change this geographic division of the country into friendly and hostile regions. The American Army conducts operations throughout the land; but when each is completed, they return to their bases. They do not wish to pin down their forces ana turn them into static occupation troops while the Vietnamese commanders claim that with their current limited army and budget they are unable to assume control of additional areas.

To see something of the civilian development projects being carried out by and with the help of the Americans, I visited a refugee settlement, where, among others, I spoke to a man who had decided to leave his village after learning that the Viet Cong were

recruiting youngsters of 15 and he feared they would He was not sorry he left. He was better off here. If he had remained in his village, his sons would have joined the Viet Cong and would never return. He, too, would have been killed. One bomb had already fallen in his backyard and his house was burned. Here he suffers no hunger. The Government provides rice. The two smaller children go to school and the older son and daughter work in the American Army camp. They borrowed money and bought bicycles. The distance to their place of work is not far, only two hours by cycle. Even if the war ends he will not go back to his village. It is better here. The children bring money as well as tins of food from the American kitchen.

Settling Refugees

When he worked for the Viet Cong he used to receive a daily ration of rice for two meals and one piastre in cash for tobacco. Here his children bring home every day 100 piastres. He is thinking perhaps of opening a store at the side of the highway used by the commuters who work in the city.

I asked him about the farm he had received here and why his children worked in the city and not with him on the land. He said he had received nothing. He was promised one kong (i acre) as a kitchengarden next to his house, and one mau (2j acres) near the stream for growing rice. But he was not given it. Next to his house he received only half a kong, and the rice field had not materialised. The land which they had wanted to give him was being claimed by the family of an army officer. Apart from the kitchen garden he had nothing, no pigs, no poultry, no bananas and no cattle. Besides the land, which he did not get, the Government gave a food allocation to each family for six months on the assumption that during this time they would find work and be able to support themselves, and also work tools and materials to build their house.

I asked my guide how much it cost to “settle” a refugee family, and he said about £l7 10s. (In Israel to set up a family in farming costs more than £500; in Venezuela and Persia more than £3000.)

American Rice

When we got up to go, my guide said to me: You see, they are happy here. And, indeed, I thing he is right. On the stove rice was cooking—rice flown in from the United States and given to them free. The children who returned from school were clean and they carried their text books with pride (books in Vietnamese printed in America). The older children work and bring home money. And the sound of artillery fire which can be heard here day and night is that of shells “going” and not “coming.” There is no doubt that they are much better off here than under the rule of the Viet Cong and the shelling by Government guns. But what the Americans call here “resettlement of refugees on the land” is not really the build-

ing of farm villages but the creation of slums around their army camps. I spent my last week in Vietnam in the south, in the Delta and in Loa Khe with Major General Depuy, commander of Ist Infantry Division.

General Depuy had been in Vietnam three years. His division had fought everywhere, from the north and south. He was the veteran among the American generals and the most experienced and knowledgeable about the problems of Vietnam.

Viet Cong’s Ability

He did not conceal his admiration for the fighting qualities of the Viet Cong troops. In a directive to his officers, he has said that the men who are fighting each other at present in Vietnam are the finest soldiers in the world, and that the superiority of the American soldier over his Viet Cong adversary Hes in fire power. In this, the Americans enjoy a huge advantage, which should be exploited. “When it comes to artillery,” he says, “consider yourselves millionaires" —no need to economise.

Nor does Depuy have any illusions about the attitude of the Vietnamese population toward the American Army. He put it this way: There is currently in Vietnam a race between two horses—the American war horse and the horse of resentment over the American presence. It is up to the Americans to ensure that the war horse gains victory over the Viet Cong before it is overtaken by the horse of resentment

The central question remains: What are the American chances of victory in the war in Vietnam within a reasonable period—say, one or two years?

It is the American assumption that bombing North Vietnam will force the Hanoi Government to negotiate. How will things develop if Hanoi, in spite of the bombing, refuses to end the fighting? In this event, it seems to me, the character of the war will have to change. If Hanoi decides to continue the campaign, she will need to make two basic changes, and the first is a change in her war aim. The Viet Cong has no chance of overcoming the American Army and flinging it into the sea. In fact, the only chance she has at present of bringing about the American departure from Vietnam is within the framework of a peace treaty—if, of course, the Americans stick to their declarations on this matter. The second is a change in the nature of the fighting. I do not believe that Hanoi can continue for very long to wage a regular war against the American forces.

Ideal For Guerillas A prolonged Viet Cong campaign against the United States Army can be maintained only through guerrilla and terrorist operations, a method of warfare which denies the Americans the military impact of their superiority in the air, in artillery, armour and other technological instruments. Vietnam is an ideal country for guerrilla warfare. I know no place where so many roads cross so many rivers and streams and which are therefore so easy to sabotage. And not only are there numerous targets for guerrillas, but the physical conditions are most favourable for them, with an abundance of natural places of concealment —the jungle, the thick foliage of the Delta, and the proximity of friendly countries, Laos and Cambodia. The tropical climate enables them to stay out in the open in winter and summer without requiring shelter. There is plenty of drinking water, plenty of wood for cooking, and they can draw fish from any stream without special effort.

If the Viet Cong abandons regular warfare and goes over to guerrilla operations, I do not think that the Americans will be able to subdue yiem. /At all events, the American reply to guerrilla warfare

cannot be technological; nor can it be increasing the number of their troops in Vietnam.

I do not believe that the Americans can bring pacification to Vietnam. The Americanisation of the war can. from the military point of view, succeed; but the Americanisation of the peace, of daily life, can serve the Viet Cong only with terrorist objectives and propagandist arguments against "American hegemony in Vietnam.” 1 am certain there are better chances of coping with Viet Cong guerrilla and terrorist operations when, for example, at the entrance to a village there are a couple of bedraggled local guards instead of a tough patrol of American marines or paratroops. The Viet Cong can more easily silence the two local Vietnamese guards; but that will then be the murder of two local youngsters, rousing the enmity of their families and friends, whereas engaging an American patrol may be considered a patriotic act by fighters for Vietnamese independence and the expulsion of the foreigners. The more the Viet Cong terror strikes at the life of the people of Vietnam, and not the American Army, the easier will it be to fight. If the Viet Cong mine roads and the victims are farmers bringing their produce to the towns this may not deter the Viet Cong, but it certainly will not increase support for them by the local inhabitants.

Only Solution

In the long run, the chances of defeating the Viet Cong and damming the spread of Communism depend on the provision of an alternative, a non-Communist, answer to the problems. But the problems need to be answered, not evaded or ignored. Moreover, the war itself creates problems. Hundreds of thousands of families are uprooted, and they wander in to the coastal zone and the big towns. Even without State care, most of the refugees manage somehow.

Thanks to the heavy flow of money to Vietnam, there are plenty of jobs, and in a short while the refugees are absorbed in the building trades, in workshops and in service occupations. The housing problem, too, is “solved” without great difficulty. In this tropical climate they can sleep under a ramshackle bit of roofing or even in the street.

There is no lack of land in Vietnam, no lack of water, and no lack of a market for agricultural produce, primarily rice. Since there is anyway resettlement of refugees, it can and should be carried out properly, granting every settler a suitable allocation of land—s to 7) acres for rice growing—and organising them within the framework of a co-operative to handle marketing and credits. “Farming” 300 square yards and paying 60 per cent interest on credits is not an alternative answer to Communism: it is a breeding ground for Communism.

The popularity which the Viet Cong once enjoyed originated not from their Communist ideology, but from their practical policies: expropriation of the estates of large land-owners and their distribution to the tenants: replacement of corrupt officials by honest administrators; championing the unity of North and South Vietnam. The Americans are fighting the Viet Cong with military implements, with technological devices. It is possible with such resources to kill, to destroy, at times also to subdue. This is of no mean importance: but it is decidedly not enough. Bombing and shelling alone will not seal the Ho Chi Minh trail for ever.