The Press THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1966. More Sanctions?

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31195, 20 October 1966, Page 16

The Press THURSDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1966. More Sanctions?

The terms of the British Government’s “ final offer ” to the rebel regime in Southern Rhodesia have not been announced: but as the Commonwealth Secretary (Mr Herbert Bowden) has said they are “ well within “ the principles laid down by Britain ” for a settlement of the dispute, it is unlikely that the offer will be accepted by the Smith regime. The British Government no doubt felt that the Smith regime must be given one more chance before Rhodesia’s case was taken to the United Nations. The Government can be expected to ask the United Nations to impose sanctions on Rhodesia, a move which will be strongly opposed by a section of the Conservative Party in Britain.

The charge will probably be made that, by taking the case to the United Nations, the British Government is passing its responsibility to others. The charge cannot be sustained. Indeed, if the mandatory United Nations sanctions topple the Smith regime, the full responsibility for restoring the political and economic conditions of Rhodesia will devolve on the colonial power, Britain. By inviting other members of the United Nations to impose mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia, Britain will be admitting only that the limited sanctions so far imposed have failed. They have failed mainly because another United Nations member, South Africa, has helped Rhodesia to circumvent them; and Britain alone cannot force South Africa to toe the British line.

For political and economic reasons, South Africa will oppose the imposition of United Nations sanctions on Rhodesia; and the possibility of South Africa’s withdrawal from the United Nations in protest against such sanctions cannot be ignored. The Security Council will need to provide for this possibility before it rises; unless the council is prepared to call down sanctions on South Africa also, its imposition of sanctions on Rhodesia would be no more effective than the limited sanctions hitherto imposed. Such an “ escalation ” of sanctions would give pause to many United Nations members—not least those African members which have been most clamorous for a return to constitutional rule in Rhodesia.

In the United States, too, there would be strong opposition to mandatory sanctions on trade with South Africa—opposition both from racialists and from business interests. Sanctions against South Africa could not succeed without American support, and, indeed, could not be imposed without America’s consent in the Security Council. It would be most embarrassing for the Democratic Party if the issue came before the Security Council before the midterm elections on November 8. This date was, no doubt, significant in the timing of Mr Wilson’s “final offer” (which allows Mr Smith one month, from October 13, to make up his mind). Mr Wilson also has a deadline to meet; his promise after the Prime Ministers’ conference of “ a settlement of this “ problem some time before the end of the year ” will not be forgotten by the more irascible of his Commonwealth colleagues.

Mr Wilson’s only hope of “ settling ” Rhodesia before the end of 1966 lies in a unanimous Security Council vote imposing mandatory sanctions, and South African agreement to this course. It is unlikely that both conditions will be satisfied; more likely that tough negotiations, involving mainly Britain, South Africa, and the United States, will drag on into at least the early months of 1967.