The Press SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1966 Will China Intervene?

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31167, 17 September 1966, Page 14

The Press SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 1966 Will China Intervene?

The sharpness of Hanoi’s denial of negotiations between its Premier, Mr Pham Van Dong, and the Soviet leaders on a settlement of the Vietnam war lends credence to reports of strong Chinese opposition to a negotiated settlement with the United States. Peking, it is reported, has applied considerable pressure on Hanoi to continue the war to the end, irrespective of the cost, and has also criticised North Vietnamese tactics. There are reports that China has hinted that it will move into North Vietnam to prevent “ a sell-out to “ imperialism ”. In Peking the Foreign Minister, Marshal Chen Yi, has asked a delegation of Japanese parliamentarians to correct an earlier statement attributed to him that China was not necessarily dismissing the possibility of talking about Vietnam to the United States. And in Warsaw, where Chinese and American diplomats have held 131 meetings in the last eight years, the Chinese Ambassador has broken the usual secrecy surrounding the talks by publicly charging that the United States and Russia, “ singing a duet, have spread deceptive propaganda “ in a vain attempt to create an impression of Sino- “ U.S. reconciliation ”.

Taken in conjunction with the current purges, the “ cultural revolution ”, the extraordinary activities of the Red Guards and the highly-charged atmosphere in Peking, these statements do little to reinforce the belief, strongly held in Washington, that China will not intervene in North Vietnam. There may, it is true, be no direct intervention. The “ guide lines ” have been laid down: the United States has said repeatedly that it has no intention of destroying the Hanoi regime or of forcing the people of North Vietnam to accept any other form of government. China’s policy, as laid down by the Communist Party chairman, Mr Liu Shao-chi, in July, is that an attack on North Vietnam would be regarded as an attack on China. But if the danger of direct confrontation is, fortunately, low the prospects of the war spreading into northern Thailand and Laos are much greater. There is an ominous similarity between present Thai guerrilla activities and those of the Viet Cong seven years ago. Thailand’s peasants are prosperous by Asian standards and the Communists could not hope to control the countryside as in South Vietnam; but because a high proportion of American air raids on North Vietnam originate in Thai bases, Thailand is a prime target for guerrilla activities. Since American bombing increased, thousands of North Vietnamese troops and construction workers have poured into Laos in a desperate attempt to keep open the roads and tracks that make up the supply trail linking North and South Vietnam. If China does plan to intervene and effectively block all attempts to settle the war, these are the danger points. Chinese irregulars and “volunteers” from its many minorities could rapidly involve the United States on two more fronts. The American difficulty is not so much to assess the chances of intervention, but to calculate the form it might take and the reaction to it. Russia clearly no longer has the power to influence or modify Chinese actions. But, paradoxically, the Soviet-Chinese dispute has imposed an effective control on Peking. China can no longer count on Soviet support if it enters the war, directly or indirectly. In addition, the Chinese Army, deprived of modem Soviet equipment since 1960, cannot be well equipped. One of the reasons for the dismissal of the Chinese chief of staff, Marshal Lo Jui-ching, is believed to have been his demand for greater co-operation with Russia so that his armed forces could receive more modern equipment A further brake on Chinese rashness may be applied by the United Nations. This year the prospects of China entering the United Nations are higher than ever before. Membership may not be available on the terms Peking has set in the past; but a seat alongside Formosa seems almost inevitable. If China wishes to take the seat long denied, it is unlikely to plunge into a war from which nothing can be gained and much lost.