The Press MONDAY, JULY 18, 1966. Trade And Diplomacy With China

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31114, 18 July 1966, Page 10

The Press MONDAY, JULY 18, 1966. Trade And Diplomacy With China

Mr W. W. Freer’s proposal in Parliament that a trade post should be established in China is reasonable, if, perhaps, premature. New Zealand exports to China are irregular; and the wool trade, which accounts for a substantial part of our exports, would not be influenced by the presence of a trade commissioner in Peking. In so large a market as China other possibilities for a more regular flow of exports should be revealed. Reciprocal trade might be less easy to arrange. New Zealand imports fabrics, foodstuffs, matting, vegetable oils, and a host of minor commodities from China. They cost about £1 million a year. China buys hides and skins, wool, and tallow from New Zealand. In the last trading year these were worth £1,590,000; the year before similar exports were valued at £2.8 million; and in 1962-63 they were worth £1.5 million. This is not massive trade and it has been uneven from year to year; but over the last decade it has increased substantially. China usually rates about fifteenth on the list of countries buying our produce.

The fact that New Zealand does not recognise China at government level has nothing to do with the modest proportions of our trade. When China has outgrown its suspicion of Western countries and has ended or modified what amounts to a selfimposed and determined isolation the gap in diplomacy will be filled. In the meantime, the extension of trade relations might help to bring the day of change closer. Even in the Communist world China’s attitudes remain rigid and often hostile. Diplomatic exchanges with China have proved to have very little meaning for those who have attempted them. With the exception of Russia, the United States has probably had more contact with the Chinese Government—through ambassadors in Warsaw and at international conferences—on more important matters than any of the countries which have formal diplomatic relationships with China. China’s obduracy in dealing with the West is deeply rooted and its origins go back long before Communist rule. The Western concept of a democratic society is, as Senator J. W. Fulbright said in Washington in May, “the very “ opposite of the Chinese ideal of disciplined “ co-operation Millions of Chinese may not agree with him, but they are not running China. Until a new generation of leaders takes over in Peking China’s attitude to the rest of the world and China’s sponsorship of irreversible revolution among its neighbours are unlikely to change. Antipathy towards the West has crystallised into antipathy for the United States, the country best able and most determined to contain Chinese ambitions and most dedicated to the protection of Asian countries from Chinese domination. Lesser Western countries hardly enter into the picture. They do not matter when only one “ enemy ” is required to maintain the tension needed to keep up the original revolutionary drive within China.

Though diplomatic relations have little purpose, trade relations are meaningful, even on a modest scale. Were it not for the war in Vietnam the United States might long ago have relaxed its embargo on trade with China. This year, many more countries than before—including, perhaps, New Zealand —may support China’s entry into the United Nations, though not at the expense of Nationalist Chinese representation. If China expects the rest of the world to recognise the de facto Government of the mainland the rest of the world can expect China to accept the de facto Government of Formosa. In fact, China cares little at present about the former and refuses to concede the latter. Sooner or later all pretences must fall away if the greatest source of world tension is to be removed. Most of all, this calls for a fundamental adjustment in Chinese attitudes, a growth of Chinese confidence in the intentions of other nations, and respect for other nations and their ideals. Russia’s partial adjustment, made slowly and painfully behind a barrier of satellite States, should not lead anyone to suppose that China’s adjustment will be similar or even as rapid. If China is denied the opportunity to dominate its neighbours it must come to terms with them. Even collectively and with Western support they do not pose a threat to China; yet it may be a generation or more before China accepts this. As foreign diplomacy seems to increase China’s mistrust, the rest of the world must wait for a change from within.